


THE GREAT GAME OF POLITICS

FRANK·R·KENT



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THE GREAT GAME
OF POLITICS

THE GREAT GAME OF POLITICS

An Effort to Present the Elementary Human Facts About Politics, Politicians, and Political Machines, Candidates and Their Ways, for the Benefit of the Average Citizen

BY
FRANK R. KENT

AUTHOR OF
"THE STORY OF MARYLAND POLITICS"



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PREFACE

SINCE this book was first written—in 1923—there have been two Presidential campaigns, each of which shed new light upon American politics. Some things that were not plain before have been made plain. Certain interesting facts about the voters of the country, male and female, more or less vaguely assumed in the past, have been definitely established. Significant and illuminating evidence of the forces by which the people are swayed in political campaigns has been given. These things do not in the slightest change the basic rules of the game. These remain the same and will always remain the same. Despite the amazing political developments of the past seven years, the book, as written in 1923, is affected in no essential detail. The story then told of the mechanics of politics and political organizations, from precinct executive to President, is still the story. The methods and manners of the machine personnel, the character and calibre of the candidates, the way in which issues are made and met, are all unchanged—will, so far as anyone can see, stay unchanged for a great many years. They are integral parts of the system and the system is solidly based. So informative, however, have been the campaigns since the first edition appeared, that unless their omission appear conspicuous, it seems necessary to rewrite a portion of the original book and to add to it several new chapters, dealing in a

general way with the more important revelations of recent years. This also affords opportunity to correct a few inaccuracies of the earlier volume and to eliminate a number of anecdotal illustrations that have lost their point with the passing of time. The book does not pretend to be a profound study of politics, or a detailed explanation of our system of government. It is written wholly with the idea of presenting the human facts about practical politics and the people who engage in it as a profession, so simply and clearly that they can be easily understood by the average man and woman.

One of the real troubles with the country is that a vast majority of voters are in a state of ignorance about politics. Their ideas about political organizations are of the haziest nature. They are full of misconceptions and misinformation. For example, the general belief about a political machine is that it is a sinister and somewhat secret association of men who run politics, live by graft, and are headed by bosses who come up from the slums and are exceedingly evil creatures. Of the real functions of the machine, of the kind of men who belong to it, what they do, how they do it, what they get out of it, the way political power is acquired, how and why it is held, there is an amazing lack of accurate understanding. Because of the inertia of the voters the country is really run by the political machines—and in confines of their own communities the bosses of these machines are our most influential set of citizens. Incomparably they have more power than any other group among us. These facts would seem to make it the sensible thing for the rest of us to gather as much information as possible about these machines and the people who operate them.

It is conceded that one reason so vast a proportion of the qualified voters regularly fail to vote is their lack of knowledge, and consequent lack of interest, of what politics is really about. Ballots are so big and elections so frequent in the great cities like New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston that average men and women find themselves bewildered by the confusion of campaigns and unable to inform themselves in a way to vote with intelligence and discrimination for any save the very highest offices, and not always for them. Consequently from one third to one half do not vote in the general elections even for President—and from two thirds to nine tenths fail to participate in the primaries, which means that the political machines regularly restrict our choice in the general election to their choice in the primaries.

The conferring of the ballot upon women has practically doubled the number of voters in the country. At the same time it has greatly added to the cost as well as the confusion of elections. This is, of course, not the fault of the women and is in no way an argument against equal suffrage. It does, however, render it more imperative that the voters of both sexes should clear their minds of their misconceptions about politics and politicians and acquire sound and accurate knowledge of political methods, if the grip of the political machines is not to be strengthened and the country left worse off than before. With many million more new voters, with elections more frequent than in any other country in the world, with politics and government growing more complicated all the time, it does seem that anything that increases the political knowledge of the average

citizen is particularly worth while at this time. More than anything else a clear view of what political organizations really are and the methods and character of the men who make them up is essential. Without this the ordinary man or woman has nothing upon which to base political knowledge and can acquire none that is sound.

✓ As already mentioned, in this book I have not tried to make a deep, scientific study of political machines. What I have tried to do is, starting with the smallest political unit, the precinct, and the smallest machine cog, the precinct executive, to paint the picture of the machine as it really is; to give the practical and human side of it, to show the good as well as the bad in it, to tell who the men are, how they work, what they get out of it, whence it comes and how much. What any straight story must show, of course, is that the power of political machines and political bosses is exactly equal to the tolerance of the people; that the extent of their domination and control is accurately measured by the indifference and ignorance of the voters; that it is the enormous number of non-voters that makes powerful political machines possible. No clear grasp of political organizations can be had without an understanding of the election machinery and the steps necessary to qualify as a voter. These things are elementary, but none the less there is a very large number of voters whose knowledge of them is vague and incomplete. Therefore I have described the sources of the vote and devoted the eleven chapters in the appendix to an explanation of how the different states regulate and restrict the suffrage, of the variations in registration requirements, the different forms of ballot and the methods of marking it.

It has also seemed worth while to tell, so far as I could, the real facts about candidates for elective office—the facts that are systematically and carefully hidden from the voters—to show how and why candidates, consciously and unconsciously, humbug the voters, and the manner and extent to which the newspapers aid in this humbuggery. I have tried to explain the “under cover” moves of the candidate from the time the bee stings him until he is elected, with the idea of showing the reasons for the overwhelming proportion of insincerity, buncombe, and fakery that characterizes almost every campaign and nearly all candidates, from those who run for President all the way down to those who aspire to be county clerk. In the latter chapters, the facts about political finance, the formation of newspaper political policies, and the way in which issues are made are presented. The purpose of the book is merely to disseminate political information and not to propose panaceas. I have no desire to preach a sermon or point a moral lesson. All I have tried to do is to tell a plain reporter’s story of the political game as I have seen it at close range in many different parts of the country in the last thirty years. The one real remedy for the evils of which complaint is so generally made—namely, regular, intelligent, and informed voting by all those qualified to vote—is so obvious as to make it unnecessary to dwell on it at length. If that fact is not plain in every chapter, then the book fails in its purpose.

F. R. K.

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PART I

THE PARTY MACHINE—FROM THE PRECINCT
EXECUTIVE TO THE BOSS—

CHAPTER I

THE PRECINCT EXECUTIVE AND HIS PRECINCT

NO CLEAR idea of a party organization can be had unless you start from the bottom.

To discuss Presidential politics without understanding precinct politics is an absurdity. It is like trying to solve a problem in trigonometry without having studied arithmetic.

The election precinct is the smallest political division. It contains an average of 600 voters. In each precinct the party organization has a precinct executive, or captain or committeeman. Just as the precinct is the smallest political division, so is the precinct executive the smallest unit in the party machine. While he is the smallest he is also, by long odds, the most vital. There are about 250,000 of him in the country. He is the bone and sinew of the machine. He is its foundation and the real source of its strength. If he does not function, the machine decays. If he quits, the machine dies.

He is the actual connecting link between the people and the organization, and he is the only connecting link—the only man in the machine who has any point of direct contact with the voters, who knows anything about them, who has any real influence with them. All that the boss has in the way of power comes from the precinct executives. All that the machine has in the

way of substance and solidity, he gives it. Without him there is no machine. He is the indispensable cog in the wheel.

The average voter will say, "But, who is the precinct executive in my precinct? I am a registered Democrat (or Republican). I have lived and voted in this precinct twenty years and I never knew there was such a thing as a precinct executive here. He never came to see me about either registering or voting, and he never sent anybody to see me."

That sort of thing can be truthfully said by a great many voters—in some precincts by more than half of them; in all precincts by some. It may be perfectly true that you do not know the precinct executive, but—and this is the important fact—he knows you. He not only knows you but he knows a good deal about you. He knows where you live, how old you are, whether you are married or single, what your job is, whether you go to church or not, what clubs you belong to, who are your friends, how you are registered, how you generally vote, and, particularly, whether you vote in the primaries or only in the general election. And he is pretty apt to know a whole lot more about you that would astonish you if you knew he knew it.

The reason he has all this information about you and you have none about him is that it is his business to have it. He is an active and professional politician, and he is in charge of a particular precinct. His standing in politics, his place in the organization, and, in most cases, his job at the City Hall or Courthouse, depend upon his ability to carry this precinct in the primaries for the machine candidates.

He can afford to lose the precinct in the general election. That will not hurt him much. It may not be his fault. He may be a Democrat in a Republican stronghold and the most he is expected to do is to make a good showing. But there is no excuse for him to lose in the primaries. He must deliver the goods there. If he cannot carry his precinct in the primaries he loses his position as precinct executive, he loses his political pull and, in all probability, his political place. All hope of promotion in the machine is gone from him.

Therefore, he studies his precinct, gets to know it like a book and can tell almost exactly what it will do in the primaries. As to the general election, he is less accurate and less concerned. He, of course, wants his party candidates to win. They all do that, because unless the party to which the machine belongs is in power, the supply of jobs is tremendously diminished, and the machine falls on a famine. It is important to elect, but it is not so important to the precinct executive as to keep control of his precinct in the primaries. That is where he lives.

The precinct executive keeps at his home a frequently revised list of every voter in his precinct. These lists he obtains from the Supervisors of Elections. He divides the 600 or so voters in his precinct into separate lists of those registered as Democrats, those registered as Republicans, and those who are unaffiliated with either party. If he is a Democrat, he pays little or no attention to the list of Republicans. If he is a Republican he concentrates on the Republican list. And he pays not a great deal to the list of unaffiliated. He knows they cannot vote in the primaries at all.

If he is a Democrat the thing to which he devotes his time and thought is that Democratic list. If it is an average precinct, fairly evenly divided, there will be about 250 Democrats on his list. The Republicans, the unaffiliated, Socialists and labour voters make up the balance of the precinct total. He gives to this Democratic list the most minute and careful analysis. Observation and experience have taught him that the bulk of the registered voters, qualified to vote in the primaries, do not do so. He knows that even in a hot contest, less than half of the registered Democrats will take part.

This curious reluctance of the voter to participate in the primaries simplifies the precinct executive's job very much. After he has gone through a few primaries in his precinct, he has a carefully compiled list of the Democratic voters who do not take the trouble to vote in the primaries and an equally careful list of those who do. This reduces the number of voters with whom he must reckon in the primaries to, say, 125.

That figure is high, but I give it so as to be on the safe side. The fact is that even in primary contests in which the public interest is presumably aroused, the number of qualified voters who take part is rarely over a third. In contests not of a spectacular nature and where the offices for which nominations are to be made are not big ones, the primary vote dwindles to ridiculous proportions—often not a tenth coming out. Not long ago in a Chicago primary contest less than one twelfth of the registered vote participated.

This, of course, plays directly into the hands of the machine. This is what makes it possible for the ma-

chine to limit our choice in the general election to its choice in the primaries. This is the reason machines are powerful and a sufficient explanation of why so many unfit men are in public office. It can all be summed up in the single statement: The voters will not take part in the primaries.

But to get back to those 125 Democratic or Republican primary-participating votes in the particular precinct. When the precinct executive has narrowed his list down to those who actually vote in his party primaries, his task is a simple one. What he has to do then is to manage one way or another to get himself in a position where he can always swing, in a primary fight, a majority of these. Sixty-five votes will do it safely in the bulk of the precincts in the county in any primary fight, and it is a pretty poor executive who is not worth that many, in a pinch.

CHAPTER II

WHY THE PRIMARIES ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE GENERAL ELECTION

RIGHT here is the place to explain exactly why the primaries are so much more vital than the general election to the precinct executive.

The same reasons that make this statement apply to the precinct executive, make it equally apply to the ward executive, the district leader, the boss, the machine as an entirety, and the country as a whole.

Unless these facts are clearly understood at the start, there can be no real grasp of machine power, methods, and control. No political knowledge is worth anything unless they are comprehended.

To think that the general election is more important than the primary election, as most voters do, is to magnify the wrong side of the political picture. It ought to be reversed, and instead of, as now, many more voters voting in the general election than in the primaries, the public interest should be concentrated on the primaries first, and the general election second. As things stand to-day, the popular tendency is to regard primaries as the particular concern of the politicians, and not of real interest to the average voter. The result is that often an absurdly small porportion of the qualified voters participate in the primaries.

There could not be a greater mistake. This lack of appreciation of what the primaries really mean, and the general neglect to participate in them, plays directly into the hands of the machine. It makes it ridiculously easy for the machine, through the precinct executives, to control the situation. It actually permits the machine to run the country.

The reasons this is true are simple enough. Primaries are really the key to politics. There is no way for party candidates to get on the general election ballot except through the primaries. Primaries are the exclusive gate through which all party candidates must pass. Control of that gate in any community means control of the political situation in that community. It makes no difference whether the candidates who pass through that gate are knocked down in the general election or not, the next set of candidates must pass through the primary gate just the same. It ought to be plain, then, that so long as the machine controls the primaries, it is in a position to limit the choice of the voters in the general election to its choice in the primaries. That is the real secret of its power, and, so long as it holds that power, it cannot be put out of business. Defeating its candidates in the general election not only does not break its grip, it often does not make even a dent in it. It can and does continue to function after a general election defeat just as it did before. The only place a machine can be beaten is in the primaries. So long as it can nominate its candidates, so long is it an unbeaten machine. This is a government by parties, and under our system parties are essential to government. In all the states the two big parties—

the Democratic and Republican—are recognized by law. These laws provide that these parties shall hold primaries, which are preliminary elections, participated in exclusively by party voters, for the purpose of nominating party candidates. The only way in which candidates may get on the ballot at the general election, other than through direct nomination in the primaries, or through nominations by conventions composed of delegates chosen in the primaries, is by petition signed by a designated number of voters. This gives a candidate a place on the ballot as an “outsider” and is rarely resorted to because of the extremely small chances of success of such candidate. Nothing short of a political tidal wave or revolution can carry an independent candidate to success. He may pull sufficient votes from one side or the other to bring about the defeat of one of the regular party nominees, but his own election is a thing so rare as to be almost negligible.

The fact that I wish to drive home now is that all over the country 99 per cent. of all candidates for all offices are nominated as a result of primaries. The obvious and inescapable deduction is that in 99 per cent. of all elections, the choice of the voters in the general election is limited to the choice of the voters in the primary elections. When the full significance of that statement sinks in, the tremendous importance of the primaries will be better appreciated. It ought to be clear that the man who votes in the general election and not in the primaries loses at least 50 per cent. of the value and effectiveness of his vote as compared to the man who votes in both. Before a candidate for any office

can be elected, except the rare independents who escape the primaries and go on the general ballot by petition, he must first be nominated. In 99 per cent. of the cases, nominations are made in the primaries. In 1 per cent. of them they are made by petition. In the face of these facts, it would appear distinctly in the interest of every voter to be a primary election voter. The truth is, however, that the one class that regularly votes in the primaries is the machine voters—and, of course, they control, and always will control, under these conditions.

It is not too much to say that the great bulk of the men holding municipal, state, and federal offices throughout the country to-day were elected or appointed to these offices because of the support of the party organizations or machines. They are exactly the same thing. There are in the United States more than 2,000,000 political jobholders of one kind or another. They range all the way from the President of the United States to the city street sweeper.

Nearly all of these are strictly organization men. Practically all of them vote strictly party tickets with unvarying regularity. Moreover, through family or other ties, every one of them is able to influence from two to ten votes besides his own. Some of them, of course, control a great many more. Five is the average. This means a powerful army. It is a lot of votes. They are divided between Republicans and Democrats, but the number is great enough to give each an exceedingly formidable force. They constitute the shock troops of the organization—the rank and file of the machines.

The potent thing politically about these machine men is that they vote. That is the real secret of machine power. They do not talk politics and then fail to register. Nor do they register and then fail to vote. Nor do they, when they vote, spoil their ballots. Every election day, regardless of wind or weather, "hell or high water," they march to the polls, cast their straight organization ballots, and they are counted. As voters they are 100 per cent. effective. Besides, they see that the voters they are supposed to influence or control likewise go to the polls. Voting is a business matter with them and they attend to it.

But the overwhelmingly big thing is that they are primary-election voters—not merely general-election voters. No clear comprehension of politics can possibly be had until these basic facts are grasped:

First, all candidates of the two great parties must first be nominated as a result of primaries. There is no other way for them to get on the ballot.

Second, it is more important to the machine to nominate its candidates than to elect them.

Third, that the primaries are the instrument that gives the organization its legal status, and that it is, therefore, the only instrument through which it can be destroyed.

Fourth, that in the general election, the two party machines compete in getting the vote to the polls, and thus largely nullify each other's effectiveness. In the primaries the machines have no organized competition. Hence they become enormously effective and, so long as the average voter fails to participate, are practically invincible.

Fifth, in nearly all states, Republicans are barred from voting in Democratic primaries and Democrats must keep out of Republican primaries, which means that each party machine in the primaries is free from conflict with the other party machine.

Sixth, not only are the nominations made in the primaries, but members of the state central committee, control of which is the key to the whole machine, are elected in the primaries.

This is not the place to go into a detailed account of primary election variations in the different states. Some data concerning exceptions to the general rules here laid down are given in the Appendix to this book, but in the main the statements made in this chapter apply to the country as a whole.

When these things are considered, it ought to be plain why the primaries are so vital to the machine, and why it is a matter of political life and death to the precinct executive to carry his precinct in the primaries. The machine can lose its candidate time after time in the general election without greatly diminishing its strength or losing the grip of its leaders. Of course, it is disheartening to the rank and file and it greatly lessens the number and quality of the political pies for distribution to the faithful. It could not be kept up too long without causing a revolt in the organization, but, I repeat, the machine cannot be smashed by defeating its candidate at the election.

But if it loses in the primaries, it is out of business. Any organization that cannot carry the primary election is a defunct organization. It either politically disappears or it makes peace and amalgamates with the

faction that defeated it. In rare cases it waits for the wind of public sentiment that blew it over to die down, picks up the pieces, and crawls back into the saddle. But no political machine or precinct executive could possibly survive two primary defeats.

Apart from the lack of competition, it must be evident that the reason the machine is so much more potent in the primaries is that the total number of voters is so much smaller. The smaller the vote the more dominant the machine. Only the voters of one party are permitted to vote in that party's primaries. All the members of any political machine are members of one party, and they all vote. Hence, in the primaries the machine polls its full strength, while the number of voters outside of the machine who can vote is very much cut down. It ought to be plain that every party voter outside of the machine who refrains from voting in the primaries adds to the strength of the precinct executive—which means the machine—by just that much.

It also ought to be plain that the man who poses as an independent in politics and declines to affiliate with either party, thus disqualifying himself as a primary voter, has greatly lessened his individual importance as a political factor as well as added to the strength of the machine.

He can be as independent as he pleases in the general election. He can refuse to vote for the party nominees if they do not suit him, but if he does not vote in the primaries, those who do are picking the men for whom he must vote, for or against, in the general election.

Boiled down, it comes to this: so long as the primaries are controlled by machines, the general-election voter, no matter how independent he may be, 99 per cent. of the time is limited in his choice to two machine selections. There is no getting away from that fact.

CHAPTER III

THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE MACHINE

It now seems natural to ask two questions:

First—By what means does a precinct executive control votes?

Second—How does he get to be a precinct executive?

To answer the second question first, the precinct executive is appointed by the ward executive, who is his immediate political superior.

The answer to the first question is more involved. Before answering it there ought to be an explanation of the way in which the election machinery comes into being, because that is part of the answer. The average voter on election day goes to the polling place and finds inside a set of officials, books in which his name is inscribed, a printed ballot, which he is given, and a lead pencil with which to mark it. It does not occur to one in a hundred to wonder how it happened that the polling place came to be located where it is, who selected the election officials, provided the books, and had the ballot printed. Those things all seem so natural to him—he has always taken them so much for granted that he never stops to think whence they came.

The plain fact is that these things are there because of

a curious partnership between the state and the party machine as represented by the precinct executive. The way of it is this: In every city and in every county there is a board of election supervisors or election controllers. These are not bi-partisan boards. They are, in most cases, appointed by the governor of the state and are composed of two Democrats and one Republican if the Democrats are in power or two Republicans and one Democrat if the Republicans are in power.

The method of selecting the members of these boards and their number varies in the different states, but in the majority the number on the boards is three and they are chosen in this way: One member must be selected by the governor from a list of names recommended by the Democratic state central committee and one from a list recommended by the Republican committee. The third member is appointed by the governor without restriction, except that the appointee invariably is a member of the majority party. Even in states where the law does not require the governor to appoint from the lists of the party committees he almost always does appoint men acceptable to the two party organizations.

These boards have complete control of all election arrangements in their respective cities and counties. The state pays the bills for everything—salaries of judges, clerks, rent, advertising, printing, etc., but the boards make the physical arrangements, for both primary and general elections as well as for registration.

They execute the election laws of the state.

Also, they are supposed to appoint the judges and clerks who serve in each precinct for election, primary,

and registration. I say they are supposed to appoint, because what they actually do is to ratify the recommendations of the ward executives. And the ward executives get the names from the precinct executives.

This has been a roundabout way of coming to the fact that the judges and clerks of election in every precinct are really selected by the precinct executive. Not only that, but it is the precinct executive who selects the location of the polling place. These are his unquestioned prerogatives. The boards of supervisors almost always unhesitatingly accept from the Democratic organization its recommendations for Democratic judges and clerks and from the Republican organization recommendations for the Republican judges and clerks.

It is an almost unvarying custom for the majority party thus to permit the minority party to have the same privilege in the selection of judges and clerks as itself. It is a sort of political courtesy extended by one machine to the other, it being thoroughly understood that when the other party comes into power and the majority becomes the minority similar courtesies will be extended it. The whole thing is based on reciprocity. It is, of course, always the privilege of the majority party's precinct executive to designate the location of the polling place.

These customs prevail all over the country. There are, of course, some variations, but there is scarcely a state where this general plan is not recognized and accepted without comment. As a matter of fact, while the extent to which the state becomes partner with the machine in the creation of the election machinery and

the conduct of the elections seems to have a somewhat sinister look on its face, it really is not sinister at all.

Suppose the board of supervisors in cities like New York, Chicago, or Baltimore should refuse the recommendations of the organizations for judges and clerks, where would they get them? It would be an almost impossible job. In Baltimore, for instance, there are about 600 precincts. Six officials are required for each precinct. That means the employment of 3,600 persons. Now, it might be possible to advertise and eventually get this number, but it is obvious it would be a tremendously laborious, tedious, and difficult process, as well as an expensive one. And even if they could be got that way they would be entirely untrained in the technical work required. Likewise, they would be unknown persons, without individual responsibility and with no one to vouch for them.

It is not generally known, because the power is not used, but the boards of supervisors in almost all the states have the same legal authority to compel service as judges of election that the courts have to compel jury service. But this is an emergency provision supposed to be used only to prevent the breaking down of the election system in some particular precinct because of lack of men. Some of the cities were nearly forced to use it during the war, but none did. It is plain that any reliance on this power to man the polls generally would cause a tremendous howl. Actually there is no other practical way of getting these judges and clerks except through the machines.

The system of depending upon the organizations for them has these merits:

First—It enables the boards to get the men needed without serious trouble.

Second—It provides experienced men who know what to do and how to do it.

Third—It gives the boards a definite person, known to them, whom they can hold responsible for the conduct of these officials.

Then, too, the custom of permitting the minority organization to name its half of the election officials is not only a courtesy of one machine to the other, but it is distinctly in the interests of fairness and honesty. For instance, if the Democratic organization selected not only the Democratic judges but the Republican judges as well there would inevitably be a suspicion, and, perhaps, a well-grounded one, of the honesty of the election. By letting the other party name its own judges and clerks both parties are placed on even terms in the matter of the count and the suspicion is largely obviated.

CHAPTER IV

HOW THE PRECINCT EXECUTIVE GETS HIS POWER

HAVING explained how and why the judges and clerks of election in each precinct are appointed upon the recommendation of the precinct executives, we can now answer directly the question as to how the precinct executive controls the sixty-five votes which give him safe control of the precinct in the primaries.

In the first place, he, himself, is worth at least five votes. There is his own vote. The other four come from his family. There is his wife, if he has one; his brothers or sisters or father or mother or son or daughter. There will be at least five upon whom he can depend, in season and out, and often more. There are precinct executives who can swing a purely family vote of fifty. Then he is careful to pick for the two judges and clerk of election, not only men who are his political friends and will vote with him but men who can control a family vote of at least five. Each of these men is paid by the state an average of \$12 a day for serving on election day and \$8 for each day of registration. The job is worth about \$64 a year to them.

They owe it to the precinct executive. They cannot get it again unless he says so. So they vote with him. That gives him twenty votes at the very lowest calculation. Then the location of the polling place is worth

on an average \$100 a year to the person from whom the Board of Election Supervisors rent. The state pays the bill, but the precinct executive picks the place. Again, he is careful to rent only from an appreciative person who can be relied upon to reciprocate with at least five sure votes in the primaries as well as the general election. Here, then, is a nucleus of twenty-five votes upon which he can absolutely count, solely as a result of his prerogatives as the agent through whom the board equips for the election in his precinct.

In every primary contest and every general election a certain amount of money is provided the precinct executive for expenses in "getting out the vote." This money comes to him from the ward executive, who gets it from the boss. How the boss gets it will be told later. The share of the precinct executive will range all the way from \$15 to \$100, depending upon how hot the contest is, how fat the campaign funds are, and the nature of his precinct. Some precincts require very little money. In some none at all can be used effectively, while others require a great deal.

What the precinct executives are supposed to do with this money is to use it in the employment of runners or messengers. What undoubtedly a very large number of them do is "salt down" just as much of it as they safely can and spend just as little as they can get by with. They generally regard this as an entirely legitimate perquisite. If they can "deliver the goods" in their precinct by spending only \$5, they are properly entitled to retain the rest, and they keep it. No one ever heard of a precinct executive returning any money once given him for election-day expenses.

They do, however, spend some of it as a matter of self-protection, and in order to make sure of control in the primaries and a good showing on election day. The average price paid the runners and messengers is \$5 a day. Two of these, worth five family votes each, added to the twenty-five already accounted for, gives the precinct executive a total of thirty-five upon which he can depend. He can, of course, run this up by employing more runners and spending more money.

He is still shy about thirty votes, enough to make him sure in the primaries. But he has not yet counted the office holders. There are in every precinct some of these, and they mostly hold their jobs because of the recommendation of the precinct executive. There are street cleaners or lamp lighters whom he has put to work through the ward executive who has the pull at the City Hall. There are members of the Police Department or firemen whom he helped put on the force. Or there may be clerks in departments at the Courthouse, or state employés belonging to his party. Or there may be aspirants for jobs of one sort or another who cannot get them without the precinct executive's backing.

There are very few precincts anywhere in which there are not at least ten persons living who are under party organization obligations of one sort or another for the offices they hold. In many precincts there are a good many more. But take seven as the average, and if each one of the seven is worth his five family votes—and it is extremely rare that he is not—then the precinct executive has got his total of sixty-five votes and a little more.

Now, of course, there are some precinct executives who are not on their jobs; who do not pretend to "line up" their people; who do not even control the judges and clerks in their precincts, and who are inactive and indifferent about whether the vote comes out or stays in. There are some precincts, too, in every city where not only no money at all can be spent, no runners or messengers used, but also where there are no office holders or persons who want office. Even a live and aggressive precinct executive would find it practically impossible to control even a handful of votes in these precincts. What he relies on in these precincts is the failure of the people to vote in the primaries and they generally do not disappoint him. All that he is expected to do for the organization under such circumstances is to do the best he can.

But precincts such as these are rare, and precinct executives who lie down on their jobs and take no interest are rare, too. The average precinct executive is a thoroughly practical and capable person, and the average precinct contains a certain number of voters who can be reached and controlled in one way or another. It is not far wrong to credit the precinct executive in any great city with sixty-five deliverable votes which he can swing in any direction and at any time he wants. Some of them have less than this number, but most of them have a good many more, and sixty-five is not far from the minimum. Multiply that by the number of precincts in any city and it is a pretty accurate estimate of the minimum machine strength when the machine is united, financed, and fighting.

In New York that means a total Tammany strength of between 350,000 and 400,000 votes. In Baltimore it means that the Democratic organization in any primary fight where it is reasonably united can poll close to 40,000. This seems pretty big out of a total Democratic registration of 125,000 but when there is no break in the lines it is not far from the truth. In a fight however, no machine is ever completely united. It never polls its full strength. There are always some disgruntled factors, certain ward and precinct leaders who get "off the reservation." The reasons this is so will be given later.

CHAPTER V

THE LOOSENESS OF MACHINE TIES

THAT estimate of sixty-five votes to a precinct as minimum machine strength must not be misunderstood.

That is the machine at high speed. That is the machine functioning under ideal conditions, with not a break in the line, with nobody "off the reservation," fully provided with funds and in fine fighting trim. Under those conditions the machine is worth fully sixty-five votes to a precinct throughout the city, and more. Sixty-five is the minimum. But those conditions do not occur frequently. They are, in fact, extremely rare. Were this not so there would be little hope of ever getting the better of a political organization, short of a revolution. Its invincibility would be practically established, and it would be all but impossible to get any one to fight it.

However, the very character of the machine itself makes absolute unity in a hot city-wide primary contest almost a theoretical thing. Political machines are not made up of harmoniously fitted, carefully adjusted, smoothly polished parts like an automobile engine. They are composed of hundreds of human units—thousands in cities like New York, Boston, Chicago, or Philadelphia—full of rough edges, human passions, strong selfish instincts and individual desires. Grudges,

grievances, and jealousies infest a machine just as fleas infest a dog.

The whole thing is most loosely held together and human cogs such as precinct executives, ward executives, and often others higher up in the organization scale are apt to fly the track at any time. The various parts of a political machine cohere not because of love or loyalty, but solely because the individual interests seem to be promoted by the organization interests. The moment it can be shown the individual in the organization that his particular interests, personal, political, or financial, lie in another direction, he leaves the organization like a shot.

No candidate with good sense, making a fight against a machine in the primaries, bases his hopes wholly on his appeal to the anti-machine or independent voters. He may do so publicly as loud as he pleases, but if he is politically wise, privately he devotes his real resources to the effort to split the machine. Not to do so would be silly. In the first place he knows the machine has every advantage in the fight against him. It has the judges and clerks, the precinct executives, the polling place, the officeholders, and the hangers-on. If all these are united against him his chances are concededly small.

In the second place he knows the great difficulties of getting the independent and anti-machine voters, upon whom he has a right to rely, to come to the polls. They talk bravely, but they vote seldom. Therefore, he goes after loose pieces of the machine, and if he has any strength and any resources and backing he can always pry some of them away. There are always

plenty of disgruntled precinct executives in a big city organization.

There is always, too, a minority faction, with a minority leader, waiting and watching eagerly for the chance to come into its own. There are always plenty of fellows in the machine who have become disgusted because they did not get the particular job they wanted or because a nomination to which they thought themselves entitled went to some one else. There are always a lot of sore spots and if the anti-machine candidate can locate them he can weaken the machine.

There are, so far as I know, but three ways of weaning machine support away. These are—by promises, by persuasion, by purchase. Unquestionably, the last is the most potent means and it certainly is true that the bulk of the men who bolt the machine in a primary fight do so because they have made a financial deal of one sort or another with the other side. In other words, they have been bought. This is a sordid fact, of course, but it may as well be looked in the face, and the truth is, it is not possible to get very far fighting a political machine with kid gloves.

I do not recall—and I have not found any one else who does—a single instance in which any candidate in a city-wide or state-wide primary fight has defeated an absolutely united machine. I do not say it is impossible to do it—because, of course, if all the voters not attached to the machine who are qualified to vote did go to the polls and vote, the machine would be completely swamped. All I do say is that I have not heard that it has been done yet. In every case there have been elements and factors in the machine which

have become detached and gone over to the anti-machine camp. This always happens in a real fight—sometimes with serious results to the machine and sometimes without. It is safe to say, then, that while the machine theoretically is worth even more than its sixty-five votes to a precinct, it does not poll that average anywhere in the country once in many fights. Usually it does not have to. Usually the primary vote is so slim that the machine can win in spite of the cogs that split off, even when it polls considerably less than the average of sixty-five to a precinct. Ninety-nine per cent. of the time the machines all over the country control the primaries with less than their full machine vote because of the lack of organized competition and the failure of the independent voter to participate in the primaries.

CHAPTER VI

HOW THE PRECINCT EXECUTIVE PLAYS THE GAME

BUT to get back to the precinct executive, it is well worth while to clear up certain other essential facts about him before going ahead. The principal unanswered questions are these:

What sort of person is he?

How does he play the game?

What does he get out of it?

Usually he holds a small political job, a subordinate clerkship in the City Hall or Courthouse, paying from \$1,000 to \$2,000 a year. Or sometimes he is a small jobholder under the Federal Government, in the Custom House or the Postoffice or the Internal Revenue Department or a bailiff under some judge. Sometimes he is a struggling young lawyer anxious to get into politics—to go to the Legislature or run some day for Congress—and sometimes he runs a small store or has a little job in one of the local public utilities companies—gas or street railway or telephone.

But, whatever he is, he is precinct executive because he believes politics is going to help him. Either he wants to hold his present job, and knows that is the way to do it, or he wants a better political position, or he aspires to be ward executive, or thinks political friends will help him in his business. Whatever he

wants, he calculates that having his precinct in his pocket is going to help him. It gives him something to deliver, something to trade with.

Then, too, irrespective of the selfish interest, the thing that gets him into the game is very often an instinctive love of politics. It is born in many men. It is in their blood. It is, after all, the great American game, and more people are actively interested in it than in baseball, football, horse racing or poker. And they are getting more numerous all the time.

There are in every city many thousands of men who love to talk politics, pull political wires, mix in political fights, join in political arguments, stand on the corner or in the ward club and exchange political views. These natural politicians permeate the great middle classes of the country. They are not so numerous in the districts where the wealthy live. They are rarely found in "society" or among the class that refers to itself as the "intelligentsia," but among the "plain people" they are numerous, virile, and active. They colour life in most of the wards of any great city—and those who become factors in a political organization form a respected and envied class.

The precinct executive is one of these. He likes the game. As to how he plays it, he chiefly devotes himself to doing small favours for small people—not big things, but little things; not for the powerful, but for the weak.

If a boy breaks a window with a stone and gets into trouble with the police, the precinct executive goes to the front for him. If his father has a mixup about his water-rent bill, the precinct executive helps him

straighten it out at the City Hall. If his mother gets a notice from the Health Department threatening her for leaving the garbage can on the pavement, the precinct executive smooths the thing out. If his big brother wants to get on the police force or in the fire department, the precinct executive shows him how to make his application and gets him his indorsements. If his uncle wants a job as street cleaner or watchman, or his aunt wants a place as charwoman, the precinct executive tries to get it for them.

Often he can do these things easily. Often, all he can do is to help a little, but it is his business to do it and he tries. Many of the little things he accomplishes himself, because he knows the ropes at the City Hall and the poor people he deals with do not. Many of them, however, he puts through with the help of the ward executive, his immediate political superior. If it is a case at the police station or the traffic court, he may not know the magistrate personally, but the ward executive does, and he helps. That's the ward executive's business.

Often the things they have to ask of the police magistrate are little things that he probably would do anyhow—let the boy off with a reprimand, fine the traffic-law violator \$5 instead of \$25, dismiss a harmless drunk with a warning. What the precinct executive, coöperating with the ward executive, does is to soften the hand of the law when it clutches his precinct people; unravel municipal red tape when they get tangled in it; help them out of trouble when he can.

All this is part of politics with him. It strengthens him in his precinct. It gives him votes when he needs

them. Many precinct executives pick out a good popular street corner in the precinct, and regularly go there at night for an hour—say between 8 and 9 o'clock. The people in his precinct know where to find him, and they come there with their troubles, or they hunt him up at his home. He makes enemies as well as friends. He has to turn people down. He disappoints others about jobs. He loses his temper with others, but he makes more friends than he does enemies, and the more friends he makes the surer his foothold in politics.

You do not find this sort of executive in the precincts populated by the rich or in the more exclusive suburbs, but you do find him in every precinct where live the great middle classes and particularly in the poorer districts. In every city there are perhaps one tenth of the precincts in which he does not and cannot function in this way, but there are nine tenths in which he does.

The precinct executive does not come into contact with the boss of the machine. The boss never sees him. In none of the great cities does the boss even know who the precinct executives are either by name or sight. He does not have to. He knows the ward executives but not the precinct executives. The precinct executives deal exclusively with the ward executives. They get their places through the ward executives and they get their own money and political support and jobs and help for their own people through the ward executives. At no time and under none save extraordinary conditions can or does the precinct executive ever try to go over the head of his ward executive. He

would not get anywhere if he did. It would be a species of treachery which would meet with swift punishment, unless some rival ward machine should overthrow the ward executive and bring about a new deal.

CHAPTER VII

THE WARD EXECUTIVE

A WARD executive is a promoted precinct executive who has fought his way up.

Just as the precinct executives form the broad base upon which the whole machine rests, the ward executives constitute a compact ring of field commanders. They are the active and powerful lieutenants of the boss. But they are not the creatures of the boss. That seems a contradiction in terms, but it is the only way to describe the situation. They go along with the boss, take his orders, run his machine and hang tightly together, because that is the way the game is played, that is the way to get the most out of it, and because it is essential to them to have a leader and because there is no nourishment in playing a lone hand in politics.

Breaking with the boss is a bad business. It would not dethrone them from ward leadership, but, unless there is a rival boss to jump to, the boss could cut their line of communication, shut off the source of supplies, put them outside the breastworks and, perhaps, scratch them from the public payroll. On the other hand, the boss always has an uneasy seat and knows that when ward executives begin to get "off the reservation" he is slipping. Only on rare occasions does he "strong arm" a ward executive. Usually he nurses him along.

Nobody gives the ward executive his position of ward leadership. He wins it. Officially, he is, in some cities, elected by the party voters of his ward in the primaries, and in others—Baltimore, for instance—he is named by the state central committee, of which the boss has control. Actually he is elected or appointed because he is the strongest man in his party in the ward. It is obvious that if the strongest man is ignored and a weaker one appointed, he cannot last. The strong man just sits tight and beats the other fellow in the next primary. And then he has got to be recognized. The machine cannot run a ward with an executive who cannot carry it. The fact is that every ward executive, just as in the case of every precinct executive, holds his position because he has the strength to hold it and for no other reason. No one can give him his job. He has got to get it himself, and he can hold it just so long as he has the strength to hold it and no longer.

Political machines do not believe in civil service reform in city or state governments, but they themselves are founded, built, and run on the merit system. Efficiency is the test from top to bottom. The executives never reach 100 per cent. efficiency. Most of them do not average 50 per cent., but the sure thing is that when a rival in precinct, ward, or district develops and grades higher in efficiency, they give way.

Most precinct executives are content to be precinct executives indefinitely, but the fighters among them are not. The abler, more aggressive, livelier types want promotion. They know that nearly every city boss in the country started in a precinct. "Charlie" Murphy, of Tammany Hall, did. Croker did. George B. Cox, of

Cincinnati, did. "Old Man" Rasin, "Billy" Stone, John J. Mahon and "Frank" Kelly, in Baltimore, did; and the late "Jimmie" Trahey of Norfolk, did. But the immediate goal of the precinct executive is to be executive of the ward. That is the next step. The way to that is by acquiring strength—which means friends—in other precincts besides his own, by making alliances with other and less ambitious and capable precinct executives and by waiting for the opportunity to grab the ward executiveship when the time comes.

Now, the ward executive is an important political personage. He has real power. The average ward embraces from fourteen to thirty precincts and includes from 8,400 to 18,000 voters. It covers a considerable area. It has a greater population than many counties. In this territory, so far as his party organization is concerned, he is a little king. What he says goes. He selects and appoints the precinct executives, and he is just as careful to pick men who can carry these precincts as the boss is to pick ward executives who can carry their wards.

The foundation has got to be solid or the whole structure tumbles down, and the precinct executive is the foundation. The precinct executive never sees the boss and keeps away from the City Hall except in his capacity of a municipal jobholder. The ward executive, however, not only reports to the boss directly and sees him nearly every day but he goes to the City Hall himself, deals with the department heads, competes with other ward executives for jobs; can get, on occasion, to the governor and the mayor if they belong to his party and is recognized as a political factor. He takes

care not to get his lines crossed with those of the boss, does not "butt in" when it would "gum up" the game, and lets the boss arbitrate when there is trouble—but he cruises around politically with considerable independence, and always with an eye out for the interests of himself and his ward. They are the same thing.

Take an average ward of eighteen precincts—if, as has been shown, each precinct executive is worth a minimum of sixty-five primary votes, the executive of the ward, whose men they are, is automatically worth approximately 1,100 votes. This does not allow for his personal strength, which is a good deal more than that of any two precinct executives—otherwise he could not have risen to ward leadership. The average ward executive is worth personally and irrespective of his precinct executives' strength an average of 200 votes through his family connections, his political pull and prestige, and the number of persons for whom he has done favours. This places back of the ward executive practically 1,300 party votes. It is enough to make him a very real and respected political factor.

There are, of course, a good many ward executives who are not worth anything like that much. Some of them are located in wards where there is an exceedingly small controllable vote, where the chances of placing people under political obligations are reduced to a minimum, and where the tendency of the voters and the sentiment of the ward are strongly against machine candidates and machine leaders.

In such wards, while the number of votes controlled by the precinct and ward executives is greatly decreased, their proportionate control is preserved be-

cause of the well-known fact that the ratio of independent voters who fail to register, or who, when registered, fail to vote in the primaries, is so much greater than any other class. The machine vote always registers and always votes. And even in the wards exclusively populated by the rich there are always votes the machine can get in a primary—chauffeurs, maids, watchmen, and workmen, who belong to the ward clubs and follow the executives. I know of one big office building in Baltimore where every one of the thirty charwomen, the eight elevator girls, the night watchmen and the superintendent were all put in their jobs by "Frank" Kelly, on recommendation from ward executives, to whom they were recommended by precinct executives. In New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and other cities, many jobs of this sort are filled with machine people. And the street-railway company, the telephone company and gas company in every city are honeycombed with machine men put in the smaller places by ward and district leaders.

It is natural to ask here whether, if it is true that the machine, through the precinct and ward executives, can control an average of 1,300 party votes in a ward, which in a primary is approximately one fourth of all the voters entitled to vote and approximately three fourths of those who do vote—it is natural to ask whether it is possible to beat an organization in the primaries.

The answer to this was given in a preceding chapter, but to make it thoroughly clear it is worth repeating.

Under ideal conditions, an effective, well-led organization, when absolutely united and financed, is practi-

cally unbeatable in a primary fight. It not only has its own fundamental strength, which has been analyzed, but there are always a number of voters, uncontrolled by machine men, who support machine candidates for one reason or another—either they like the organization candidate or they dislike the other fellow or his crowd, or they want to go with the tide, or they are not particularly interested, or they have a prejudice of some sort that swings them in line.

And then, of course, there is the basic fact that so many of the people hostile to the machine are either unregistered or register and do not vote.

All of this makes it seem hopeless to fight the machine in the primaries. It is hopeless if the machine is united—but it almost never is. The fact that it is made up of human beings and not steel parts prevents it from functioning with 100-per-cent. efficiency or ever polling its full strength. It is always possible to pull enough parts of it away to beat it. A popular candidate, plenty of money, newspaper support, experienced management, and an aroused people can do it, although this combination is almost as rare as a thoroughly united machine.

There is no use blinking the fact that the advantage of the machine is a heavy one, and yet it can often be overcome if the split can be manœuvred. Its real protection, the fundamental thing that gives it power, is not so much the pro-machine voter as the anti-machine non-voter. Look at these figures in the 1922 primaries in the typical city of Baltimore. On the Democratic side, out of 105,670 qualified and registered Democrats only 39,265 voted. Of this number the

machine candidate, Bruce, got 19,402. Norris, a former machine man who had split the machine badly in East Baltimore, where it is strongest, got 17,147. A little more money and newspaper support would have enabled Norris to beat the machine in spite of the fact that its candidate was not a machine man and strongly appealed to the independent Democrats. Look at the Republican figures—out of 72,745 registered Republicans only 25,574 voted and the anti-machine candidate—John W. Garrett, an unusually high-type man—got only 8,595.

There were in Baltimore at the last primaries 66,405 registered Democrats who did not vote, 47,171 registered Republicans who did not vote, and 16,253 registered voters who did not affiliate with their party and who could not vote—a grand total of 129,829 out of 194,669 registered voters who did not vote in the primaries. And that is better than the average primary. Even in the general election 42,215 did not vote. Is it any wonder the machines run our politics and choose our candidates for us? These Baltimore figures are entirely typical of the average primary vote throughout the country.

It has already been explained that the defeat of candidates in the general election does not seriously damage the machine or weaken the grip of its leaders. The primaries is the place to do these things. Either a straight-out defeat by the opposition party in the general election or the rarely successful independent movement are mere incidents in the career of the machine—very unpleasant but not at all fatal doses. But a primary defeat—that is different; that shakes the machine

to pieces and makes the boss groggy. Inability to nominate party candidates, from the machine standpoint, is vastly worse than inability to elect them. It may be set down as a basic fact that no machine can be put out of business in the general election, so long as it is supreme in the party primaries.

CHAPTER VIII

PERQUISITES, PRIVILEGES, AND REWARDS OF THE WARD EXECUTIVE

THE political rewards, perquisites, and privileges of the ward executive are very much greater than those of the precinct executive.

In the first place he holds a much better political office than the precinct man. He is sometimes a police magistrate, or the head of a department at the City Hall, or a deputy court clerk, or a member of the city council or board of aldermen, or a member of the board of election supervisors, or its chief clerk, or a state official of some sort, or he is the paid secretary of some state board. Eight out of ten of them are on the public payroll in some capacity at a salary that will range from \$2,000 up to \$7,000 or \$8,000. Occasionally the ward executive is in the contracting business or the bonding business, or sells supplies of some sort, and his political pull with the boss and at the City Hall is a big help financially to him. Sometimes he is a lawyer who uses politics to build up a criminal practice and who is always in the police or traffic or municipal courts.

Then, too, he gets a better slice of the campaign funds than the precinct man. Before every primary and every general election day there is a distribution of

money for election expenses. Where this money comes from will be told later. It is an interesting story. It usually is given out the Saturday before the election. The ward executive gets his from the boss. When the time comes he goes to the boss and is handed the money for his ward. Always it is in cash and usually in \$1 or \$2 bills.

The amount varies. In some wards, where money can be used effectively, it is very much larger than in others. The boss knows how to grade them and does it. In an average primary- or general-election contest in which there is an average amount of money the average ward executive will get from the boss about \$500. In some wards this will be cut to \$200 or \$300. In others it will run all the way up to \$1,000.

What the ward executive does with this money is his own business. He is expected to carry his ward in the primaries, and he is expected to measure up to a certain standard in the general election. In the general election it is a matter of percentage. The boss knows exactly what each ward, under normal conditions, ought to do in both primary and general election. It is his business to know. If the ward executive falls much below the percentage of the vote he is expected to deliver, the boss wants to know why. Something has gone wrong. Either he did not spend the money he was given, or he has lost his grip on the ward, or he "laid down" or "sold out." When his ward slumps he has to have an airtight alibi or he is likely to be "thrown out in the cold." The boss cannot hold on to a ward executive who does not "deliver the goods."

If, however, the ward executive does better in his ward than the percentage expected, he increases in prestige and power and places himself in line for greater political preference. If he can do this, or if he merely measures up to the standard set, nobody asks what he did with the money. Of course, he has to distribute a certain amount to the precinct executives. Otherwise there would be a tremendous howl from them and his little machine would blow up. He gives them enough to satisfy their needs and carry their precincts. The rest is his. Sometimes he can "salt down" a fairly good part of the whole, but there are occasions, when he is fighting for his political life, when he not only spends all he is given, but money of his own besides. But this happens infrequently.

On election day he is all over the ward, helping out the weaker precinct executives, seeing that the stronger ones are on the job, watching out for disloyalty among the workers, checking up to see that the officeholders all come out and vote, ready to throw himself into a tangle to straighten it out. Sometimes he has to send a hurry call to the boss for help—more money or personal influence with a bunch of voters he cannot reach. Ordinarily the ward executives—and the precinct executives—try not to strain their friends in the wards. If there is no primary fight, or if it is one easily handled, the executive is content to muster his purely machine votes, and not bother the voters whom he has to persuade and cannot order. There is no sense in going to unnecessary trouble. But when the fight is a real one every wire is pulled and no resource left untouched to get his vote to the polls. Rainy weather on a pri-

mary day is always a help. Still fewer of the anti-machine voters will come out in bad weather.

It cannot be too clearly understood that the machine in the primaries is infinitely more powerful than in the general election. In the primaries it has the great advantage that any organization, trained and equipped, has over the forces that are untrained, unequipped, and unorganized. It is the same advantage a regiment of soldiers, armed with machine guns, has over a mob. If the mob is big enough and mad enough, it may overwhelm the soldiers, but it is not often done. The mob to be effective must have leadership, arms, ammunition, and discipline.

But in the general election it is very different. Then two machines are arrayed against each other. Two trained and organized forces clash and fight. Each works to get its own voters out, and each is equipped with money, runners, and experienced men. The result is that in the general election the machines practically offset each other, whereas in their respective primaries they have no competition from each other and not often from any other source—because of the indifference of the average voter.

It is, of course, true that the two machines are not always equal in strength and efficiency. In some cities the Republicans get into power so infrequently that there is no chance to nourish the organization on political jobs and the public payroll. Therefore, it is feeble and ineffectual in the general election. In other cities the Democrats have the weak machine for similar reasons. But there are few places, outside of the Far South, where the minority has not a sufficiently strong

machine proportionately to offset the peculiarly machine activities of the other side. In most of the great cities of the country the administrations change from one party to another frequently enough to make the machines of relatively equal strength.

CHAPTER IX

THE WARD CLUB

ONE of the greatest assets of the ward executive is his ward club.

These clubs flourish all over the country. There are probably 2,000 of them thickly scattered about in the cities with a population of 50,000 and upward, and they have, perhaps, a combined membership of more than 1,000,000. Every one of them has its own individuality but in the main they are so much alike that a club in San Francisco cannot be distinguished from one in Jersey City. Evenly divided between the two dominant parties there are not many wards in any section without their two ward clubs. In Baltimore, for instance, there is not a single ward in which there is not both a Democratic and a Republican organization club.

The multitude of voters who take no active interest in politics, and vote, when they do vote, perfunctorily, have not the least conception of what these clubs are, of their influence, or even, except in the vaguest way, of their existence. Yet, they are a very vital part of the life of every city in the country.

While they are basically political, with a membership confined to party people, they are run largely on a friendly, neighbourhood basis, and the effort is to make

them the social as well as the political centre of the ward. All Democrats are eligible for membership in a Democratic club and all Republicans in a Republican club. There is no other requirement. And it is not necessary to be a machine Democrat or Republican. You are just as welcome as an independent Democrat or Republican, and, if you have the strength, you can oust the organization from control of the club just as you could, if you were strong enough, oust it in the ward.

The effort of the ward and precinct leaders is to get on the rolls of the club as many party people as possible. Everybody is welcomed. The dues are so low as to be nominal. The standard rate is ten cents a week or fifty cents a month, but nobody is ever dropped from a ward club because he does not pay his dues. The membership of the average club is between 400 and 600. Of this number there will probably be about 110 or 120 who regularly pay dues. These include all the precinct executives and office holders and some others, but the bulk of the membership in all these clubs pay nothing. Yet they have the same privileges and stand just as well as those who pay.

Usually the ward executive is the treasurer of the club. All his political conferences are held there. It is there he meets his precinct executives, distributes the precinct money on election day, and holds the organization meetings for indorsement of the ticket.

In all the clubs there are a pool table, card room, reading room, a big room for meetings, and a bar. In the old days, the bar was a big source of revenue. Now nearly every club in the country has gone in for "home-

brew" and there is keen competition in many cities for the reputation of being the best "home-brew" club. This "home-brew", of course, is sold without a license and helps support the club. In most clubs there is a nightly poker game, out of which there is a small "rake-off" or "cut" for the benefit of the club. Some of these games degenerate into real gambling, but mostly they are for a small limit, and are simply the kind of game that goes on in every social club in the country.

It ought to be clearly understood that these clubs—the great majority of them—are distinctly not tough. The gambling is comparable to that which goes on in any exclusive social club and they are, for the most part, orderly and decent. They are neighbourhood gathering places where men can meet, hear the latest gossip, exchange political views, play pool or cards if they like, or just loaf.

In New York and Chicago—particularly New York—the social activities of the club are unceasing and far-reaching. There is always something going on at the club. They have clam bakes, excursions, dances, oyster roasts, and picnics. All Democrats or all Republicans are invited. And nearly always everything is free, although sometimes tickets are sold. The members flock to these affairs, taking their wives, sisters, and sweethearts.

Once in a while the city boss will visit the ward club and everybody gets a chance to see the celebrity. And during the campaigns the candidates for mayor or for governor will come out one night and speak.

The ward executive keeps control of the club machinery just as he does the ward machinery. He

dominates the board of governors, directs its political functions, provides the entertainments, watches its finances, and he brings in, as contributing members, people outside the ward who are his friends and want to help him along or stand well with him.

The value of the club politically to the ward machine is obvious. It gives it a home. It gives it substance and respectability and a pleasing social aspect. The strength and power of the ward executive are often measured by the popularity and prosperity of his club. It makes it easy for him to see his people and provides a place where his people can always see him. He is at the club almost every night. He would be at a loss without it, as the centre of his activities. Through it he can without trouble keep his finger on the pulse of every section of his domain—know exactly what the people in every precinct are saying and thinking, check up on the reports of his precinct executives.

In other words, it makes it possible for him to handle and run his ward. Without it he would be greatly handicapped, always insecure, and uncertain of actual conditions.

It is through the ward club that "the word" is sent down the line when the machine candidates are chosen. It is through the ward clubs that the machine formally indorses and gets behind its candidates, and it is the ward clubs that swing in back of the ticket when the time comes to line up. They are a tremendous machine asset.

In many cities, like Philadelphia and New York, there is a big central machine club—such as the Union League or Tammany Hall—where the boss makes his head-

quarters and the leaders meet. The Republicans formerly had one in Baltimore, when the late William E. Stone lived and flourished as a leader, and there have been occasional factional and district clubs, like the old Crescent Club and the old Calumet Club. But these central clubs are by no means as important to the machine as the ward clubs. The ward club is almost an essential—the central club is a luxury with which many machines dispense altogether.

CHAPTER X

POWER OF THE WARD EXECUTIVE TO PICK CANDIDATES

SO FAR we have described the kind of man the ward executive is, the way he works, the tools he uses, and the constituent parts of his ward machine. We have explained his relationship with the boss, how he gets to be the ward leader, what he gets out of it, and his relative strength.

We now come to the most vital thing about him—the thing which it is important for every voter to understand clearly, the thing which makes of him a far-reaching force that affects every citizen of his state—namely, his power to select candidates.

In nearly every city of less than a million inhabitants, the legislative districts and the councilmanic districts have been so arranged as to allot to each ward one representative in the lower branch of the city council or board of aldermen. These districts also allot, as a rule, one state senator to each group of six wards and one member of the higher branch of the city council in cities where there are two branches. It also works out that the congressional districts in cities usually include about the same number of wards, which, under the law, are entitled to choose one Congressman.

And there is another thing—the party organization usually provides that there shall be either one member

of the state central committee from each ward or three from each group of wards forming a legislative district. There are variations of these numbers and proportions in different cities, but there is no variation in the general principle by which these offices are distributed along ward and district lines, and the division given above is in effect in a large majority of the cities throughout the country. In the larger cities such as New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, the unit of representation is larger but the basic idea is the same.

Now then, it is obvious that the ward executive is in a position to have a lot to say about these matters. Actually, when it comes to selecting the organization candidates from his particular ward for the legislature or the city council or the party committee, he is the absolute and sole dictator. He brings the candidates out. He puts them in the field. He is their creator and their sponsor. He puts behind them not only his own ward machine, but, if they must be elected from the district at large instead of merely from the ward, he can put behind them the machines of the other wards in the district.

What happens is this—when the time approaches for the holding of a primary for the nomination of legislative or councilmanic candidates, the executive looks around the ward for the man best suited to his purposes. There may be a number of aspirants among his friends in his club, or there may be an outsider who is making a fight, or there may be no one who particularly wants the nomination. If he is a Democrat in a Republican district, where there is no chance of success in the general election, it makes little difference whom he puts up.

If, however, it is a Democratic ward or district, or one where there is something like an even chance, it makes a lot of difference. Under these circumstances, he tries to do two things:

First—get a man who, after he is elected will not prove a “kicker” or a “bolter,” but will train with the organization, take advice from the executive, and “go along.” In other words, a man whom he can “deliver,” when needed.

Second—get a man with whom he can win in the general election.

Nine times out of ten, because of the indifference and inertia of the voters as a whole and the general tendency to regard this matter of picking candidates as the business of the politicians and not of the people, he can use his own judgment, and put up the man he wants with little or no opposition. It should be remembered that it is in the primaries that all party candidates are chosen, and that the proportion of voters who participate in them is very much smaller than in the general election.

Sometimes, the character of the ward and the power of the executive over it are such that he can “get away with murder,” and with complete impunity nominate and elect totally unfit and unworthy men. Sometimes he lives in a ward where that sort of thing would be politically disastrous, and sometimes he has opposition in the ward from a rival faction that makes it either dangerous or impossible. In those cases, he is apt, if he is smart, to get behind the very best man he can find, a man with real personal strength in the ward, of recognized independence, integrity, and character.

But mostly, he is free to do as he pleases. What he does is to decide on his man, take him "down town," introduce him to the boss and say, "Here he is. I will be responsible for him." The boss shakes hands and that is all there is to it. The candidate announces himself, the ward club indorses him, the machine swings in behind him, and in nine times out of ten he is nominated and elected.

This happens in nearly every ward in every district. The executives pick their men, take them to the boss, and start their ward machinery behind them. When the wards in a district have thus completed their selection, the selections become the organization ticket, the boss links the ward machines together, and it settles into its stride to put over the full machine ticket in the primaries.

Occasionally the slate gets broken. Sometimes a faction arises that upsets the programme. Once in a while an independent movement gets such headway that the machine candidates are either knocked out in the primaries or beaten in the general election, but not often. Mismanagement, bad judgment, "soreness" in the ranks, grudges, greed and jealousies, and other human feelings always prevent the machine from developing its full power, and there inevitably come periods where an accumulation and combination of these things split the organization, force a new deal, and bring to the front new leaders—but these occur rarely.

It is a conservative and safe statement to say that the vast bulk of the members of the state legislatures from cities and the vast bulk of the aldermen and

councilmen who make up these bodies in every section of the United States are made in exactly that manner. The method does not vary anywhere and the number of times when the executive can put up in the primaries exactly the man he wants and get away with it will run fully 90 per cent.

When it is grasped that the state legislatures are the supreme governing bodies of the states, that the power of taxation and appropriation is wholly in their hands, that they make the laws in the states, and that their only limitation is the Federal Constitution, the tremendous significance of this power of picking candidates possessed by the ward executives can be appreciated. It practically amounts to running the country.

Think of it—the city councils, which pass the ordinances for the cities and regulate city taxes, and the state legislatures, which fix taxes for the state and pass all state laws, are largely composed in every city and every state of men personally chosen by one or the other of the party machine executives—and chosen by him primarily for the purpose of “delivering” his vote when needed. What this really means is that they vote the way the boss wants when they get the word.

That this is the actual situation throughout the entire country, I do not think can be disputed for an instant. There are some minor differences between the methods of the country machines and those in the cities, but none in this principle of picking candidates by the ward or county bosses.

As an example, take the city delgation to the House of Delegates in Maryland. Go back for twenty-five years, and there has not been a single session where

there were less than three fourths of the whole delegation not only hand-picked by the ward executives, but "deliverable" in any way and at any time that the local machine bosses wanted. In recent years there have been sessions of the Legislature in which there was not a single independent delegate in the city delegation—not a solitary Democrat whose vote was his own, or who could not be controlled by the city machine through his ward executive, when it needed him. The same thing is true of the Republican delegates—almost invariably they have been and are picked men, who unhesitatingly accept guidance from the ward executive. And what is true of the Legislature is true of the City Council or Board of Aldermen. Sometimes the ward executive has himself elected to these bodies, but more often he prefers to send some one else who will vote just as he would vote, and be the "goat" if there is trouble.

In these matters, Maryland and Baltimore are entirely typical of the rest of the country. It is the same everywhere. There may be legislatures or city councils somewhere in the United States free from machine control, but if there are, I do not know of them. There are some independent fellows in all of them, but they are almost invariably a small minority.

Just what this machine control by the boss, through his executives, means—to the boss and his machine—will be told later, when the time comes to describe the boss. What it means to the people is almost too obvious to need explanation. It really means that the power of self-government is out of their hands; that by their inactivity and indifference to party primaries

they permit themselves to be governed by a set of professionals who are active and interested 365 days in the year—and 366 on leap years!—and that they pay them for doing this.

Whose fault is it? The answer is as clear as a bell—the non-voter. It goes right back to the statement previously made that to many thinking men the most vital political problem in America to-day is the enormous number of qualified voters who do not vote—particularly in the primaries—that make it possible for the organizations to control city councils, state legislatures—in a word, to run the Government.

CHAPTER XI

PICKING CANDIDATES

IT OUGHT to be clear by now that it is not the boss who picks the candidates for the legislature, for the city council, and for the party committees—it is the ward executive. The boss agrees to and ratifies the executive's selection—but he rarely goes over the head of the executive in the ward. It simply is not done.

The boss may have a friend in the ward or a relative, for whom he wants to do something, but he can do it only through the acquiescence of the executive. It is extremely rare for the boss to have the slightest interest in the men the executives pick. His one requirement is that they be "Muldoons," which is the political description of a straight organization man who will "vote right" and "stay hitched."

It is, however, not only the member of the legislature, the city councilman, and the party committeeman from his ward whom the ward executive picks. He very often has a say not only about who shall be nominated for the state senate but who shall be nominated for Congress. His ward is an integral part of the district from which the state senator and the Congressman must come—the state senator being confined to the district by law and the Congressman by custom. If his ward is one of the strongest in the district—one that

can be depended upon for a good majority in the general election, or if he stands particularly well with the boss—he may land one or both of these.

These are not his recognized prerogatives, like the others, and the boss may himself do the picking for these places—and often does—but the ward executive can have a say in it. He may have in his ward an aspirant for Congress or the state senate. If he can prove his availability to the boss he may land him.

But these are the higher-class places, and there are other qualifications which the boss requires besides simply being a “Muldoon.” In the first place he must be a higher-type man because he has to stand out alone in the district and not merely in the ward. It is necessary to have a certain degree of public standing, of respectability and reputation. In the second and more important place, a candidate for Congress and often for the state senate is expected to make a more or less liberal contribution to the campaign fund, at least to help finance his own campaign, or to be a person for whom it is possible to raise an adequate campaign fund.

Perhaps the ward executive has a man in his ward who can meet both requirements. If he has there is a good chance of getting the boss back of him. The more liberally he contributes to the campaign fund the less rigidly are the other tests applied. If he has money enough and will put it up, the boss and the ward executives and all other executives, in most cases, are perfectly willing to name him, regardless of how he votes or behaves after election. It is largely a business matter with them. If the aspirant has money and will spend it he can be anything else he pleases.

If, however, he lacks money or will not "loosen up", or there is no other moneyed candidate available, they reward some more or less respectable "Muldoon," his respectability depending upon the character of the district and his chances of election.

This is not to say that there are not often times when the machine gets back of candidates for Congress and for other offices solely because of their personal qualities and the public sentiment behind them, and without any assurances of a financial nature. They do. Often in states and cities there develop men of complete independence, high character, and ability with political aspirations, whose strength with the people is such as to compel the machine to fall in line behind them, without pledge, promise, or persuasion.

Such was the case in 1922 in New York, when the Tammany organization started out to make William Randolph Hearst its gubernatorial candidate and was forced to take Governor Alfred E. Smith. And it was the personal strength and public record of Governor Nathan L. Miller in 1920 that put him over with the Republican machine regardless of its personal feelings. Cases like these arise from time to time in all states. Often, too, conditions are such that the machine seeks out men of independence and character and induces them to run so as to strengthen the rest of the ticket before the people.

But these instances do not affect the general rule—and the habit of the machine is to make ability to finance the campaign a prime qualification for its support. Many candidates, of course, get by without contributing. They are put on the ticket to fill it up, or

because of lack of interest or material, or because there is no contest, or because they will later be useful, or for other reasons—but for the larger offices the machine, unless compelled by circumstances, rarely gets behind candidates without knowing whence the money to make the fight is coming.

But, to get back to the ward executive, often he is able to find available timber in his ward for one of the minor places on the city ticket—a clerk of the court, or sheriff, or registrar of wills, or city comptroller, or judge of the orphans' court, or some such place.

When he does produce such a man it is no simple proposition to get him on the ticket. The boss looks him over with extreme care. He does not put a man in places like these who is going to be politically owned exclusively by the ward executive. Too much power goes with these positions. There are so many subordinate places under them. If a machine man is nominated he has to be his man first and the executive's man second—not the other way round, which might make the executive too strong and induce him to try "setting up shop" for himself.

These and other considerations are weighed by the boss before getting behind the men recommended by executives for the more important places. There is the geographical distribution of places on the ticket to think of and there is always the question of finances. Candidates for city council and for the legislature get by without having to contribute, but when it comes to filling the places where the term is longer, the pay higher, and the power greater, unless the candidate is supported in order to strengthen the ticket or because

of some party emergency, he is expected to help finance the fight.

Particularly is this true with the Congressional candidates, and it not infrequently happens that a man will spend more money in his campaign for Congress than the salary for a year. I know of one instance where a rich man anxious to break into politics spent \$18,000 to go to the state senate for three months. It was the entering wedge for him and he was willing to pay.

There is another historic instance in Maryland—that of the late William H. Jackson, father of William P. Jackson, of Wicomico county, who spent over \$80,000 in one Congressional campaign on the Eastern Shore. That, I think, comes pretty close to being the record for the country in a campaign confined to a single Congressional district. Most of that sort of money is handled by the boss and it trickles down through the ward executives or county leaders to the precinct men and the “floating” or purchasable voter. A good deal of it sticks on the way down.

That sort of political angel is rare—but he still exists, and the organization, from the boss down, is on the outlook for him all the time. He is their ideal candidate and when he gets in the whole machine rejoices. While it is not often that a candidate for any office can be got who does not put some sort of a limit on the amount he puts in the fight, there is a well-known political proverb to the effect that “every campaign produces a sucker.”

CHAPTER XII

THE CONTRAST BETWEEN COUNTY AND CITY MACHINE METHODS

BEFORE taking up the subject of the boss, it will be easier to clear up the differences between county and city organization politics.

County politicians are fond of saying that county politics are cleaner than city politics, that the county representatives in the legislatures and local offices are a better type than those from the city, and that the county machine leader is less venal and more respectable than his city prototype.

Right here is a good place to say with emphasis that the general idea that all machine politicians are necessarily crooked is a foolish and unfounded one. There are plenty of crooks among them and there are certain phases of machine politics which almost inevitably breed dishonesty and create crooks, but it is equally true there are many clean, honest men in every organization.

And there are ward and precinct executives who play the game absolutely on the level and never touch a dirty dollar.

It is also true that while it is the machine that puts into office all over the country slavishly subservient and unfit men, it is also the machine which in every great

city has—sometimes through necessity and sometimes through choice—put into high public offices the very highest and best type of men the community affords.

The trouble is that in any description of a machine and its methods, so much stress has to be laid on its power, its perquisites, and its usurpation of the governing bodies of the communities, that it is difficult to avoid giving the impression that the whole thing from top to bottom is thoroughly sinister and bad.

The truth is that while machine politics as played in the great cities is certainly inherently sordid and selfish, a terrific and unjustifiable burden on the taxpayer and a breeder of waste and graft, there are here and there strong streaks of good in it—not enough to make it white, or even a pale gray, but still enough to keep it from being wholly and inkily black. There are in the machine not only a respectable number of the individual units who are decent fellows, but many of the machine products turn out to be good public servants.

The machine is bad enough, it is true, but common fairness compels the assertion that there is a certain percentage of decency and honesty not only in its ranks, but in its products and its leaders, and I here repeat the statement made earlier in this discussion—that the iniquities of the machine are exactly equal to the tolerance of the people of the community.

But to return to the claim that county politics is somewhat purer and county candidates a grade or so better than the city ones. To a certain extent this is true and there are two reasons for it. One is that in the country communities the population is so much smaller and the people all know each other so well and

so thoroughly that they simply would not tolerate the nomination of the type of "roughneck" who gets by in some of the city wards without comment and mainly unnoticed. Politics is more personal and a great deal closer to the people generally in the counties than in the city.

In the city existence is so hectic, the rush of events so swift, and there are so many things to do that the people do not have the time to scrutinize and analyze and think politics the way they do in the county towns where life is slower and simpler and there is less excitement and fewer things to do. Therefore, the county machine man has to watch his step a lot more closely than the city man. The average county in the average state has considerably fewer voters than the average city ward.

The other reason is that the county boss does not work his way up through machine politics from precinct executive to ward executive the way the city boss does. Leadership in a county comes to him, in most cases, not because he has won his spurs as a machine politician, but because he is the dominant man in other ways in his county.

Either he is the leader of the local bar or the president of the local bank, or the most influential merchant, or the representative of his county in the state senate. The big thing is that he does not make his living exclusively out of politics or a political job, as do the bulk of the city ward executives and city bosses. He is something other than merely a professional politician and jobholder.

These county leaders are, as a rule, pretty high-

grade fellows who do not only stand well in the social and business life of their communities, but many of them, as already said, are the unquestioned leaders in them. Obviously, they compare favourably with the average ward executive, and, naturally, the organizations of their counties are run on a somewhat higher plane.

But their methods are much the same. There is no variation in the fundamental principles of the way the game is played. The county organizations are built on patronage and nourished through political positions. Each county is divided into districts, and, if the districts are large enough, they are redivided into precincts. There is a machine man in charge of each precinct or district, and the same tests that apply to the city precinct executive apply to him—namely, his ability to deliver his district in the party primaries. Each county has its partisan board of election supervisors, and the judges and clerks of election are chosen in the same way—on the recommendation of the precinct men. Each county is a legislative district by itself, and is entitled to one State senator, and a membership in the lower branch of the Legislature based on its population.

These candidates are picked by the county machine in the same way as the city nominations, except that, because of the smallness of his vote and the more intimate knowledge of his people, the county boss has to be a little more careful in choosing them. But, when they get to the Legislature, they are just as controllable by the machine as the city delegates, and respond to the boss in the same way. Also, the impression must not be given that, because of the extra care, a good many

county candidates are not very low grade indeed. They are. Some of them equal in depravity and ignorance anything any city could produce—but, on the whole, they do grade a little higher.

There are two other distinctive things about county politics. One is that much more money is spent on "election expenses" in the counties, proportionately, than in the cities. Where an average ward executive will need or get \$500 to \$1,000, a county boss, with less votes to handle in his bailiwick, will need or get anywhere from \$2,000 up to \$8,000. That seems enormous, but it is the fact.

The explanation is first that distances to the polls are so much greater in the counties than in the cities that vastly more money has to be spent in getting the vote out. Teams and automobiles have to be hired. Many voters in the counties, who will not sell their votes, will not go to the polls unless they are sent for. Then there is a big class of farmers who will not leave their work in the fields and lose a day to vote unless they are paid for it.

Then, too, the "floating" or purchasable vote in the counties is not only proportionately greater than in the cities, but it is a whole lot more expensive. Men who sell their votes in the counties get more for them than those in the cities. Vote buying is, of course, equally against the law in both city and county, but the practise is a long way from dead in either. There are always loopholes in the law that give the chance to buy and sell votes, and no legal way has yet been devised in any state wholly to stop it.

There is a true story illustrative of the difference in

city and county vote prices in Maryland. Some years ago an Eastern Shore politician was in Baltimore on election day and went down, out of curiosity, to the Third Ward, where there was a hot councilmanic contest on. He found votes selling for fifty cents a piece. He was not a bit interested in the candidates, but compared with the prices on the Eastern Shore it looked like such a bargain that he just plunged in and bought a few—just because they were so cheap. Where he lived he had been used to paying anywhere from \$5 to \$20 a vote, according to the closeness of the fight.

This purchasable vote exists in every state and in almost every district in the country. In some places it is the balance of power. In others it amounts to little or nothing, but everywhere there are some men who will not vote unless they are paid for it.

In one Missouri county not long ago this incident occurred: just before the polls closed, the district leader was accosted by a "floater" who had been hanging around all day. There was not much interest in the election and there was no use in spending money, but the district leader said, "Hello, Ben, have you voted yet?"

"No, Mr. Carey, I ain't voted."

"Well, Ben, here's fifty cents. Go on in and vote."

"No, Mr. Carey, if I don't get a dollar, I'll vote my principles."

Another difference between city and county politics is that in the county the voter cannot be got in line as easily as in the city. More time has to be spent on him. He wants some one to come around and argue with him; tell him about the prospects, discuss the is-

sues, explain things a little. In the cities, the machine makes little or no effort to enlighten or instruct the voters. In the counties there is, and has to be, some effort along these lines—and it is possible to make it both because there are fewer voters and because they have more time to talk politics and more interest in it.

Except for the differences that have been pointed out, however, there are no essential details in which city politics differ from county politics. The machines are formed, operated, and effective in exactly the same way.

CHAPTER XIII

THE BOSS

NEXT comes the boss. Ever since this discussion started it has been working toward him.

He is at the apex of the political machine I have been trying to describe. A curious American institution, with no legal or even official party status, with a power partly real and partly mythical, sometimes wholly sinister and low, sometimes personally honest, occasionally cloaked in respectability, sometimes possessed of a sense of public service—these state and city bosses are the most influential individuals in their respective communities in America—if exception is made of those persons whose influence is purely a spiritual one.

That is a pretty far-reaching statement, but I believe it will stand the test. It is not a pleasant thought, perhaps, but who had more influence in New York than Charles F. Murphy, the boss of Tammany Hall? J. Pierpont Morgan? William Randolph Hearst? Governor Alfred E. Smith? William H. Anderson?

The Morgans and the Hearsts have an immense power and are backed by great banking machines and publicity engines of their own. They have a reach that the Murphys cannot approximate. Their power extends from coast to coast, touches nearly every state and even crosses the seas—but match them in their

own state or city against the Murphys and where are they? It can, of course, be argued that the bosses are mostly purchasable articles and that the ability of the big men of business to buy them diminishes their power in comparison with theirs.

That would be a sound argument if the Murphys were dependent upon being bought by these men, but they are not. The revenue of the bosses comes from so many sources and their collecting agencies are so wide and varied that while they frequently do sell out to the "moneyed interests," and while very often selling out is part of their game, they are, in fact, quite independent and do not have to sell—and sometimes cannot be bought. They can flourish and prosper without yielding their independence. It is possible for them to sell their political influence to the people with money to pay for it, and deliver the goods, without surrendering to control—and it is actually a danger to the financial interests to assume such control when it can be had. They can sell their influence and still keep it—even increase it. Actually, they do not sell it—they rent it—and when you measure them locally, man to man, against any other leader, in this matter of domination of the affairs of the people in a particular community, the boss has the better of it.

It is true he is always under a certain restraint. He dares not go beyond a certain limit in the use of his power for fear of arousing a public sentiment that can sweep him out of existence—but the great men of finance, the captains of industry, the great industrial bankers, are under a similar restraint. With them there is always the apprehension of political attack—

of a wave of hostile public feeling that may shatter the slender structure on which credit is based and bring the whole house crashing down.

Unquestionably, the political bosses and the business giants are the two most concretely powerful groups in the country, and public sentiment is the curb on both of them. Fear of an aroused people keeps the bosses of politics and the bosses of business both within bounds. Of the two, the super-capitalist is the more powerful the country over, but confine them to their respective communities—a single city or a single state—and the political boss stands out supreme.

It is not merely his ability to get votes to the polls and win elections. That in itself does not matter so much. It is the power that comes to him after the election that really counts. Through the inertia of the people, as has been shown, the boss and his machine control the primaries by means of which all party candidates for all elective offices must be named. There lie the source and the secret of his strength. Control of the primaries is absolutely vital and essential to the boss. The minute he loses that he and his machine are on the political scrap heap. So long as he retains that he can hold his power and continue to function. So long as his grip on the primaries is unshaken all the people can do is to vote in the general election for or against the candidates the boss chooses in the primaries.

If they defeat the machine candidates of one party it is done only by electing the machine candidates of the other. It is a difference largely of labels, but not of men or methods. The only alternative is the put-

ting up of an independent ticket, which not only involves the construction of an independent political machine at great labour and great expense, but its success depends upon the appeal being strong enough to stir the masses of the voters into revolutionary action. It is seldom tried and still less frequently achieved. Independent tickets—even isolated independent candidates—are rare. One in a generation for any city or state is a good average. Not oftener than that on the average does the accumulated resentment against the bosses sweep over the dam. Not oftener than that do the bosses let the situation get so out of hand as to make an independent ticket feasible or formidable. No oftener than that is the line clearly drawn with the machine on one side and all the rest of the people on the other. Usually the boss manages to have a certain proportion of independent sentiment behind the machine ticket in a fight.

No boss likes to be licked in a general election. A defeated ticket does not put him out of business in the immediate way that a defeat in the primaries would do, but it is a jar, and repeated general election defeats would ultimately break up his machine behind him. There is no nourishment in being defeated. It would be an awfully stupid boss, therefore, who did not play for public support in the general election. In the nature of things he is bound to get some. His candidates are sure to have some personal strength and the independent candidates are equally sure to have some elements of weakness. It never happens that the boss and his machine are completely isolated.

What happens in this country is this — 95 per cent.

of the time—in every state and every city—the nominations for all offices are practically left in the hands of the politicians because of the indifference of the voters. As has already been pointed out, on an average, except in exceptionally hot contests where unusual public interest is aroused, only a small proportion of the voters—rarely over 20 per cent.—take part in the primaries. This permits the machine easily to dominate. The Democratic and Republican city and state bosses, acting with some restraint for fear of arousing the voter from his lethargy if they go too far, place on the ticket whom they please. Then, at the general election, when, perhaps, between 60 and 70 per cent. of the voters come out to the polls, one set or the other of the boss-picked candidates is elected to office. That is the simple story of elections all over the country—the bosses pick the candidates in the primaries because the voters, other than machine men, do not come out in sufficient numbers to bother them, and the people are compelled to choose between one or the other machine ticket in the general election.

The net result, as has been before pointed out, is that nearly every state legislature and every city council or board of aldermen is controlled by machine men. These legislatures and boards of aldermen make the laws under which we all must live—even the Morgans and the Hearsts. These legislative bodies have the power of levying taxes. They regulate the revenues of city and state, make appropriations for public improvements, direct the distribution of the state's funds, and have complete control over the public purse. They make the rules under which business is done in their

states and prescribe regulations which must be observed by the individual. What they can do, and do, affects every citizen of the state, big or little, rich or poor, white or black. The state legislatures are the supreme governing bodies of the state, and the only limit to their power is the Constitution of the United States.

When, to the tremendous power that control of the legislative machinery of the cities and states gives the boss, is added the fact that the inertia of the people also makes it possible for him to elect mayors, governors, judges, and members of Congress who are under political obligations and are disposed to recognize him more or less generously in matters of patronage and in other ways, the extent of the influence of the boss can be appreciated. It can be clearly seen that he outstrips all others. He may, and often does, sell his influence, but no one else in his city or state has that much influence to sell.

CHAPTER XIV

THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF BOSS

IT is difficult to write accurately about bosses, because there are so many different kinds of them.

What applies to one type does not completely fit the others. Basically, they play the game in much the same way. Their machines are constructed of the same material and nourished off the same payroll—the public's—but, personally, they differ. There are state bosses and city bosses and there are variations of both types. There is no such thing as a national boss. The nearest we ever came to that was Mark Hanna on the Republican side and Arthur Pue Gorman on the Democratic side—and they were not bosses with a dependable national machine behind them. When we get to the national aspect of politics, further explanation of their position will be made. All that need now be said is that political bosses to-day are confined to the individual cities and states. How these are loosely linked together in the national committee is another story.

It is a mistake to think that all bosses are illiterate products of the slums. It is a mistake to think that all bosses are dishonest, or that all bosses make money out of politics, or run their machines for personal profit. There are bosses who spend their money in

politics instead of making it, and there are and have been many bosses of breeding and education.

The late Senator Boies Penrose, of Pennsylvania, was a representative of a distinguished Philadelphia family, a Harvard graduate, and a man of great intellectual force, in spite of the fact that he was one of the most ruthless and unscrupulous of bosses. William Barnes, long Republican boss of New York State, is a university man, with unsuspected literary tastes.

Senator Robert M. La Follette, of Wisconsin, was the undisputed Republican boss of his state, but he was neither a rich man nor a grafter. The Massachusetts Republican machine was a Lodge machine and was bossed in the usual hard-boiled manner by that highly cultured and intellectual representative of the Massachusetts aristocracy—Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.

For many years John Walter Smith was Democratic state boss in Maryland. He was state senator, Congressman, governor, and United States Senator, but, aside from his salary as a public official, he never made a dollar out of politics. On the contrary, he spent in maintaining his machine and making his fights an almost incredible amount of money.

On the Republican side in Maryland, Senator Weller was the recognized state boss, but his personal honesty was above question, and he unquestionably spent some of his own money in holding his power. There was also a Republican city boss in Baltimore—the late William F. Stone—who ran the local machine for many years, but died a poor man. He not only never made money out of politics, but he impoverished him-

self and his family. His was a rare case. Senator Reed is now the undisputed boss of Missouri. He beat the old machine leaders and took their organization away from them. Personally, he is an able and honest man.

What men like these get out of being boss is gratified political or personal ambition, public honour or position and the sense of power. To most of this type a real love of the political game plus the selfish motive is behind their desire to be boss and stay boss. It stirs their blood, gives them a thrill, and often, when they have money and leisure, an interest in life without which they would languish.

There may be bosses of this type who have gone into politics solely with the idea of public service. It would be a splendid thing if there were, but I do not know any of them and I have not heard of any of them. While they are personally honest, they are distinctly not altruistic men, and the machines they run are often just as rotten and just as expensive to the taxpayer as those of the purely mercenary boss, and they will do, and do do, equally indefensible things.

Their machines are built on patronage and run on the spoils system. They are honeycombed with small grafters, and legislatures are just as corrupt under them as under the other type. They are personally honest, but they are not pure. They would not sell their influence for money, but they do sell it for support, and those who do not sell for money rarely scruple to buy for money. If they had such scruples they would not be bosses long. It is a bad system—the boss system—but again, I repeat, its badness is exactly measured by the tolerance of the people.

But it is not this higher type of boss that the average man or woman thinks of when discussing machine politics. It is the municipal boss, who is a professional, not a rich amateur, with whom politics is a business, not a game, who works at it all the time, instead of playing at it occasionally, who makes his living and grows wealthy out of it, who has no other visible means of support. Most of the big cities of the country have bosses of this character. They are the natural products of the city machine, its logical leaders, and they are the ones who need the most explanation.

They are not in the game for honour or ambition or love or health. They are in it for money. They do not run for elective offices and they rarely hold appointive offices. They do not get out in front of their machines where they can be shot at by the voters, but direct them from the rear, where they can minimize the effort to make their personalities a campaign issue. They finance their machines, but not with their own money. Politics with them is completely devoid of sentiment. It is purely a business, and they make it pay, because of the lack of energy and interest in their own affairs on the part of the people.

CHAPTER XV

HOW A BOSS BECOMES A BOSS

THE typical city boss of the professional type just described does not hop into machine politics at the top.

He begins at the bottom and works, scrambles, and fights his way up—and he does not arrive without a whole lot of battle scars. Almost always, this sort of boss begins as a precinct executive. Murphy did in New York, George B. Cox did in Cincinnati, Rasin, John Mahon, and Kelly did in Baltimore. As a matter of fact, most of them thought when they got to be a precinct executive that they had taken a big step forward. Their actual break into politics was considerably below that important and rather independent position.

Where most of them really started was as a paid runner or messenger, employed on primary or general election day by the precinct executive to help get out the vote. For this they were paid from \$2.50 to \$5. Nineteen out of twenty of the professional city bosses were first politically active in this way, and many of them were too young to vote at the time.

Now, the fellows who rise by their own efforts from that far down in the scale to the boss of a big city machine have got to have certain qualities. Stupid fellows, lazy fellows, slow-minded fellows, weak and timid

fellows without ambition and courage do not rise in machine politics. They simply cannot "make the grade". The successful machine politician who comes up from the ranks is first of all a fighting type. His whole life is a fight. He has to fight to win his place, and he has to fight to keep it. Every campaign is a fight, and as he goes up the political ladder his fights get bigger and bigger, harder and harder. It can be emphatically stated that no boss ever really landed who would run away from a fight. Whatever else they lack, they all have courage—and they are all able to take punishment as well as give it. Politics teaches them many things—and that is one of them.

But merely being a fighter is not enough. There are other essential qualities. Fundamentally a boss must have a flair for politics. The instinctive lust for the game has to be in him. He has got to know naturally how to handle himself politically, just as a duck naturally knows how to swim, or a born tennis player how to handle a racquet, or a born baseball player a bat. It has got to be his game. Uneducated he may be, but shrewd he must be.

The ability to handle men, to make them follow him, through loyalty or fear, or self-interest, or personality—that is another trait that has to be born in a boss and which he cannot acquire or affect. And then he has to have sense enough to know when not to fight. He has to have enough judgment to inspire his followers with a certain degree of confidence. He does not need much else. Give him these traits—and they are as indispensable as they are rare—and the boss can dispense with most others. He may be illiterate, im-

moral or unmoral, untruthful and uninformed about everything worth while outside of his peculiar game, and still be a boss. Without them he gets nowhere as a machine leader and his strength and status as a boss depend wholly upon the degree to which he possesses these qualities.

The average story of the rise of a city boss is this: he breaks in when a youngster as a runner or messenger, and makes himself useful to his precinct executive. After a while the precinct executive makes him a judge or clerk of election. As he begins to make friends and gain experience, he gets more valuable, and pretty soon, through the precinct executive, he lands a small City Hall job—inspector in the Water Department, checker for the Street Cleaning Department, or watchman or janitor or some such thing at about \$900 a year. He trains along with this for a while, active in his precinct all the time and making friends around the neighbourhood, until the time comes when he either beats the precinct executive in a primary fight, thus taking his precinct away from him, or the precinct executive dies or goes up or gets out, and, having attracted the attention of the ward executive, he gets the place. Then he is on his way.

At once he gets a better job at the City Hall. His power is increased through the precinct prerogatives of naming the judges and clerks of election, picking out the polling place, employing the runners, and handling the precinct money on election day. As time goes on, he begins to gain strength in other precincts in the ward. He joins the ward club, makes alliances with weaker precinct executives, slips a jobholder in here and

there, begins to gain power and know where he is going. And one fine day the ward executive finds that the coming boss has centred around him all the executive's enemies in the ward plus his own friends, has taken away from him most of his precinct executives, and is ready for a fight. If he wins he has the ward. He is its natural leader and inevitably, as the stronger man, he gets the position.

As I have shown, the ward executive is a real political power. Now, the coming boss is in contact with the real boss. He gets a better-paid and more influential city job, and a bigger slice out of the campaign funds. He begins to make his own personality count at the City Hall and to get his share of the patronage. He may even go himself to the city council, or the state legislature. He begins to make some money. He has taken an important stride forward.

At this juncture he may not have it in his mind to become the machine boss. The chances are he is thoroughly loyal to the boss, ready to fight the boss's fights and follow where he leads. But that does not prevent him from doing what machine people call "spreading out." With those qualities born in him, he cannot help it. He solidifies his own ward solidly behind him, and then he begins to lap over into other wards in his district. The boss likes him, recognizes his value, gets in behind and encourages him.

That happens everywhere, where there is a machine. There is always among the ward executives the exceptionally qualified man, who "spreads out" and becomes a district leader. Sometimes he does this in spite of the boss, but usually with his help. The boss wants a

loyal, strong man in the district, who can act as his right hand, keep down trouble in the machine, sense the situation, acquire enough strength of his own to keep the ward executives on their toes—and still be his friend.

The coming boss, after he acquires direct leadership, usually plays close to the actual boss. He aspires to be his trusted friend. If he can get himself in that position, the boss takes him in on big things, helps him make money, works through him in many ways, uses him as a confidential agent in more or less delicate and difficult matters. Every boss has a Man Friday, a fellow whom he trusts, uses as a collecting agency and relies on generally in a fight. Sometimes he has two or three, which enables him to avoid putting himself too deeply in the power of one man, and makes it unnecessary to give any man his whole confidence.

Ward executives, who “spread out” as district leaders, fight to get close to the boss. That way lie power, profit, and opportunity. As the boss’s right-hand man, his influence grows apace—also his political rewards, both in the form of public office and private income are greatly increased. And, finally, there is the chance—as the heir apparent, the next strongest man—of succeeding to the throne.

Briefly these are the stages through which the typical city boss of the professional kind goes on his way up:

From runner or messenger to judge or clerk in the precinct.

From judge or clerk to a small city job.

From the small city job to precinct executive and a better job.

From precinct executive to ward executive, real political power and an influential and well-paid city job.

From ward executive he "spreads out" to a district leader, with strength in a number of wards besides his own.

From district leader he becomes the right-hand man of the boss, with his chance to make much money and wield big influence as the confidential agent and heir apparent.

And the next step takes him to the final goal—the bossship—which he may reach in one of two ways:

First, the boss may die or retire, and he easily and naturally takes over the management as the only logical leader in sight, or

Second, he may quarrel with the boss—usually over a division of the money—split the machine, ally himself with a temporary independent, reform or factional revolt, and beat him in a city-wide primary fight.

There were two excellent illustrations of these two methods of becoming boss in Baltimore. Rasin, who had for more than a generation been the absolute ruler of the city organization, died. John Mahon, who was the next strongest man, with friends not only in one district but in all of them, and who had besides been the trusted agent and lieutenant of the boss, who once broke from him over the question of money, but became reconciled and was his right-hand man, succeeded him without a struggle. When the big boss died the machine instinctively turned to the sub-boss as the leader—and he gave it no opportunity to turn anywhere else either. The crowd had not got

back from Mr. Rasin's funeral before he began to function as boss. In less than two days he had been accepted by the whole Rasin machine.

It so happened that there was no one else to go to—and the machine must have a leader. A leaderless organization disintegrates. A split machine, with half a dozen leaders, is neither effective nor profitable, except in a small way. Every precinct executive, every ward executive, every district leader, wants a boss—a directing head—and when the directing head dies their immediate and vital concern is as to who will take his place. It is essential to their business to have a leader—and they want one big man, not half a dozen little fellows. They want a headquarters, a clearing house, a place of centralized power. "In unity there is strength" applies with particular force to a political machine. Self-interest sent them to John Mahon when Rasin died, and self-interest sent John Mahon half way to meet them coming.

The other way of getting to be boss was typified by the Mahon-Kelly break of 1915. Kelly was John Mahon's trusted friend and lieutenant, just as John Mahon was Rasin's. They broke—it is generally believed over money. Anyhow, Kelly, a district leader, in real control of the Fourth district and of great unsuspected strength in the big organization wards in East Baltimore, bolted the machine, joined with the John Walter Smith state organization, which financed him, and in every primary fight, John Mahon found his machine split up.

Kelly began to win in the primaries for Councilmen and members of the Legislature. Kelly got control

of the State Central Committee for Baltimore city, and, finally, in the Preston-Williams Mayoralty primary of 1919, the Kelly machine beat the John Mahon machine, city administration and all, by 5,000 votes. This was a knockout blow. Williams was not elected, but that did not affect the fact that Kelly had proven himself the stronger man in the primaries. Kelly had the committee. Kelly had more of the ward executives than Mahon. Kelly's friends were on the Supervisors of Election Board. Kelly was, in fact, the boss.

CHAPTER XVI

THE BOSS, THE BUSINESS MEN, AND THE NEWSPAPERS

POLITICS is not an exact science.

It is never possible to work things out politically on a mathematical basis. Two and two do not by any means always make four, and calculations by the machine and about the machine very frequently go wrong. There is no such thing as complete political accuracy. An element of uncertainty enters into all political calculations and makes of every contest, from a precinct primary to a Presidential election, a sporting proposition.

It is human nature that throws the calculations out and prevents politics from being run like a railroad train on a time table.

The human jealousies and hates, the passions and prejudices, the hot desire for revenge, the bitterness of disappointed office-seekers, the soreness, sordidness, and selfishness of individuals, the vaulting ambitions of some, the apathy of others, sudden strokes of daring and unexpected weaknesses revealed—all these things, and others, help make politics a precarious game, keep machines from functioning full strength, and make the climb of the machine man from precinct runner to boss hard and slippery. Many a promising and sturdy machine product, full of hope and speed, has broken his

political neck just as he put his foot on the top round of the ladder.

But there is this to be said—these professional bosses of the city who fight their way up from the bottom last a lot longer than the other kind who buy their way in at the top. For one thing, as the professional depends upon politics for his living, he works at it harder, more earnestly, and more systematically than the state bosses of the higher type.

There are three distinct things which greatly strengthen the city boss after he arrives. They enable him to consolidate his position and make it easier for him to hold on to the job of being boss than it was to get the job. They are these:

First—The urgent necessity of the rank and file of the machine to have a leader, plus the fact that the machine is most effective and the units of the machine most prosperous under a stable and reasonably permanent leadership.

Second—The quick recognition and acceptance of him as the boss by the big business men and corporations of the community and their eagerness to transact business with him.

Third—The advertisement given him by the local newspapers.

The first of these has already been touched on. The little fellows in the organization hate to see a change in bosses. It unsettles their business, renders their political status uncertain, and adds to the precariousness of existence. They deplore factionalism, breaks in the ranks, quarrels among the men high up in the machine. Therefore, when a new boss succeeds an old one the rank

and file all down the line are anxious to make his seat secure. They want him to stay boss, now he is boss—and that is a big help to him.

The second is almost as helpful to the boss and more interesting than the first. Just as the interests of the rank and file of the machine make a boss through whom they can deal a real necessity, so do the interests of the big business and financial concerns find use for a similar agency. The fact that the boss is this agency is not only one of his great sources of revenue, but also a great source of strength.

In every city in the country, there are great corporations, big and little businesses that are affected one way or another by legislatures and city councils.

Sometimes these business and financial interests want affirmative action from the legislative bodies, sometimes it is negative action they want. Sometimes it is a tax question, sometimes a new charter, or an amendment to an existing law, or the repeal of an old one,—but whatever it is, in most cases if it is vital, they get it secretly through the boss.

Under our system, which is a bad one, the boss is a tremendous convenience to the business and financial concerns whose interests may be affected by political and legislative activity. Actually, these interests want a machine boss. Such a boss seems almost as much a necessity to this class of business men and financiers as he is to the smaller class of machine men. That seems a strange thing to say, and a good many business men are likely to deny it, but it is true just the same.

What, for instance, would these business interests

do without the machine boss? Where, when legislative action of a disastrous kind threatens, would they go, if there were no boss? How would they stop a bill that affected them adversely, or pass one that they wanted passed? They could do it, of course, but not easily. It would mean going to the seat of the legislative body themselves, or employing expensive lawyers and lobbyists, making a hard, costly and disagreeable fight, getting down into the mess of politics personally and fighting their way out. They would have to deal with all sorts of sub-bosses, ward executives, district leaders, and county overlords. They would have to count noses, pore over roll calls, locate the controlling influence over delegations.

To inexperienced persons it would be an appalling job. It would not be easy for the experienced ones. The whole proposition is tremendously simplified for the business interests if they are able to go or send to a single boss, make their agreement with him, and rely on him to "deliver the goods." In the absence of such a boss, they are without adequate means of protecting themselves from the political interference with their business.

And it is not merely the public utility companies that are affected by political activity, but the banks, the trust companies, the insurance companies, and others. To all of these, when political trouble threatens, when legislative bodies propose destructive measures, the boss is their refuge and their strength, and they fly to him. They need him almost as badly, although not so constantly, as the people of his own machine need him. In between times, the business men, these

bank presidents, trust-company presidents, insurance presidents and the rest, curse and damn the boss and his machine, but when the legislature meets they seek him out and ask his help.

Undoubtedly, it is a relief to these men to have a boss to whom they can go. It is a simple, direct, and satisfactory—to them—method of getting rid of a bad situation. Without the boss the condition at the legislature would be so chaotic as seriously to frighten the big business interests. With a boss they feel there is always a way of keeping things from running wild. They hate the necessity of going to him, but the necessity exists, and they would far rather have one boss with centralized power to deal with than a lot of little ones with influence over only a few votes.

This is written not as a justification of the boss as an essential instrument for the protection of the business interests of a community, but merely as a statement of a condition that does exist. It does not mean, however, that nothing can ever be got through machine-controlled legislative bodies without the boss. In matters where public sentiment can really be aroused it is always possible to jam through a legislature bills opposed by both bosses and corporations. Frequently it is done.

Strong governors, such as Woodrow Wilson was in New Jersey and Roosevelt and Hughes were in New York, were able to do it, with the right newspaper support behind sound measures. And there is always a minority of independent men in every legislature. Against a really aroused public sentiment the machine is futile, and the bosses, big and little, run for cover. The difficulty is that it is so seldom aroused, so in-

frequently solidified and militant. To the vast bulk of the legislation passed the people are thoroughly indifferent, and the legislation in which the business interests are most concerned is largely of this character. Then it is that the boss's power becomes almost indispensable to them.

As to the strength given the boss by the local newspapers—even those which oppose him most bitterly—the explanation is easy. A considerable part of the power of the boss comes from the assumption that he is boss. He may not have the actual personal strength in the machine to achieve boss-ship or to hold it after he has grasped it, but if a sufficient number of people can be induced to think he is the boss and to believe he has the power it is an enormous help to him.

Many an aspirant for the boss's throne, standing on a shaky foundation, has literally been made by being singled out and denounced as the boss by the local newspapers. The assumption that he, and not some one else, is the leader, starts the little fellows of the machine flocking to him. It also gives him that "under-cover" recognition from the big business people, essential to a solid standing. The more violently he is denounced by the press the stronger the trend toward him. The organization people expect their boss to be denounced by the newspapers. It is a well-known political proverb that "it is better to be roasted than ignored." An undenounced boss is stamped as a weak and ineffectual fellow, and the psychological effect on his followers is to feel that he is "not there with the goods."

Up to a certain point, the city machine leader thrives on hostile newspaper publicity, just as the Ku

Klux Klan thrives on it, and the Anti-Saloon League. Nothing the newspapers say about the boss weakens him with his followers in the organization. On the contrary, it convinces them that he has the power, which most of the time he has not, and confirms them in the conviction that he is the man to tie to.

Of course, there is a limit beyond which the boss cannot go in getting himself denounced helpfully. He must not get caught in crookedness. He must not be too brazen and flagrant in the plundering of the public. He must not be discovered in the act of "double-crossing" party candidates, or throwing elections—but merely to be assailed as a corrupt and venal boss does not hurt him either with the units of the machine on the one side, or with the big business interests, who find it convenient to use a boss's power, on the other.

Personally, of course, nobody likes being publicly assailed as a crook in the newspapers, but any intelligent professional boss would much rather his local press shoot at him than take up some other man in the machine and denounce him as the real boss. In a little while the power of publicity is such that they could make him the real boss.

A case in point happened in Baltimore. A few years ago Kelly was a strong district leader, but had not "spread out" all over the city. The newspaper stories of his life, the exaggerated picture of his power, the labelling him as "The" Kelly, were undoubtedly a big help to him politically. It advertised him. He did not like it but he thrived on it, and, to a considerable degree, that publicity is responsible for his increased

strength and prestige in the machine to-day. That attack, and all subsequent attacks, did not lose Kelly a single friend. They did not wean away a man—but they started a lot of fellows to going up on West Saratoga street and calling him boss who had not done so before.

All this must not be taken as meaning that newspaper hostility to the boss and his machine is futile and not worth while. If it were not for the uncompromising fights waged by the independent newspapers against the city bosses and their machines the people would, indeed, be in a sad plight. There would then be no check at all to the power of the machine, no limit to what it could "get away with," no means of throwing the light on its iniquities, no way of arousing that public sentiment which it fears and which alone can smash it to pieces. If it were not for vigilant and hostile newspapers the machine could plunder with impunity, and the burden on the taxpayers imposed by the system would be tremendously increased. If it were not for the newspapers the boss and his machine could ride roughshod over the people. It is the independent newspapers that keep the fear of the Lord in the machine, that make it watch its step and bring speedy punishment for continued excesses. But this does not alter the fact that a certain amount of denunciatory advertisement helps the individual boss.

It is an interesting fact that, notwithstanding the political help a hostile newspaper is to him, the boss, as a rule, is extremely sensitive to the personal attacks. In the first place, not many of them are intelligent enough to understand when it really does help politi-

cally. It is human and natural for him to think that it may destroy him. In the second place, there is so much that the newspapers do not know about him but that he knows about himself that it makes him extremely apprehensive. In the third place, there is always his family. It hurts them. The average boss lives a decent, moral life privately. And in most cases, because he has made money, his family lives on a better scale than he did. His children have advantages that he did not. They go to good schools, have social aspirations that were unknown to him—and they suffer intensely when he is attacked.

CHAPTER XVII

THE BOSS AND THE JOBS

THERE are three interesting questions about the city boss of the purely professional machine type which remain unanswered:

How does he work?

Where does his money come from?

How much money does he make?

In the first place, every boss has his headquarters—some place where he can be found every day by the people who want to see him. Sometimes, as in New York, there is a central clubhouse like Tammany Hall, where it was always possible to see Murphy, or the Union League in Philadelphia, where Senator Vare and the little oligarchy of Philadelphia bosses can be located. Sometimes he has a private office in a downtown office building, where he ostensibly carries on a business of some sort. Maybe he is a member of a law firm, or, as some of them do, has the name of an insurance company painted on the glass door. Or, perhaps, he uses a big hotel in the down-town section as his headquarters.

But always there is some place where the boss is every day. Here he sees his district leaders and ward executives. They drop in to get their orders; unload their troubles and put things up to the boss to do.

They keep him busy. The life blood of his machine is patronage. Without patronage there is no nourishment for the machine worker, small incentive for him to play the game, no real rewards. Between campaigns, therefore, patronage is the boss's chief concern.

In the average city of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 population the machine will have from 500 to 1,000 precinct executives, from 20 to 40 ward executives, from 10 to 20 district leaders, and literally innumerable members of party committees, friends of the leaders, hangers on, men who are useful one way or another in the primaries, who have got to be cared for. In the great cities, like New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, these figures are on a far bigger scale. All of these men want jobs. Every last one of them is anxious to connect with the public payroll. It is a harassing problem for the boss. It takes all the sweetness out of life for him. There are never enough jobs to go around and it is impossible ever to satisfy everybody. He is in constant hot water with his followers.

In a city of approximately 750,000 population there are easily 10,000 places, big and little, under the municipal administration. In Baltimore the total is close to 13,000. Add to this the much smaller but still considerable number of state-administration jobs that go to the city, and it would seem sufficient to satisfy the most rapacious machine. It would be if the machine got them all, but it does not. In the first place, a number are always technical positions which must be filled by trained men. In the second place, no mayor or governor dares, because of public opinion, to turn the city or state government completely over to the machine.

In the third place, in these days it is, except in rare cases, impossible to elect a mayor or a governor who is purely the creature of the machine, or complaisant enough to yield fully to its demands. In the fourth place, nearly every mayor or governor is anxious to make a reasonably good record for himself, invariably has a number of personal selections to make, and sees clearly the necessity of placating the independent element of his community, as well as recognizing his political obligations to the machine. In the fifth place, many cities now have some form of civil service in effect. Even though these laws are sometimes loosely drawn and more loosely administered, and the machine finds ways of partially nullifying the merit system, they unquestionably do eliminate from the list large numbers of available places for the politicians to play with and decrease the power of the machine to that extent, just as they increase the efficiency of the city government by rendering secure and non-political the positions of the experienced and efficient officeholders.

So, when all these things are taken into consideration, it is easy to see why the available supply never is equal to the machine demands. Always the boss has got to hustle, to pull wires, to fight and to work to get what he can. The things he sets greatest store by are the smaller places, the labouring jobs. These are the ones the precinct executives have to have to keep their precinct machines functioning. In the last analysis the precinct organization is the real machine. Unless it is strong, the whole thing is weak. Hence, the boss would far rather be able to satisfy these fellows than any one else.

He is usually satisfied to let the mayor pick his own heads of the engineering departments, although if there is more than one applicant, the boss always has a preference, but when it comes to the head of the Department of Street Cleaning, with his army of street cleaners, sewer and paving gangs, garbage collectors and sprinkling-cart drivers, and to the Superintendent of Public Buildings, with his multitude of janitors, watchmen, elevator men and charwomen, the boss regards these heads of departments as peculiarly his own and vital to his machine and its success. In nearly every city where there is a boss the custom is to let him name these department heads. Refusal upon the part of a mayor of his own party to let him do so is construed as a declaration of war against the machine, as an effort upon the part of the mayor to "set up shop for himself." To deprive the machine of these places is to take from it what it regards as its own—and the boss fights like a wild cat, when necessary, to hold on to them.

While these two departments of the City Hall invariably constitute the bulk of the organization roll of job-holders, the boss places as many in other departments as he can. He always has a man for every vacancy. Sometimes he can make the appointments direct through the mayor or the heads of departments. Sometimes he has to work through friends and bring outside influence to bear—but he is always working—and always vigilant. If an office-holder drops dead, the boss is on the job with a candidate to succeed him. Every resignation stirs him into action. The pressure behind him for places is unceasing and insatiable.

There are innumerable ways in which he works to land places, and there is no obstacle which he will not try to surmount.

When the boss can put his man in a good job, carrying with it the power of making a number of subordinate appointments, he makes the subordinate places as well. The machine, in fact, is made up of job-holders—big and little. When the party of the boss is in power and the mayor or the governor is favourably disposed toward the machine, it waxes strong and the boss powerful. When the other party is in power or there is an anti-machine man in the City Hall or governor's chair, or the mayor breaks with the boss after his election, then the machine is out of luck. Its job-holders get thrown out of their jobs. Hundreds and hundreds of machine heads fall, and the organization rations and rewards dwindle. The machine people fall on hard times. They go through a patronage famine and there is great moaning and groaning and cursing in the ranks.

But it is a mistake to think that separation from the public payroll or being outside the City Hall breast-works, or having a mayor or a governor who refuses machine recognition, puts the machine out of business, or causes it to disintegrate or break up. The "boys" have to relinquish their places and perquisites, but they stick together. They know reform administrations do not last for ever. They know that another election will roll around, that the pendulum of public sentiment always swings back. So they tighten their belts and gird their loins for the next fight, confident of a return to power. Perhaps, they have to put up a better-type candidate than before, get hold of a winning

issue, rid themselves of the incubuses that caused the defeat—but almost invariably they “come back.” And in the interval there is no weakening in the ranks. Self-interest and optimism based on experience keep the machine intact. The death blow to the machine can be struck only in the primaries. When it loses the primaries, it is out of business, but being kicked out of the City Hall does not break it up. Often it scarcely makes a dent in it.

The machine can stand the famine for a period when places are impossible to get. The boss then has a complete alibi. The rank and file stand by him and wait, but when the patronage is there and they think it can and should be got, they look to the boss to get it. That is his job and they expect him to work at it. So strong is the pressure that often the boss will carry on his own private payroll men whom he is unable to provide for in any other way.

CHAPTER XVIII

HOW THE BOSS PICKS THE MACHINE TICKET

PLACING just as much of his machine as he possibly can on the payroll is the primary purpose of the boss.

That is the fundamental idea back of a political organization. That is its *raison d'être*. All the labour and expense of building it up, all the time and trouble of controlling the primaries, all the fighting and working to elect the ticket after it has been nominated, from the machine standpoint, would be aimless and futile and foolish, if success were not to be rewarded with something more than the mere satisfaction of winning. If, after the machine has sweated, fought, and bled to nominate and elect a set of party candidates, somebody else is to get the jobs—why, what is the use?

Political organizations run politics because of the lack of active interest and clear understanding upon the part of the ordinary citizen. This general political inertia, these hazy and confused political ideas, this tendency to think of politics as something low and slimy, which ought to be left to the politicians—particularly the primaries—these are the things that make machines possible and powerful. In proportion as the average voter becomes interested and informed, the bulk and power of the machine decreases.

Under our party system, as has been shown, some

sort of unofficial organization is essential to the orderly conduct of elections and the proper functioning of the Government. There has to be some human agency to do the actual party work of filling tickets, arranging details, providing election officials, bringing forward candidates, preparing for registration. These things do not do themselves. Nor can the state do them all. They call for voluntary activity upon the part of some one—and those who volunteer naturally form an organization and develop leaders. The whole thing is human and natural and inevitable. Nor can it be expected that the men who take over this work do so from patriotic or public-spirited motives. They take it over from purely practical and selfish motives and because there is an opportunity there for place, power, and money.

The point is that, although an organization of some sort is essential, under ideal conditions, with every citizen politically informed, and active enough to vote, the organization would be a simple, slender, inexpensive affair, easy to reward through proper patronage recognition without imposing a real burden on the taxpayers. Under existing conditions, with the voters lax, uninformed, inactive, and numerous not voting in every community—particularly in the primaries—the machine grows great and powerful, tremendously costly to the taxpayers, and develops bosses who are able to demand and get a far larger proportion of the positions under city, state, and federal governments than is good for them, for the state, the city, or the country. The basic truth is that the boss will go just as far in the patronage matter as he can—and the distance he can go is exactly measured by the indifference of the voters.

Under conditions as they exist to-day in the big cities of the country, he goes very far, indeed. It becomes his chief occupation—this placing of his followers on the public payroll.

But that is not all he has to do. There are two things expected of him as boss—the nomination in the primaries of candidates friendly to the organization and the election of these candidates. It is here that the boss shows his quality. So long as more than half the qualified voters fail to vote, the kind of machine described in these pages has the power to put over in the primaries practically any one it wants. It would be possible, for instance, in either New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, St. Louis, or Cleveland for the bosses to nominate almost any old “Muldoon” for mayor that they might choose—but electing him is another matter. There is no sense in putting up a candidate in the primaries merely to have him knocked down in the general election.

It is true that, so long as he holds control of the primaries, the boss still has his machine, but no machine will indefinitely follow a funeral director—and no boss not a fool would deliberately court defeat through a too-brazen exhibition of primary power. What he does is to try so to load the ticket in the primary with the precise proportion of “Muldoons” that can get by in the general election—but no more. Almost always, in the framing of the ticket which the machine supports in the primary, the boss looks for men of sufficient standing and independence not only to command a certain degree of public respect and support but also to enable him to nominate “Muldoons” for

the bulk of the places without arousing a dangerous popular resentment.

It is a matter of judgment. The boss wants a ticket that will win, but, at the same time, he wants candidates, who when they win, will not turn around and kick him and his machine out of the City Hall. How far he has to go in taking chances with independent men on the machine ticket depends upon the strength of his party in the city, the temper of the people, and the weight, disposition, and force of the newspapers. It has been shown how the nominations for the legislatures, the city councils, and the smaller or more numerous offices are made through the ward executives—and how it is easy in these instances to “get by” with tried and true deliverable machine men.

It is when it comes to picking the head of the ticket—the candidates for mayor or governor or judge—that the boss uses care and judgment. It is by the head of the ticket usually that the public judge the whole thing. If the head of the ticket is a good, strong man of standing and known integrity, or if some of the more conspicuous of the candidates are of this type, the rest of the ticket can be and is with impunity loaded down with “Muldoons.”

In political circles this practice of putting a few of the conspicuously higher type on to leaven the organization loaf is known as “perfuming the ticket” or putting a “clean collar on the dirty shirt.” In other words, the machine ticket is as clean as—and no cleaner than—the sentiment of the people of the community compels it to be. That is to say once more what has already been said in these page a number of times—the

quality of the ticket is exactly measured by the tolerance of the voters. Everything about the machine—everything in politics—is measured by this same yardstick, and it cannot be said too often. It is the heart of the whole thing from beginning to end.

There are various ways in which the boss, or bosses—because in some cities like Philadelphia and Norfolk the machine is run by a little oligarchic group of bosses, rather than by one man—get the “clean collar” or “perfumery.” Sometimes he has nothing at all to do with bringing the candidate out, but places his machine behind a man who announces himself, without reference to the boss or the machine, but who looks like the strongest proposition in sight, and a dangerous one to beat in the primaries. It may be a matter of expediency, or to avoid a bruising fight, or to placate popular sentiment, or purely a question of finances.

Sometimes the boss manœuvres the appointment of a group of prominent business men affiliated with the party, who canvass the field and induce some respectable citizen to enter with the assurance of a machine support, which leaves him unpledged and uncompromised. Sometimes the man thus chosen is friendly to the machine; sometimes not. There are no rules about this part of the game. It is purely a matter of what can be done, and depends upon the character of the candidate, the exigencies of the situation, the necessities of the machine, the political complexion of the community. There are times and places when the boss can himself inspire a mayoralty candidacy without the necessity of a camouflaged committee or any other set of false whiskers. The disadvantage of this, how-

ever, is that it is apt to make the boss and the machine more directly the campaign issue than is safe.

This fact may be set down as sure—whatever way the boss may get his candidate, he tries to pick one whom he can elect.

Right here it ought, in fairness to the boss, to be said that, even if he had a free hand and did not operate under the restraint of public sentiment, in only rare cases would he go the limit in putting up wholly unfit or really bad men for conspicuous places. The boss may, and often does, live like a leech, on the public purse, but, in spite of being a boss, he is also a citizen of his community, and there are mighty few of them who have not some sort of civic sense of right and wrong. His is not at all the civic view of the reformer, perhaps, but it is a distinct civic sense just the same. It is an unusual boss who does not take pride when his machine-made mayor turns out to be a good public official, and equally unusual that he is not disgusted when he commits some disgraceful or scandalous act.

There have been instances in most cities where the boss has sold out to the other side, "laid down" or "thrown the election," but they are rare. Often machines coöperate and help one another in the primaries. That is sensible and easy, but it is neither sensible nor easy in the general election. In the first place, the ward and precinct executives, very many of whom are decent fellows who play the game on the level, according to their lights, revolt against treachery. In the second place, if there is a chance to win they want to win, because to lose means hard times and no jobs. In the third place, the boss cannot "throw an election",

without a good many people knowing about it and raising a howl that may split his machine.

Some of the cogs in the machine in a hard fight, with money on both sides, go crooked. District leaders and executives of the lower type may jump the track, but rarely the boss, and when there is treachery in the ranks it is sternly punished by the boss. All of this does not prevent an occasional general "sell out," but in these days it is rapidly getting almost as dangerous to "buy" as well as to "sell." Men are apt to hesitate before they give to the necessarily unscrupulous person with whom they must deal the power such knowledge affords him.

Now, when the boss gets his "clean collar" it is the simplest and easiest thing imaginable to swing the machine back of him. The balance of the ticket has been made up through recommendations of the ward executives and district leaders, by giving recognition to the various elements with voting strength sufficient to make it inexpedient to ignore them, or to individuals powerful enough to compel recognition, and to sections of the city which will resent being left unrepresented on the ticket. In some cases candidates are put on because of their ability, or the ability of their friends, to contribute to the campaign fund, and sometimes for purely personal reasons. Sometimes, too, it is a matter of luck with a candidate—lack of opposition, or a last-minute demand for a man. Take any machine ticket in any city and it is a queer conglomeration containing some of the best and some of the worst types in town—and put there through all sorts of influence and for all sorts of reasons.

When it is completed the boss closes the gate and "sends the word down the line." All this consists of is a curt phrase to the ward executives and the district leaders as they come in to see him at headquarters.

"It's Smith," says the boss, or "It's Jones," "go to it." In many cases, that is all he does say. Sometimes after the "It's Smith," the boss says, "What can you do down your way?" or "What will your ward give?" or "You ought to give him 1,000 majority", or some such thing. The ward executive is likely to reply, "All right, boss," and get out, or he may tell the boss about the sentiment of his people or express his judgment as to the selection's strength or weakness in his ward or district, but it is always an exceedingly brief conversation. There is no argument. What the boss says goes.

A bolter is an extremely rare bird in a well-run machine with a real boss. Once he gets the "word" the ward executive or district leader hurries off, calls a meeting of his ward club, and passes the "word" along that night to his precinct executives. Inside of twenty-four hours after the boss decides the whole machine, from top to bottom, has got the "word" and begins to function. The ward clubs meet and indorse the ticket, the business of lining up the office-holders begins, the candidates open up headquarters and the campaign is under way.

Sometimes the boss decides weeks in advance. Sometimes it is only a few days before the primaries when the decision is given out, but it makes no difference—the machine can be swung in line just the same. The executives prefer to know as far ahead as

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possible, because it gives a better chance to iron out the rough spots, and checks freelance candidates from tying up and committing precinct executives, and making inroads on the organization forces. But the manner in which, at short notice, the vast bulk of the machine workers can be swung in behind the boss's candidate is a marvellous illustration of discipline, when the looseness of organization construction is considered and the varieties of human beings taken into account.

CHAPTER XIX

THE COST OF CAMPAIGNS

AND now—the money. Political campaigns, both primary and general, are enormously costly. A plain recital of the facts makes an amazing and significant story.

In New York city alone as much as \$1,000,000 has been raised and handled by the Tammany organization in a single mayoralty fight, and the total cost of a state-wide gubernatorial campaign has run well over the \$2,000,000 mark. These seem incredible figures, but there is the best authority for affirming their correctness, and no experienced man to whom they have been submitted thinks they are high. In Chicago and Philadelphia the campaign funds in a mayoralty contest for one party frequently touch the half-million mark, and state campaigns in Illinois and Pennsylvania are tremendously and notoriously expensive, although they do not reach the colossal figures of New York.

The rest of the country, clear down to the county townships of two and three thousand people, follow suit in this matter of political expenditures on a sliding scale graduated according to size. There is almost no state or city, county or town, in the country, in which there is anything like a real contest, politically, that is not periodically drenched with money for political purposes.

The main idea of these expenditures is to induce the voters to go to the polls and vote for the candidates in whose interest the money is collected. The bulk of it is legitimately expended, but in every section there is a considerable proportion put out in direct violation of state and federal laws, which attempt to limit the amount that may be spent as well as the amount that may be contributed by the candidates.

In many states the laws now require full publicity for all campaign receipts and expenditures, and in the case of candidates for the United States Senate and House of Representatives, the federal statute not only insists upon a sworn statement of contributions and expenses, but provides that candidates for the Senate must not personally contribute more than \$10,000 and for the House not more than \$5,000, for the general election campaign. In the Newberry case it was decided that Congress could not restrict the expenses of candidates for Federal offices in the primaries, that being purely a state matter, but the states can, and many do, place a rigid limit on primary expenditures, including them in the general limitation.

Now, the point about all these laws, federal as well as state, is that they are entirely ineffectual. They are deliberately and generally ignored. They are no more observed than the Volstead Act is observed. Everywhere they are obeyed only on the surface—and not always even that is done. The sworn statements made in the states and to Congress never show the total receipts or the total expenditures. The thing is so managed that conscientious candidates or treasurers—or cautious ones—may make their affidavits honestly,

and without risk. They have not personally handled, expended, received, or officially known of more than their affidavits show—but more has been handled, received, and expended just the same, and they know it. So does everybody else.

All that is necessary to prove this is to mention the Senatorial campaign in Delaware in 1922 between T. Coleman du Pont on the Republican side and Thomas F. Bayard on the Democratic side, or in Rhode Island between Governor E. Livingston Beeckman on one side and Senator Peter Gerry Goelet on the other. Literally, these two little states were saturated through and through with money, poured in by both sides, and the sums expended reached unbelievable figures—but they do not show in the reports.

The fact is that nowhere in the country has there been devised a legal method of effectually limiting the amount of money that may be spent in political fights. No law has yet been enacted through which the politicians cannot drive a four-horse team. In Maryland there is, perhaps, as rigid a one as exists in any state. It was drawn by the most astute Reform League lawyers. The effort was made to close every loophole and it has real teeth. Yet in actual practice it is about as effective as if it were not there at all.

The figures I have given for New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago do not include both parties. They include only one. To include both, the estimates should be doubled. In the average city of between 700,000 and 1,000,000 population, to finance a single party city-wide primary contest a minimum of \$25,000 is required, and from \$35,000 to \$40,000 more to put the ticket

over in the general election. This, of course, does not apply to cities in states like Alabama, Louisiana, or Georgia, where one party is so overwhelmingly in control that the election is merely a form. It does apply, however, to every city where there is a reasonable degree of uncertainty as to the result.

These figures are the actual minimum. In a hotly contested primary fight, in which two strong factions are lined up, the total expenditures of each side will run as high as \$70,000 and more, with another \$50,000 to win the general election. There have been in Baltimore, for instance, primary contests in which more than that was expended. As the territory widens the expense goes up. No governor of Maryland in twenty-five years has been nominated and elected under a total political outlay of \$100,000, and in most cases it has cost a great deal more.

It can be simply stated in this way: to make a successful primary and general election fight for mayor in Baltimore costs approximately \$70,000. To make a successful fight for Governor—even when there is no primary contest—not less than \$100,000 is needed.

What is true in Maryland is true in proportion of practically all the other states in the country. The bigger the city and the bigger the state, usually the more money it is necessary to spend, although it is true that the smallest states—Delaware and Rhode Island—are more expensive politically than most of the others. If the larger states spent money in proportion to these two little commonwealths, the amounts would be stupendous. They are almost beyond belief as it is. Where all this money comes from, who gets it, what it is

spent for and by whom and how, and where the boss comes in, will be explained later.

First, it is necessary to present a general picture of the money end of politics. When you consider the figures and facts I have given by states and cities, they seem big, but when you try to visualize it nationally and begin to compute the total political expenditures for the country as a whole, the thing becomes staggering in its magnitude. It is impossible to gauge it accurately. Fully half of it is hidden. If it were possible to get every financial report in every county, city and state and for every Congressman and Senatorial candidate, and add them all together, it would not begin to show the real total. It would show many millions, but not all the millions.

When it is reflected that this country is in a literal whirl of politics, that elections follow elections with bewildering rapidity; that there are councilmanic, legislative, mayoralty, gubernatorial, Congressional and Presidential campaigns; that sometimes these overlap and merge—but that in all of them everywhere this business of raising and spending campaign funds proceeds steadily and earnestly, one hesitates to make even an estimate.

In a Presidential campaign, for instance, the national committees, the state committees, the county committees and the city committees all go collecting at the same time. The collections, however, are not centred in one pot. There is no pooling of the funds. Each collects for its own specific purposes or its own particular territory. Each raises, spends, and accounts for its own money and is entirely separate and distinct.

It pours in and it pours out. It runs up into many millions.

The Republican National Committee in the Harding campaign of 1920 accounted for \$3,829,260, while the Democratic committee that made the fight for Cox officially accounted for \$1,349,260. But in the 1916 campaign the Republican National Committee admitted to having spent \$6,022,678. These expenditures concerned only the national headquarters. They did not touch the state or city or county collections, nor did they take into account the primary expenses for Presidential primaries. Yet there are not many persons credulous enough to think that these official reports of the national committee of either party tell their whole story.

Professor Charles Edward Merriam, in his book, "The American Party System," roughly estimates the total outlay of each party in a national election at \$10,000,000, or \$20,000,000 for both. This seems low to me, but when to it is added the actual cost to the states of legally registering the voters and holding the primaries and elections some idea of what politics really costs the country and of what it really means to the taxpayer can be grasped. This cost of registration and holding the elections, of course, has nothing whatever to do with the campaign funds concerning which we have been talking. They are a private and party matter. The other is an official state affair and the bill is paid wholly by the respective states and not at all by the party committees.

In New York the cost of holding a single election in the state—the mere matter of paying judges, renting

polling places and printing ballots—is conservatively estimated at \$1,750,000. This is a direct payment out of taxes. Apply it to the forty-eight states, with their average of one election a year, and consider what it means.

Take Baltimore as a typical city. The cost to the city of holding a primary election is approximately \$92,066; the cost of a new registration of voters is \$151,320; the cost of the general election is approximately \$96,041—a grand total of \$339,427 for the purely physical arrangements of elections in three months. In the coming year [1931] there will be four elections in Baltimore—a state primary and general election in the fall and a mayoralty primary and general election in the spring. There will also be a new registration. This means that in less than a year the city will pay out more than \$390,193 for actual election expenses, every dollar of which comes out of the taxpayer's pocket and is entirely disassociated with the campaign funds of the two parties. For states with twice or five times the population of Maryland this sum can be multiplied twice or five times.

It may be interesting to give the details of the cost of a primary election in Baltimore as an illustration. Here they are:

2,672 judges at \$12 each	\$32,064
1,336 clerks at \$12 each	16,032
668 rooms at \$15 each	10,020
Advertising	7,000
Stationery	2,000
Printing (miscellaneous)	2,500
Hauling, erecting, and taking down booths	4,000
Hauling ballot boxes	700

Printing election returns	1,250
800,000 ballots (estimated)	15,000
Repairs to booths	1,500
Total	<u>\$92,066</u>

When it is considered that there is at least one primary and general election annually in nearly every large city and that in some of them there are as many as four in a single year, and that this state expense is merely in addition to those enormous private party campaign funds which accompany each election, it can be seen that while it may be worth it, the price we pay for our republican form of government is a considerable one.

CHAPTER XX

HOW THE MONEY IS RAISED

BUT this matter of money in politics is so big and so complicated that the best way to explain it clearly is to get back to the boss and confine the explanation to the individual city. What is true of one is, with certain variations, true of them all.

Campaign funds are collected in three different ways:

First—By assessing the party office-holders.

Second—By assessing the candidates for office.

Third—By voluntary contributions from friends of the candidates, friends of the party, friends of the boss, and business men seeking political favours and consideration.

Few states these days permit corporations to contribute to campaigns and the Federal law rigidly prohibits it. But this does not prevent individuals connected with corporations from contributing personally, and many of them do, although their names do not often show in the reports.

The theory of assessing the office-holders is that—in cities which do not operate under civil service and in some where they do—the bulk of the job-holders, big and little, get their positions through machine influence and because the party to which they belong came into power. It is presumed that they appreciate

these facts. It is further presumed that they realize that a continuation of their party in power plus retention of their machine influence is essential to the security of their jobs.

Lamentable as this condition may be, it unquestionably exists generally in all cities. It is, therefore, clear that the party office-holder has a direct and vital interest in two things—the success of the machine in the primaries and the success of the ticket in the general election. He is expected to display this interest not only by voting but by contributing. In every city-wide and state-wide campaign an average of 2 per cent. of his salary is expected. He cannot be made to give this sum, but plainly, it is a wise thing for him to do.

Sometimes the assessment is 1 per cent. in the primaries and 1 per cent. for the general election. Sometimes it is 2 per cent. for each if the machine is “up against it,” but usually the job-holder gets off with a 2-per-cent. contribution for a campaign. This means that a city office-holder with a salary of \$900 contributes \$18. If his salary is \$1,800 he gives \$36; if \$6,000, he gives \$120. He can give more if he wants, and many of the better paid ones do, but that much is expected.

In every campaign each party has a treasurer. He is really selected by the boss, although ostensibly the choice is with such party committee as happens to function officially in the city. Sometimes he is the chairman of the local state central committee, and sometimes there are two committees and two treasurers, one representing a special campaign committee for the

purpose of "beating the bushes" for the business men and the other the regular party committee.

At the headquarters the party treasurer has a list, always revised and up to date, on which appear the name, position, and salary of every party job-holder, from the mayor down to the newest charwomen or street cleaner. Each of these gets a letter from the treasurer. It is a form letter. It contains no order to "come across," no threat, and no mention of any particular sum or reference to assessment. In most states that sort of coercive method is not only out of style, but illegal besides.

The letter merely cites the fact that the party is engaged in an important campaign, that funds are badly needed, that the ticket is a good one and that as a Democrat, or a Republican, he is urged to contribute as liberally as possible. No intimation of how much is expected is given in this letter. Usually the job-holder knows this without being told, or if he does not he finds out, and in order that there shall be no misunderstanding he is verbally informed by his precinct or ward executive. There are exceedingly few job-holders who fail to respond.

In every city the contributions of the office-holders are the foundation and often the bulk of the campaign fund. In New York receipts from this source alone will run regularly over \$250,000; in Chicago, close to \$150,000; in Philadelphia, \$100,000, and in Baltimore, even with the Civil Service law in force at the City Hall and in all state departments, from \$18,000 to \$25,000. It is an interesting fact that even state and city officials fully protected by the merit system against

attack from the politicians contribute as regularly and liberally as those outside of the classified service. Apparently this is due partly to their genuine interest in the party and partly to a feeling that, even when wrapped in the civil-service cloak, it is better to have the machine friendly.

The assessment of candidates for campaign funds is not on a percentage basis as with the job-holders. It is regulated by the financial strength of the candidate, by his liberality, by the importance of the office for which he is running, and by whether he was an active seeker after the nomination or merely a willing one. But whether he seeks it or not, it is the unvarying custom for candidates to contribute.

It is conceded that campaigns cannot be successfully conducted without money. The candidates are the chief and direct beneficiaries of success. Hence, it is reasonable to expect them to help, so far as they can, in the financing of the fight—and they all do, from the Presidential candidates down to the clerk of the city court.

What they give varies greatly. There have been candidates for mayor in great cities who, personally and through friends, have put into campaigns \$100,000 and more. There have been candidates for mayor who have gotten through with a single contribution of \$1,000. There have been gubernatorial and senatorial candidates who have in a single campaign spent several hundred thousand dollars of their own money.

The only candidate for governor or mayor I ever heard of who was nominated and elected without spending a cent was the late Gov. Austin L. Crothers, of Mary-

land. He was nominated in a convention in 1907 as a result of a last-minute switch of delegates. Immediately after his nomination he caught typhoid fever and did not recover until after his election. It cost more than \$100,000 to make his fight, but none of it came from him. It came from the office-holders, party friends, and John Walter Smith. Even had he not been ill, Governor Crothers's contribution would have been a small one, as he was a poor man and could not have made the usual gubernatorial contribution.

In the average city of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 a contribution of \$5,000 from the mayoralty candidate and in the average state, \$15,000 from the candidate for governor are adequate and generous. Candidates for judge contribute \$500, \$1,000, \$1,500 or \$2,000; for clerk of the court, \$500 or \$1,000; for state senator, \$500, and for Congress, from \$1,000 to \$5,000 or more.

These figures give merely an idea. The variations in candidate contributions are so great that no worthwhile schedule can be given. The only thing that can be said is that practically all candidates except those for the smaller offices give what they think necessary and can afford. Sometimes the contribution is all out of proportion to the office; sometimes it is small. It depends upon the character of the fight and the purse of the candidate.

In Maryland the law passed in 1912 provides that candidates for office shall be limited in their political expenditures to \$10 for each thousand registered voters qualified to vote up to 50,000 and \$5 for each thousand voters after the first 50,000. Strictly construed, this means that a candidate for governor in

Maryland, where there are about 400,000 registered voters in the entire state, would be limited to a personal contribution of approximately \$2,200. Under this law candidates for mayor in Baltimore, where there are approximately 225,000 voters, are limited to personal contributions of about \$1,250.

Few states have so rigid a law, but there are ways through it as well as around it. A candidate is permitted to spend, in addition to the amount prescribed, without limit for postage, stationery, telegraph, telephone, advertising, publishing and travelling expenses. It is marvellous how far these exceptions can be and are stretched. Also, while the law provides that contributions from the candidate's wife shall be construed as coming from himself, it says nothing at all about how much his brother or sister or uncles and cousins may give.

What happens in Maryland and in every other state where there is a Corrupt Practices Act along these lines is this: The candidate gives directly to the campaign fund as much as the law permits. Then some exceedingly intimate and trusted friend or relative quietly arranges a meeting with the boss—not the treasurer but the boss—and secretly slips him in cash—no checks—as much as may be necessary. Sometimes this will be ten times as much as the candidate has openly put in. No one knows of this little transaction except the exceedingly confidential friend and the boss. It appears on no record and in no report. After the election is all over, the candidate has been inaugurated, the reports filed and approved, the confidential friend some night sitting alone with the “people's choice”

in his library will say: "By the way, you owe me \$10,000 for that little investment I made for you last month," or words to that effect. And the scrupulously honest and innocent governor or senator will say: "That's right. I'm glad you reminded me of that little matter. Here's the check. I hope the investment turns out all right," or words to that effect. And then they shake hands and grin—that is, they grin if the election went their way, but there is not much grinning if it went the other way.

That is how the thing is done all over the country nine times out of ten and every politically experienced person knows it. Sometimes, with extra cautious fellows, the confidential friend will simply hold up a certain number of fingers. The candidate will nod his head and next day there will be left at the friend's office a small package containing the indicated number of thousand-dollar bills. Not a word has been exchanged and there is no scrap of paper in the way of evidence. It is, of course, true that in some cases the candidate never does know anything about the additional money slipped to the boss by his friends, but there are not many candidates with that kind of friends.

Independent and reform movements almost invariably spend money in campaigns along machine lines and with equal disregard of the law. If they did not they would not be able to make a fight.

Now, as to the voluntary contributions from party friends and business men—these constitute a considerable part of the total. The treasurer's little letter asking for financial help goes to a long list of "prospects," none of whom are office-holders. The responses range

all the way from a dollar bill to a check for \$1,000, and even more. Millionaire party men like Bernard M. Baruch, interested in the upbuilding of the Democratic party, will send \$2,500 to this state or \$1,500 to another to help the cause. Woodrow Wilson never failed to send a contribution—usually \$500 or \$1,000—to the National Committee in a Presidential campaign or \$250 to the Congressional committee in the off-year contest. But the great bulk of the responses in any city or state campaign comes from three classes of people—

Men and women genuinely interested in the candidates and the party.

Business and financial men who think it expedient to help out and do so largely as a matter of political insurance.

Those who cherish personal political aspirations and desire to acquire party standing and good will.

CHAPTER XXI

WHAT THE MONEY IS USED FOR

WHERE the campaign funds come from, how they are raised and what they amount to has been described as fully as possible. What remains now to be explained is how the money is spent, for what, and by whom.

First, there are these things, all of which cost money:

Headquarters, rent and furniture,
Halls, bands and speakers,
Advertising,
Printing and stationery,
Sample ballots,
Postage,
Telephone and telegraph,
Travelling expense,
Clerk hire and headquarters payroll,
Stenography and typewriting,
Banners and placards,
Campaign buttons,
Campaign literature,
Copies of registration lists,
Election-day expenses.

These are all legitimate expenditures, but, in a big state or city, they run into large figures. For instance, to send a single letter under a two-cent stamp to 200,000

legalized-voters costs for postage, alone, \$4,000. When you add in the cost of the paper and envelope the amount practically doubles. Most of the big cities have a great many more than 200,000 voters. Most of the other items in the list are too obvious to make it worth while to go into details.

The one big item that needs explanation is the last one—election-day expenses—because here is where the boss comes in. In any primary or general fight, no matter whether the campaign fund is fat or thin, enough must be saved for election day. It does not do much good to stir up the voters for six weeks and then not get them to the polls. A proportion of them will come out voluntarily and vote, but there is an element in every community that has to be “rounded up.” That is the machine’s job—and it takes money to do it. Runners and messengers must be employed and paid. There is always a certain “floating” vote that has to be looked after. There are automobiles to hire and piratical fellows worth a block of votes who have to be “fixed” or they will not function.

The process is this—the week before election day the money necessary to see the thing through is got together. Sometimes, if the candidate and his friends are rich and liberal, there is no trouble about it. Sometimes there is a terrible time to get it—a last-minute call for help is given; party leaders meet in conference, the candidates are “shaken down” again, men who have large political interests make big contributions. Sometimes a note indorsed by party leaders is given and the money borrowed from bank. Exactly that happened in Maryland in 1920, and the note for

\$20,000 was not paid until just before the 1922 election. One way or another the money must be had.

Usually the bulk of it is put up by one man. It is a well-founded political belief that every campaign produces an angel. The amount varies according to the size of the city or state and the character of the fight. In a city like Baltimore it will range from \$15,000 to \$50,000. In the counties the range is higher. In the memorable campaign of 1895, which resulted in a Democratic Waterloo, the Gorman-Rasin machine, in a desperate effort to save the situation, put out \$100 to a precinct. That probably was the high-water mark for this locality. In New York as high as \$500 to a precinct has been put out.

The money for election day in every city and state is given out for the counties the Thursday before the election, so that there will be time enough to get it around, and in the city usually on Saturday—sometimes on Monday.

There are two divisions—one by the party treasurer and the other by the boss. The ward executives assemble on the specified day at headquarters. One by one they go into the treasurer's office, and receive from him in \$1, \$2 and \$5 bills the money for their wards. This is the money that is to be accounted for by the treasurer in his report. From the treasurer's office, the ward executives go direct to the room where the boss has secluded himself. He sees each executive separately. To each he gives a neat package of \$1, \$2, and \$5 bills, along with enough blanks for the challengers and watchers in each precinct. Generally, the amount the executive gets from the boss is larger than

the amount he gets from the treasurer. It is money that does not have to be accounted for and does not show in the report. It is the money that has been privately given the boss for election-day expenses by the candidate or some trusted friend or agent of the candidate.

The ward executive takes the money and meets his precinct executives that night, generally at the ward club. He re-divides the money given him by both boss and treasurer. He has a private session with each precinct executive, gives each what he thinks he ought to have for his precinct, along with his precinct challenger blanks. The precinct executive is the spender. He employs and pays the runners and messengers, "fixes" the fellows who are worth "fixing," and buys votes where it is possible, worth while, and not dangerous.

The same system is used in the counties. The state boss meets the county leaders and gives them the cash for their counties. They pass it along down the line until it reaches the voter. But all of it does not reach the voter. Men of long experience in this sort of thing will tell you that on an average not more than 60 per cent. of the money raised for election day is actually spent for the purpose raised. Beginning with the boss, it is "sliced out" on the way down. Part of it sticks to every pair of hands through which it passes. This is not true of all bosses or ward executives, precinct executives, or county leaders, but it unquestionably is true of a lot of them.

If the boss starts out with, say, \$35,000 or \$40,000 to distribute, he does not divide it all among the ward

executives. He will divide about \$18,000 or \$20,000 among them, give a share to certain district leaders and lieutenants who expect to be taken care of, and still have a balance. In many cases this balance goes into the boss's pocket. How much the balance is depends upon how much he gets to start with and how hard the fight is. Sometimes he can "salt down" a fourth or a third. No one knows about it. No one can prove it and he does not have to account for any of it. He cannot afford to shave the executives too closely, and does not—but the idea that all the money the boss gets for distribution on election day is passed on will not hold water.

What is true of the boss is true of the ward executives. Some of them divide up all they get, but not all of them. A good many "hold out" just as much as is safe. As for the precinct executive, if he can carry his precinct with an expenditure of \$12, why spend \$25? From the boss down this "hold out" is considered legitimate, although they all take good care to keep it secret, and no machine man was ever known to admit it. The theory is that it is necessary to spend enough money on election day to get results, but that it is foolish to spend it unnecessarily, and that a dollar saved without risking defeat or loss of prestige is a dollar earned.

Some bosses have grown rich entirely off the campaign "hold out"—utilizing to the limit the chance to conceal the big amounts that are secretly slipped them in the hot fights. Of course, the "cut" of the ward executive and the county leader is necessarily much smaller, but the fact remains that to a very considerable portion of the machine election day is a highly profitable

time. In a hot fight everybody gets a little and the boss a lot. This is one reason the machine likes a good, stiff fight, with rich candidates on each side. Then the campaign fund waxes fat and the "pickings" are juicy.

In the average city of 200,000 voters the unscrupulous boss always has a chance to "hold out" a few thousand, but the city is not too big to make it impossible to check him up if he "holds out" too much. In cities like Chicago and New York, however, where the number of registered voters runs over 1,000,000 and the campaign funds reach huge proportions, the boss can with impunity pocket many thousands in every fight, and there is no doubt at all that he does.

CHAPTER XXII

WHERE THE BOSS REALLY GETS HIS MONEY

Now, aside from his "slice" of the campaign funds, how does the professional city boss make his money?

The charge that he makes a large part of it by collecting from prostitutes, gamblers, "streetwalkers," criminals, and law violators generally, which has so frequently been made and is so generally believed, is not, in my judgment, true. Even in New York, it is not true. Certainly it is not true in the smaller cities.

I do not mean to say that there have not been bosses in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and other places who have not profited from these sources. Nor do I mean to say that in most cities there are not some politicians who "horn in" on this sort of thing. What I do mean is that where this game is played it is, in the main, a police graft, not a political one, and that it is an exceedingly rare thing for a real boss to have even an indirect connection with it. The great majority of them are wholly free from it, and have always been.

I do not believe the average boss made money that way—even in the old days of the "segregated" district and the corner saloon. Some of the smaller politicians, a certain class of criminal lawyers with a supposed political pull, and policemen of the worst type engage in this business—but not the boss. As a matter of fact,

except the police, those who collect from these elements do so largely on a bluff, lack the power they pretend to have, and profit because of the ignorant fears of the lawbreaker. Largely it is a "con" game.

There are cases, of course, where persons with powerful political friends are enabled to carry on unlawful activities under their protection, for which they pay in either cash or support. But it is rarely the boss who is hooked up in this. In the first place, he does not have to make his money that way, and in the second place, there is too much danger of a "squeal" from the fellow who is being held up, that might result in the ruin of the boss. What the people who ply their trade in violation of the law, in New York City and every other city in the country, try to do is not "fix" the boss, but "fix" the policeman on the beat—and it is no reflection upon the many thousands of honest and incorruptible policemen to say that, in many cases, they succeed. There are exceptions to all rules, but the idea that the boss makes his money by levying tribute on prostitutes and criminals is largely a fiction built up by persons who have confused small police graft with political collections, and who lack a clear-headed view of the real situation. They do not seem to realize that, if there were no other reason, the risk involved in that sort of thing renders it impracticable for the boss. It would place him too completely in the power of the crooks. It just would not work, and besides, the boss does not have to get his money that way.

Where the boss makes his big money is from the business men and the big business interests who want political protection or political favours. In every city

these interests seek the boss and employ him. Some times, he appears on their payroll, and some times he is there but does not appear.

It is, for instance, a common thing for the boss in many cities to become the paid agent of a big bonding or insurance company. With some of these companies it is a matter of policy to employ, in as many cities as they can, either the boss or some one with sufficient political strength to swing municipal and state business. There are ways, too, in all the bigger cities by which large corporations manage to compensate the boss financially for his good will and assistance. Some times they pass him out a tip on the stock market, which he can play to advantage. In New York and Chicago, and in some cities of less size, great corporations have on their staff a well-paid lawyer whose sole job is to look after their political interests, and who is picked because of his personal closeness to the boss and his ability to deal with him. And in the big cities the boss, too, has his confidential agent or lawyer who represents him in business negotiations with the corporations.

Obviously these negotiations are of a delicate and diplomatic nature. Both the corporation and the boss are interested in keeping them "under cover." Both sides watch their step with considerable care. Neither wants, except in rare cases, to deal directly with the other. Both employ intermediaries who can be absolutely trusted and who profit from the transaction.

The head of the corporation puts the matter in the hands of his lawyer, and he does not want to know anything about it. He wants no report from the lawyer.

He studiously avoids hearing any details or names. He gives him no instructions except in a general way and the conversation between them could be heard by all the world and published without harm—so long as the winks, nods, and facial expressions are not shown on the screen. He takes extreme care to keep himself in a position whereby he can go before any legislative or congressional investigation committee and, under oath, swear that at no time and in no way has he or his corporation ever spent a single dollar for political favours. Often, the head of the corporation does not even talk to his political lawyer—but, so keen is his desire to keep his heart pure, that a trusted vice-president, or his regular counsel will do the talking and O. K., without question, the political lawyer's bill for services and expenses. The idea is to secure the aid of the boss, but to put as many fences between the head of the company and the boss as possible.

And the boss shares this feeling. He does not want to do his own dealing, or his own collecting. Every boss has his confidential agent, who makes the arrangement and collects the fee. The thing has been systematized, so that the risk of exposure is reduced to a minimum, and both boss and corporation president can look each other in the eye, on the witness stand, and swear that they never saw each other before and have had no dealings.

The big "pickings" of the boss come during the sessions of the state legislatures. There is no question about that. As has been explained, the state legislatures are the supreme governing bodies in their states, with complete control of the revenue raising and tax-

ation machinery, as well as the power to grant charters and amend and repeal existing laws. It also has been shown that by reason of the inertia of the voters and their reluctance to participate in the primary elections, the bosses can and do nominate and elect to the legislatures practically whom they please, and, in every legislative body in the country, dominate and control a considerable block of deliverable votes of delegates who will, as the politicians are fond of saying, stand up on their chairs and vote aye when they get the word.

It is in the legislatures that the local business interests are most exposed to attack. Big business breathes easier when the sessions are over. All sorts of bills of which they are afraid are introduced. Some of them represent more or less genuine efforts of delegates to regulate, restrict, or raise money for the state; others, merely "bell ringers" framed by the politicians for the purpose of making it necessary for the corporations to deal with them. And sometimes the corporations have little private bills of their own which they want slipped through quietly. In all these matters the boss is needed. Things cannot be slipped through without his knowing it. Nor can the corporations, the racing interests, the moving-picture interests, the department stores, or any business combination often defeat bills aimed to injure them without "taking in" the boss or some legislative agent of the boss.

Two exceptions must be made to this. One is the rare instance when an aroused public opinion, led by the newspapers, forces through or kills measures even when fought by both boss and corporations; the second is the Anti-Saloon League. The Anti-Saloon League

can and does in a number of states both pass and defeat bills with the machine and the corporations and the newspapers all on the other side. In some States—notably Ohio—the Anti-Saloon League takes complete control of the Legislature, selects its presiding officers, frames its committees and runs it, regardless of either or both machines.

The reason it can do this is that it does not hold aloof from politics and primaries, as do the majority of the people who deplore its power, but rolls up its sleeves, gets right down into the political ring and fights the machine tooth and nail. By threats of political vengeance at the general election, by cajolery and promise of support, and through its activity and force becoming in the country districts the balance of power between the parties, it compels the nomination of candidates, who will “vote right” on League measures, or extract pledges from machine candidates that they will do so. Under terror of political annihilation at the polls, it scares members of the legislatures into submission even when their personal convictions are wholly against the measures proposed. That is the way the League “put over” prohibition.

In other words, the League is a political machine, of which the state superintendent is the boss and the pastors of the supporting churches are the ward executives and county leaders. There is, of course, no reason why business men of any city or state, or the Anti-Prohibitionists, or the racing people, or any other group who think the same way and have a common interest, or just the voters who are in favour of clean politics and against bosses and corporations who deal with

each other, cannot also organize machines and exert the same kind of influence. There is no reason why they cannot do it, but they do not do it. Either it is too much trouble, or it takes too much time and money, or they do not care sufficiently, or they have not a cause for which they can publicly appeal, or there is some other reason, and they would rather not make the effort.

It is, of course, infinitely easier and more convenient for the business interests simply to deal with the boss, pay his price, and avoid the fight. Exactly that perfectly natural tendency to take the easiest way is the thing that enables bosses to grow rich and machines to grow powerful and continue in undisputed domination of legislative bodies in all the states. But, the Anti-Saloon League took the other road—and got what it wanted.

The point I wish to make is that if the legitimate business interests of a state, with legitimate issues at stake, adopted Anti-Saloon League methods, they could drive bosses out of legislative lobbies and pretty nearly starve them to death. It is all a question of energy. To the business man, to the average voter, the very idea of going through the strenuousness of the long struggle, coupled with innate distaste for the game and almost complete ignorance of it, makes the thing unthinkable. And so, they take the other way—the easy way—and either deal with the boss or let him run politics as he will.

The legislative session is the harvest season with all the bosses, big and little. They all meet there—the big city boss with his big block of voters and the individual county bosses, with their little blocks of hand-picked delegates. They trade, and deal, and dicker, join forces

and get on opposite sides over the multitudinous measures that touch some financial nerves somewhere. It is a great game—bosses and lobbyists, and lawyers, and hangers-on—they all flock to the state capitol. The delegates, supposed to represent the people, are pulled and hauled, bought and sold, individually and in blocks, persuaded or tricked. The independent and intelligent delegates are always in a small minority.

The big state bosses, who are not in politics for money, get in the game, too, and either are there in person or have their agents. Political measures get tied up with financial bills, party platform pledges are sidetracked for pet corporation babies—the whole thing is a glorious tangle. All the bosses and lobbyists and lawyers and interested agents sweat and fight and curse and try to get “in on” as many things as they can—make hay while the legislative sun shines.

Mingled with them are the Anti-Saloon League agents, the worried and bewildered representatives of societies and organizations for civic betterment, reformers of one sort or another, women who want to get their “rights,” heads of state institutions anxious about their annual appropriations, and a variety of others. It is a bewildering whirl toward the last, when the legislative calendars are choked, the files bulge with bills, and the crisis approaches. But the boss is not bewildered. He knows his way around. He keeps close tab on the bills in which he is interested, knows exactly their status all the time, checks up on the roll call, keeps his votes in line, and usually comes out of the session with a practically perfect score—and no one knows how much money.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

THE key to the political machine, the hall mark of the boss, the sign that he is in the saddle—is control of the state central committee.

Just as the legislature is the supreme governing body of the state, so is the state central committee the supreme governing body of the party in the state. Members of the state central committee are elected separately, by the counties and city legislative districts, in simultaneous party primaries, usually every two years—in some states every four years. Each county and city committee, following its election in the primaries, meets and elects from its membership its local chairman. Then the whole state-wide committee meets and elects from its membership a state chairman. With the Democrats in Maryland, and in one or two other places, there are curious variations of this method, but the principle is the same.

Theoretically, the state chairman is the leader of his party in the state. Chosen by a body directly created by the vote of the rank and file of party voters, springing, it might be said, straight from the loins of the party people, it would seem that the state chairman was the natural leader, the real party boss, as a result of the will of the party voters registered at the polls. It

would seem, too, that the local chairmen in the counties and the city chairmen as well were, under this democratic method of selection, the natural leaders, the selected party bosses of their respective localities. That is the theory of it. They certainly ought to be. It is hard to understand why they are not. Once more, the whole answer is the failure of the average citizen to inform himself on politics, to realize the vital importance of the state central committee, and his willingness to leave its selection to the politicians, as a matter in which he has no interest.

How many voters, outside of the machine, concern themselves or post themselves about the men who periodically appear on the ballot as candidates for the state central committee in the precinct where they live? How many appreciate that failure to elect these candidates would depose the local boss, strip the machine of its power, and bring about a new political deal?

Actually the state chairman, in 99 out of 100 cases, instead of being the real leader, is simply a figurehead, a politically dominated man, controlled by the real leader, whose influence made him chairman and who can as easily retire him. In every state the members of the state central committee are "hand picked" and "hard boiled." They are absolutely and completely controlled by the boss, who holds control of the machine just so long and no longer than he holds control of the committee.

In rare instances the real boss himself is chairman of his local county committee, but not often. Nearly always he prefers to have there a trusted follower and friend who will act for him. This makes it unnecessary

for him to run in the primaries or personally appear on the ballot. The city boss almost never is personally a member of the committee. That would bring him out in the open and, perhaps, arouse the voters to the importance of the thing.

The reasons why the state central committee is vital to the boss can be summarized as follows:

The state committee or its chairman fixes the date for the party primaries.

It fixes the date and makes the arrangements for the state and city conventions.

The state chairman is in charge of state headquarters and the official managing director of the state campaign.

The state chairman, either personally or through the treasurer named by him, collects and handles the campaign fund, supervises campaign expenditures, buys supplies, puts clerks and other helpers on the headquarters pay roll, and really runs the fight. Back of him always is the boss.

In addition to all this, the state central committee as a whole and in each legislative district and county unit has a very great influence in the matter of state patronage. In every county and in every city the governor of a state has many little local appointments of justices of the peace, notaries, members of the school board, game wardens, inspectors of one thing or another, and the like. Besides, nearly every county and city is recognized in the apportionment of the larger and better-paid places. In all of these the local state committee is considered. Its recommendations always carry great weight and in most cases are conclusive.

The governor hesitates to turn down the names indorsed and presented by the local committee. To do so means to ignore the local party machine and the local boss back of it. It is not often done.

But, more important to the machine than all the rest, is the local board of supervisors of elections. These are almost invariably appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the local committees of the two parties. In some cases, as has been shown, the law compels him to accept their recommendations for two of the three places on the boards. Control of these boards, as has been pointed out, gives the machine in its own locality the judges and clerks of election and the right to select the polling places.

Also, just as the state chairman runs the state campaign and collects the state campaign fund, so does each local committee run its local campaign and collect its local fund. Enough has been said to make plain that, political figureheads though its membership may be, the control of the state central committee is the prime essential for the boss. Take away that control and he is gone.

The lesson of all this is that the place to beat the boss and his machine is in the primaries. When you defeat his candidates in the general election, you merely make him more careful and skilful next time. He provides more "perfumery" for his ticket and camouflages its presentation, but his power is untouched and his machine is intact. But, beat him in the primaries and he is badly jolted and greatly weakened. He can stand losing his candidate for mayor or governor in the general election, but he cannot well stand failure to nomi-

nate them in the primaries. Occasionally, however, if he still retains his grip on the state committee, he can stand a primary defeat. He is considerably shaken, but he stays quiet, waits for the wind to die down, and then gathers up the pieces and, through the complacency and inertia of the voters, who always lapse back into inactivity after the excitement, begins to function again.

But, take away his central committee in the primaries—beat his candidates for those inconspicuous and little-appreciated offices, and it is a death blow. As a boss, he is permanently shelved. So little is the real significance of the state central committee grasped by the voters, outside the machine, that in most cases the boss's candidates for these places are elected without opposition. No one takes the trouble to put up opposing candidates and make a fight. Actually, the only real fights are between the politicians. They know the importance of it, and when a rival to the boss develops in the machine, his goal is the local state central committee. If he gets that, then he is boss.

In each state there are variations in the size of the state central committee. It ranges all the way from eleven members in some states to more than 200 in others. In some cities there is a member from each ward; in others one, two, three, or five from each legislative district. In some states the counties are represented on the committee on the basis of total population, or the number of registered voters. Most of the states, however, have the simple method of making the membership of the state central committee for each legislative district and county identical in size with

the membership of the county or district in the state legislature. There is, however, no fixed rule. It is a matter of party custom or convenience. In some cities and states it is not compulsory that the chairman shall be a member of the committee, although that is the usual party custom, but he may be chosen by the committee from the outside.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE AND NATIONAL BOSSSES

SO FAR, this story has dealt exclusively with state and city politics and has not touched the national field.

As a matter of fact, national politics is state and city politics. In Presidential campaigns the state lines are not obliterated, and the national campaign is conducted in each state and city by the same machines and bosses and committees which have been described. The national headquarters supplies literature, speakers, and money to aid in the state campaigns, but all these go to the state committees and are used without restraint as the state committees direct. The national headquarters and managers have neither jurisdiction nor authority over the states in a national campaign. All they can do is help out, offer coöperation, and depend entirely upon the party spirit, loyalty, and skill of the state managers.

The national conventions nominate candidates for President and Vice-President and adopt platforms, but the names of these national candidates are placed on the ballot in each state not by national political agencies, but by the state agency. And the names of the electors for President and Vice-President, who, under our system of government, elect the President

and Vice-President, are selected exclusively by the state—without advice or assistance from the outside.

There is only one way in which the state political machine is hooked up with the national political machine—and that is through the national committee. Actually, there is no national machine comparable to the state or city machines, and there is no national boss in either party. All there is to the national machine is the national committee, and this committee functions only every four years, during the national campaign. The rest of the time it is wholly dormant. It is composed, in the Republican party, of one member from each state and territory, and, in the Democratic party, of one man and one woman from each state and territory.

In most states, the state member, or members, of the national committee are chosen by the delegates selected by the state to the national convention. In a few places they are elected in party primaries, and, in one or two states, by the state conventions.

Usually the member of the national committee from the state is the state leader or boss. Often he is a United States Senator, as the Senate is frequently the goal for which those state bosses who are not in politics for money but for honour or power and position strive. Only in rare instances is the professional city boss a member of the national committee. It is the custom to have the state represented on the national committee by a really representative party man. Close to a majority of the whole membership is composed of United States Senators or ex-Senators. In many states it is regarded as somewhat of a Senatorial prerogative if the Senator

happens to have real political strength and is not simply a political accident.

Take the national committee as a whole, of either party, and it is a fairly representative body of strong men, of a distinctly higher grade than members of the state central committees. Nor are they the political figureheads the state central committeemen are. It is, so far as I know, the one party body or committee of which a majority of the members are not politically dominated and controlled by persons outside of the committee. There are on the national committees some men, of course, who have been put there by state bosses and are merely political agents, but the bulk of the membership is composed of the state bosses themselves. And they are independent of each other. Each is a separate political unit with power in his own state, but none in the states of his neighbours.

It would seem that there would develop out of this membership a natural leader who would dominate enough of the others to become a national machine boss. One reason why this does not happen is the extremely limited scope of the national committee, and the shortness of its period of activity. The complete political independence of the state machines prevents the national committee from gaining a foothold in any of the states and keeps it from expanding its power and prerogatives.

Another reason why the national machine boss does not develop is that the chairman of the national committee changes with every national campaign. It is the privilege of the candidate for President to name the chairman of the committee to conduct his campaign.

He picks a close personal friend upon whom he can absolutely rely. For the purposes of the campaign the national chairman is boss—but all there is for him to boss is the national headquarters. That, in itself, is a big job, involving enormous labour and the expenditure of millions of dollars, but it does not give him real political power in the states, or any means, save the one of party appeal, to compel the coöperation of the local machines.

The nearest approach to a national boss in this country is the President of the United States. The power of the federal patronage and the prestige of the Presidency itself is so great that the President, if he chooses, can pretty nearly dominate the national committee during his term of office. It is an accepted political fact that a Republican President can, through the federal offices, renominate himself. In the Republican Party—particularly in the South—the state machines are largely built around the federal jobs and, in many cities, the Republican boss is the collector of the port or the internal revenue collector, or holds some similar position. It is somewhat harder for a Democratic President to renominate himself than a Republican one, because the Democratic National Convention requires a two-thirds vote of all the delegates for the nomination, while the Republican candidates are named by a majority vote. In spite of this, there have been extraordinarily few Presidents of either party who have failed of renomination for a second term.

It can be fairly stated that the President is not only the national leader of his party, but can boss the national committee if he so desires. His power over the committee, however, vanishes completely when he

steps out of office. So does that of his political agents and lieutenants through whom he has exerted the political pressure.

The late Mark Hanna, during the two McKinley Administrations, dominated and controlled the Republican National Committee and was regarded as the Republican boss. He had the power only because he was close to the President and in practical control of the distribution of all federal patronage. It is an enormous lever. The number of federal office-holders is very great, and there are more now than ever before. By judicious apportionment of these offices in the different states, Hanna was enabled to gain a power that made him the dictator of the national conventions and the boss of the national committee—but only while his friend McKinley lived and was President. When McKinley died and Roosevelt became President, the Hanna power not only waned—it disappeared, and Frank Hitchcock, Roosevelt's Postmaster-General and political agent, became the dominant force in the Republican national machine.

When the party is out of power and the federal patronage lever is not available, there is no dominating influence in the national committee or in the national convention. The latter meet without real leadership and the struggle for the Presidential prize is more or less open and free. Eventually, the bosses of the states with the bigger delegations trade and deal until a combination that will control the necessary votes is formed. Then they "put it over," but when a one-term President desires another term he can always secure at least another chance at it by a renomination.

Besides the fact that by the exertion of his power the President can renominate himself there is another reason why he is almost invariably renominated. This is because, unless he has broken down in health or has sickened of his job, failure by his party to renominate him is equivalent to a repudiation of its own leader and its own record. It has nothing to stand on, no chance to "point with pride," no claim for a continuance in power because of accomplishment and good faith with the people. It starts out in the campaign handicapped and on the defensive. It would be an admission that they had not "made good." This is an untenable position for a national party. It must not permit itself to be manœuvered into it. Even if it has to draft its President for a second term, it wants him to run. There are, for instance, few clear-headed politicians who have much doubt that President Harding would have been renominated by the Republican convention of 1924, had he lived. Barring some personal reason, such as his own health or that of his wife, failure to renominate him would, in the judgment of most experienced men, have doomed the party to defeat from the start.

The national committees come actively to life in the December before the November of the Presidential election. They meet in Washington, and there fix the date for the national conventions and select the cities where they are to be held. Usually the dates are the last part of June and the first part of July. There is always competition among the cities for the honour of having the conventions. Delegations from rival cities appear, offer to raise \$100,000 or \$150,000 or more, if the committee will come to their city. There is much

pulling of wires and, generally, a spirited fight. Finally the city is selected, and usually it is the city that has bid highest. Then the committee names a sergeant-at-arms, who has charge of the physical preparations for the convention, the arrangement of seats, the hiring of help, the distribution of badges and tickets, decorations, music, etc. It is really a big political plum, and the sergeant-at-arms has great power. He has the appointment of numerous assistants, deputies, guards, clerks, and office help. There is keen competition among members of the national committee for their share of these appointments, as they are in great demand among the politicians in their states, all of whom like to go to the national conventions.

After the sergeant-at-arms has been named, the city chosen, and the date fixed, the national committee issues the call for the national convention, and adjourns. It does not come to life again until the convention meets. Then it assembles a few days before the opening in the city selected and frames up the temporary organization of the convention. It selects a temporary chairman and temporary secretary and maps out the programmes for the opening day. They also pass on the credentials of delegates for the temporary roll call of the convention, deciding in case of contest which delegates are entitled to appear on the temporary roll. When all this is coupled with the ability of the temporary chairman to name the committee on credentials, it amounts to practical control of the convention. Almost always the little group of men who control the national committee can control the national convention. Almost always the temporary organization is made the

permanent organization, and, with the national committee against it, there is small chance of a contesting delegation getting by.

After the national convention the committee again meets, in New York or Chicago, and then elects as chairman the man whom the Presidential candidate indicates as his choice. The rest of the national campaign is in his hands. He establishes headquarters in New York and Chicago, begins to build up his headquarters organization, form his finance committee, and gather his speakers and ammunition. It is a huge job, this running of a national campaign, and it takes millions of dollars and great political knowledge and skill—but it is the newly elected chairman who runs it, not the national committee. The committee does not meet again, except in emergency, for four more years. The chairman is the boss while the campaign lasts. If it is successful, he is usually rewarded with a Cabinet job and becomes a conspicuous figure in the new Administration. If it is unsuccessful he drops out of sight, and the public generally forgets his name.

CHAPTER XXV

WHY OHIO PRODUCES SO MANY CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT

THE fact that Ohio, in Mark Hanna, produced the nearest thing the country ever had to a national political boss, is not the reason so many presidents come from that state.

Since 1869, seven of the fourteen men who have lived in the White House were born in Ohio, and six lived there when nominated.

The real reasons are much more fundamental. Here are three of them, upon which men in both parties, who know most about Ohio politics, agree:

First, because it is in Ohio more than anywhere else that the political currents of the country meet, mingle, and amalgamate. The electorate there is tinged with the thought of the East and flavoured with the feeling of the West. To a certain extent, too, it is the gateway through which flow tides from North to South and from South to North. It is middle ground and battle ground, and the drift of Ohio is pretty apt to be the drift of the country.

Second, because there is more genuine independent voting in Ohio than in any other state in the Union. For instance, there are in the single county of Franklin, in which is located Columbus, at least 25,000

voters who are habitually and wholly free from party ties, who swing from party to party and back without the slightest sense of party obligation or restraint. These are habitual independents and not merely Democrats or Republicans temporarily "off the party reservation." They are voters who have no party home, and there are several hundred thousand of them in the state.

Third, because the state being neither Democratic nor Republican with anything like reasonable security, politicians in both parties play the game with a greater degree of intensity than anywhere else and political organization is more effective and efficient than anywhere else. To win, Ohio politicians have to be smarter than those in other states—and they are, also, more unrestrained. Things are said and done in Ohio politics, on both sides, that could not occur in other states without violent reaction—for instance, the frightful filth of the Harding-Cox fight in 1920.

These are the reasons, I think, why Ohio got her start over the rest of the states in the matter of producing Presidents. Of course, now there is another and very potent reason. Ohio, having gained national recognition as a pivotal state whose Presidential candidates are usually successful, naturally capitalizes that recognition. This works in several ways. Unquestionably the Presidential aspirations of Ohio politicians are tremendously stimulated by the acknowledged fact that more Ohio men are nominated for the Presidency than from any other state, and that, therefore, the chances of a man seriously stung by the Presidential bee to land the nomination in one party or the other are better than

if he lived somewhere else. This naturally produces more candidates. It means that in Ohio men seriously aspire and are seriously considered for the Presidency who would be laughed at in other states.

Sometimes these men get the nominations. Sometimes they do not. Every governor of Ohio, for instance, is a Presidential possibility. He may not be a great governor or a great man, but the fact that he has come to the front in Ohio politics, and has once carried Ohio in a state-wide election, places him more directly in line for a Presidential nomination than does any other position in the world—even the governorship of New York. The same thing is almost as true with an Ohio senator. Every governor and every senator in this state is an active candidate for the Presidency, and this has been so of them all for the past thirty years. Some of them never get out in the open as candidates. Many of them are mere political accidents and drop out of political consideration shortly after their election, but there is not one of them who does not regard an Ohio election as a start on the road to the Presidency. He knows, for instance, that when the national convention meets there is likely to be a deadlock over the nomination. In that case, the plea that "he can carry Ohio" acquires a force that has swung more than one man, of a mental stature that would preclude his being put forward by any other great state, over the line as the head of the ticket. So, why not he?

This is not to say that there have not been Presidential aspirants and Presidential candidates from Ohio of full Presidential size, but it is to say that, for the reasons given, men do aspire to the Presidency in Ohio—and

have sometimes been nominated—who would not be taken seriously outside of Ohio. The fact that since 1869 but one President of the United States—Grover Cleveland—has been chosen without the twenty-four electoral votes of Ohio—is a significant one, which has been—and will be again—used by Ohio politicians and President-makers with great effect in national conventions.

Another thing which, in the judgment of some of the best posted political observers in the state, aids in the development of Presidential candidates in Ohio, is the fact that, through Ohio Presidents, the state has for many years received a greater proportionate share of federal patronage than any other in the Union. Every President elected from Ohio—and every other President for that matter—is a candidate for a second term. Obviously, he cannot be renominated unless his state is solidly behind him and unless his party machine is well nourished, vigorously and militantly for him. Naturally, therefore, the Ohio President drenches Ohio with federal offices, feeds the political leaders and newspaper editors with federal plums, scatters broadcast federal favours of many kinds. The extent to which this has been done in Ohio is not generally grasped, but it is very great. It is not only the federal offices which go to the state out of proportion to its rank that count, but there are a multitude of small federal perquisites and preferences, legal employments, public honours of one sort or another, junkets and “influence” that are used with vast political effect. Always, too, when there is an Ohio President, there is one member of the Cabinet from Ohio—sometimes two—and that helps in

getting for Ohio still more of these federal favours that mean so much to politicians. Always, the Ohio president names an Ohio man as a member of his Cabinet, and that member is generally his closest adviser and friend. Thus, to the distinction of having furnished many more Presidents in the last fifty years than any other state, Ohio adds that of having had many more members of the Presidential Cabinet than any other.

All of these things cultivate among Ohio people a stronger taste for politics than is possessed by citizens anywhere else. The rewards for political activity are not only larger but much more numerous and, therefore, easier to obtain. More people, proportionately, play politics in Ohio because the inducements are greater. Naturally, the fact that so many Ohio men—not all of the first grade, either—have become Presidents and members of Presidential Cabinets, is the overwhelming reason to-day why so many more men in Ohio actively aspire for Presidential nominations. The facility with which the state has, in the past, elected Presidents breeds Presidential candidates as nothing else would. There has not been for a generation a time when there was not in Ohio at least one, often two, and sometimes three, potential Presidential candidates. Take ten years ago for instance: there were Cox, Pomerene, Willis, and ex-Justice Clarke, to say nothing of Newton D. Baker. One of these was a Presidential nominee, one was a member of the Supreme Bench, one Secretary of War. What state in the Union can match this list of men quite potentially Presidential possibilities?

It is not only Ohio Presidents who recognize Ohio disproportionately in the matter of federal patronage,

but, to a modified degree, the same policy is followed by those infrequent Presidents who do not come from Ohio. So soundly founded is the reputation of the state as a political pivot, so well established is its claim for political preference, that it is by these considered essential political policy to take special care of Ohio in all matters of federal patronage. For instance, Cleveland, Wilson, and Roosevelt each gave to Ohio a Cabinet position, although none of the three was an Ohio man.

Inevitably the state increases in political power under this sort of treatment. The more it gets the more it is in a position to get. Candidates develop for Presidential nominations and Cabinet positions because the chances are good. State political machines grow strong because they are extraordinarily well nourished. Bosses are powerful because they have big jobs and a lot of them to distribute.

The point I wish to make is that, while the location of the state and the character of the voters unquestionably account for Ohio's initial advantage in producing Presidents, making of it a logical place to look for candidates, the cumulative political effect of having had seven Ohio Presidents is the thing that to-day makes the state in many ways the most important and significant politically in the Union, notwithstanding the fact that there are a number of others which have greater electoral votes.

One other thing might be said about Ohio politics that is usually overlooked. That is that independent movements and fusion tickets are so rare there as to be practically unknown. The simple reason for this is

that two great parties are so evenly divided, and the political balance so nicely adjusted, that there is neither room nor need for independent movements. Independent or fusion tickets usually make their appearance in states where one party is normally in the majority and the other normally in the minority. In states like these, the majority party, through abuse of long-continued power, creates a condition that gives rise to the independent movement or fusion ticket. In Ohio, no such condition exists. Neither party stays in control of the state long enough to sow the seeds for such movements. The swing of the really independent voters from party to party changes control so often that public resentment against one party or one machine does not sufficiently accumulate to express itself that way.

It is a condition that keeps both Democrats and Republicans in Ohio full of political hope all the time, encourages candidates of all kinds, and prevents one party from having a monopoly of the Presidential aspirants.

Ten years ago, both parties nominated an Ohio man for President. If another Democratic National Convention gets into the same kind of jam as it did in 1920 at San Francisco, there need be no surprise if a compromise candidate breaks through there again with the old argument—"he can carry Ohio." It is not probable next time that both candidates will come from Ohio, but it is always possible. Had President Harding lived, one candidate in 1924 would certainly have come from Ohio, for his party fully expected to renominate him.

The oftener Ohio nominates a Presidential candidate, the oftener she is likely to do so.

CHAPTER XXVI

HOW THE MACHINE HANDLES THE WOMAN VOTE

THE part played by women in the ten years since they have had the vote and the way in which the political machines have adjusted themselves to this new class of voters forms an interesting chapter in politics.

In the first place, the idea that woman suffrage has doubled the vote is not well founded. It has greatly increased the vote, but it has by no means doubled it. The fact is that considerably less than one half as many women register as men. This proportion holds true in every section of the country. It will not, however, hold true indefinitely.

Despite an occasional shrinkage here and there, the number of women who qualify as voters is growing every year. Eventually, the figures of the male and female registration will be relatively the same, although there probably always will be a preponderance of men.

As yet, politics is a new game to women. There is a woeful lack of political knowledge and political interest among men, but naturally the proportion among women is far greater. They have a better excuse. They have not had time to learn and, until they got the vote, not much reason for informing themselves.

A considerable number of women were strongly oppose to the suffrage amendment and some of them are

still unreconciled to having the vote, as they see it, thrust upon them. Many of these decline to register and refuse to interest themselves in politics or political questions. The number of such women, however, is bound to decrease all the time, and lots of those who were most violently opposed to giving women the vote appreciate that now they have it the only sensible thing to do is to use it. Otherwise they will be governed by those who do use it, and it is hardly possible for intelligent women to hold the view that this fact does not concern them. They know, if they think at all, that it very much concerns them.

The actual situation as it exists to-day can best be shown by an analysis of the registration figures in any great city in the country. Take Baltimore as a typical community—between those great cities of more than 1,000,000 and the smaller ones around 200,000. With a population of 735,000 there are in Baltimore a few more than 40,000 men qualified to register, but who do not, and there are nearly 80,000 women who could register and do not.

On the registration lists as they stood early in 1923 there were 130,725 men and 63,943 women. The total registration, men and women, was 194,668, which means that considerably less than one third of the voters qualified to register but who have not registered are women. Of that 194,668 total, 72,563 men and 33,107 women registered as Democrats; 46,607 men and 26,138 women registered as Republicans. This shows that less than one third of the total Democratic registration was female, whereas more than one third of the Republican registration was female.

The explanation of this is that the Negro women in Baltimore have been rounded up by the local Republican machine and are registered, in proportion, considerably heavier than the white women. To that extent woman suffrage has been a gain to the Republicans, in Maryland and in other states, outside of the far South, where the Negro vote is of any real size. More than one third of the total Republican registration in Baltimore is coloured. A hundred per cent. of the Democratic registration is white. This is also true of other states in all parts of the country.

Another significant fact about the Baltimore registration is that the 4,698 women who registered but declined to state their party affiliation are all white. All of the Negro women who registered declared themselves Republicans, which gives them practically two votes, one in the Republican primary and one in the general election. Of the 80,000 women in Baltimore who failed to register the best estimate is that fully 70,000 are white.

Another interesting thing about the woman registration everywhere is that, while it was far below the male registration, a smaller proportion of the women, than of men, who register fail to vote. In other words, the politicians who get at the facts know that when a woman takes the trouble to register she can be counted on more surely to vote, at least in the general election, than the registered male, of whom there are large numbers who regularly register and just as regularly fail to vote.

So far as the machine is concerned, the first person to recover from the shock of the suffrage amendment was the precinct executive. To him it was immediately

a matter of highly practical concern. Suddenly—overnight, as it were—there were twice as many potential voters in his little political kingdom as before. There had been approximately 300 persons over twenty-one years old in his precinct who could become political effectives; now there are 600. This meant that to be sure of keeping his political grip on the precinct, to retain his ability to deliver it in the primaries and to measure up to his percentage in the general election, he had, somehow, to double his strength. So he set to work. Nobody had to tell him what to do. The boss did not have to send “the word” down the line. Self-interest did that. His job was in jeopardy and he started out to save it.

First, he registered the women of his own family—his wife, sister, mother, and daughter. Then, if he had married sons, he saw that their wives and mothers-in-law were registered. Next he went after the judges and clerks of election in his precinct, who are appointed on his recommendation, and then after every single political jobholder in the precinct with whom he had direct or indirect influence, and made every one of them realize the vital importance to them and to him of getting their women relatives registered—and not only registered but out to vote in the primaries. In other words, he went through his precinct with a fine-tooth comb and made every machine man in it, and every man whom the machine could reach, responsible for the registration of his female relatives. When he had thoroughly done this job—and precinct executives in both parties all over the country did do it—he felt safe, even under a doubled vote.

But the vote did not double. Less than half as many women registered as men. The women he had worked to get, however, did register and did vote, just as the machine men register and vote. Therefore, greatly to his gratification, the precinct executive, whom women suffrage had at first thoroughly scared, found as a result his strength increased and his grip on his precinct in the primaries tightened. And, if his strength has increased, automatically the ward executive's, the district leader's, and the boss's are correspondingly increased because the foundation of the whole organization is the precinct and the precinct executive. If the precinct executive is strong, the machine is strong; if he is weak, the machine is weak. One thing that may be set down as sure is this—from the boss clear to the bottom, the female relatives of every man in the machine are registered and voting female relatives.

CHAPTER XXVII

EFFECT OF WOMEN ON MACHINE STRENGTH

THE undeniable fact is that in every city in the country and in every state woman suffrage has increased the power of the political machines and the political bosses, particularly in the primaries, where all nominations are made. This may be rather an unpalatable statement to many women, who believe that female suffrage has a tendency to purify politics and lift it to a somewhat higher plane. The truth is, that there is a real foundation for this belief and the women voters have had a not inconsiderable influence on the tone of the machine and on the way it plays the game. But it is also a fact that the failure of the women to register as heavily as the men has added to its inherent primary power.

This would not be true, of course, if women voted with real independence, but, notwithstanding numerous exceptions, the vast bulk of women voters in every state vote exactly as their husbands, sons, brothers, or other male relatives vote. This is almost invariably true of the women whose male relatives are directly or indirectly connected with the machine, and it is wholly natural that it should be. There are few women who could be induced to vote against the personal interest of the men of their families, and an anti-machine vote,

or even failure to vote with the machine, on the part of a woman whose male relative is part of the machine is a vote directly against his personal interest—aimed squarely at his method of making a living.

Even when there is no machine influence, it is natural for the women voter, inexperienced and uninformed in politics and without the facts about candidates and issues, to look for and accept political guidance from the more politically wise male members of her family—and most of them do. There are, of course, plenty of thoroughly informed and independent women, who do their own political thinking and voting and in some cases do it better and more intelligently than the men, but that does not alter the fact that to-day the great bulk of the woman vote is practically a deliverable vote—in the hands of the male relatives.

It is the testimony of practical politicians all over the country that the women as voters have not changed any political situation or altered the political complexion of any locality. Even on the so-called moral issues the women have not voted one way and the men the other. The family vote, as a rule, hung closely together before woman suffrage came, and it still hangs together now that the women have the vote. It is a rare thing for father and son to belong to separate parties or vote against each other, and it is even rarer for husband and wife to split politically—although of course it sometimes happens. But it can be accepted as a political rule that nineteen times out of twenty the family votes as a unit.

As the years roll by, the disparity between the male and the female registration is bound to decrease until it

practically disappears. So, too, will the lack of political information upon the part of the women voters decrease. Appreciation of the importance not only of registration and voting but of intelligent and informed voting among the women is sure to grow. And as it grows the additional power which the present easily manipulated woman vote gives the political machine not only will vanish, but the machine job will become harder and the machine itself weaker. Independent voting plus political knowledge ultimately will prove a powerful weapon in the hands of women, but the great bulk of them have now neither political independence nor political knowledge. Those among them who have either or both will be the first to admit the truth of this statement.

It is true, however, that the woman vote, even as it is, has had a distinctly improving effect on practical politics. Any machine man will concede that. The ward executives not only opened their clubs to women, but make a special drive to have them at the meetings and club nights. And their presence has caused the "Muldoons" to "spruce up." Both their collars and their language are cleaner. The precinct executive, the ward executive, the district leaders and the boss are all a little more careful of their conduct—watch their step a little closer.

The machine leaders recognize that, while in the bulk of the precincts the woman vote is disposed to "go along" without trouble, the instinctive revolt of women against crookedness in politics and immorality generally is stronger and surer than among men. Since the vote was given to women, the whole tendency of the machine

is in the direction of decency, and the idea in precincts and wards is to make the organization attractive to women—not repulsive.

As a result women are beginning to play the game with the machine. In the last election in the Bronx there were literally thousands of women workers under the Tammany organization for "Al" Smith. It is good politics for the machine to recognize and encourage the women in political activity. The Democratic National Committee has doubled its membership so as to provide for one woman from each state and territory. In various states, including Maryland, they have been given equal representation on the state central committees or, at least, some representation. In many precincts they are now named as judges and clerks of election and not a few are employed by precinct and ward executives on election day as runners and messengers.

Not only are they being taken into the ward clubs, but in some cases they have ward clubs of their own directly affiliated with the machine. Also, the ward and precinct executives are beginning to distribute among women certain small political places, and here and there the machine gets behind a woman for nomination to the city council or the legislature, or in some cities for the school board. Mayors and governors, feeling their potential power, are placing them on boards and commissions and in various state jobs.

So far as the machine is concerned all bars are down to the women. Not only that, but in every city and state in the country both machines are actively after the woman vote. As an obvious matter of self-interest

each machine is forced to do all it can to get the women whose political inclinations are toward the machine's party to register and vote. For one machine to fail in this is to give the other machine a tremendous advantage in the general election. So both sides are hard at it. Of course, with equal success in getting the women on the books, the machines and the parties neither change their relative strength nor alter the political complexion of their locality. All they do is preserve the balance of power, but that is an exceedingly essential thing for them to do.

Just as the woman vote, in its present state of partial registration and political inexperience, has increased the power of the political machine, so has it correspondingly increased the political strength of various semi-political groups such as the Anti-Saloon League, the labour organizations, the Ku Klux Klan, and other associations and groups which vote for or against candidates on some special issue or because of some particular prejudice. What the women have done is to increase numerically the machines and these groups without altering their relative proportions to one another.

If women voted, for instance, with the solidarity and singleness of purpose of the Anti-Saloon League forces it is easy to see they could bring about a political revolution in the country. They could smash machines, bend bosses to their will, and put in effect whatever reforms they pleased. Actually they could run things politically as they wanted—at least for a while. Ultimately, of course, such sex solidarity would produce its answer, but for a time, any way, they would “have the

country in a sling" and things never would be the same again.

But women do not and never will vote that way. There are as many varieties of women as there are of men—perhaps more. They divide and disagree in much the same way and over much the same things, and they are swayed by much the same arguments. Women neither feel alike nor think alike, and while they are no more the creatures of prejudice than are men, they do not and will not vote alike.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE MACHINE AND THE MERIT SYSTEM

THERE are two ways by which political machines and bosses could be reduced to such a state of feebleness that their dominating influence over the nomination of candidates for public office would disappear.

One, of course, is through the awakening of the independent voters to the necessity of participating in the primaries—the opening of their eyes to the fact that here lies the heart of politics. That would be the better way, as they could strike then at the very roots of machine control and take away the ease with which the machine now limits the choice of the voters in the general election to its choice in the primaries.

The other way is by the adoption of the civil service, or, as it is generally called, the merit system, in state and city government. By this is meant that all municipal and state employees, instead of being appointed without restriction by mayors, governors, and heads of departments, first shall pass an examination designed to test their fitness for the particular place they want and then selections are made based upon their showing in the examination. The key to the system, however, is the protection given the job-holder after his appointment, through the provision that he cannot be removed except for inefficiency or misconduct, and only then

after charges have been made and publicly heard. Briefly, this means that a capable and honest man or woman cannot secure a city or state job solely because of political influence, nor be thrown out either because of a loss of political influence or a change in the administration.

Neither of these things would completely abolish machines or put politicians out of business. There is no way to do that, and, as has been shown, some sort of volunteer machine is essential to orderly election procedure if confusion and chaos are to be avoided. They would, however, so diminish the power of the machine that most of the evil features which make it a menace and a burden to the people would be lost.

Fully and sympathetically enforced in city and state, the merit system as soon as its permanency came to be accepted, would bring about two results:

First—It would take away from the machine that great slice of patronage pie which constitutes its chief nourishment.

Second—By making their jobs non-political and secure, it would shut off the regular flow of cash that comes from the frequent campaign assessment of the job-holders.

Without jobs to distribute to the "Muldoons" and with an emaciated fund for the primary fights, there certainly would be a tremendous shrinkage in machine strength. In the first place, the big and easy rewards that make so many men practise politics as a profession would vanish. There would not be a living in it for nearly so many persons. In the second place, if political strength and political pull are not to be compensated by

a connection with the public payroll, the purpose of acquiring such strength and pull would be largely lost to a multitude of machine men. If the boss lacks the power to make political jobs for his followers, why follow him? If, in addition, the campaign funds are to wither and dry up, what is there in professional politics to hold a mercenary machine together?

None of this means that, even under the most rigid merit system, the machine would go out of business. There will always be a certain field for political influence, a certain number of political jobs, perquisites, and privileges, and certain ways by which politicians go around or through the merit system. No plan has yet been devised, or is likely to be, that will make these things impossible. But it does mean that, under ideal conditions, the machine field would be greatly restricted and the machine power greatly curtailed.

Under ideal conditions the merit system would stabilize the city or state government by removing political influences and party regularity as the prime qualifications for office. It would promote efficiency by rendering impossible the wholesale turning out of office, every time there is a change in administration, of many thousands of men who have just begun to know their work well enough to do it and are beginning to have a real value. It would prevent the kind of thing that happens in state after state, when a new governor of different political faith takes hold and appoints new heads of departments from his own party. At once the process of displacing employees of one party with those of the other party begins, and continues until the turn over is complete. Under

ideal conditions, all the capable job-holders who do their work would be entirely safe and free from obligations to the machine, either for past or future favours.

But ideal conditions seldom prevail in this world anywhere—and never in politics. No law works practically as well as it does theoretically. There are always kinks. The trouble about the merit system in the communities where it is now in operation is that it has rarely been sympathetically administered. Either the men charged with its administration have a political bias against the system itself and are themselves incompetent, or the governor or mayor who named them is himself at heart against the system and wants to comply merely with the letter of the law and not its spirit.

Under such conditions it does not and will not work perfectly, but even under adverse conditions it does accomplish much. Ways of evading it, under a complaisant commission or a hostile head of the local government, are easily found, and the job-holder has no protection upon which he permanently can count. Knowing the power of the machine, the job-holder is skeptical both of the lasting qualities of the law and the inability of the politicians to get at him in spite of it. There is in his mind always a suspicion that at some session of the legislature it may be amended, modified, or emasculated in some way that effectually will restore the old political status.

Also there is the fact that the great bulk of the job-holders in every city are either cogs of the machine or natural sympathizers with machine politics when the

merit system experiment is made, and are not enthusiastic about seeing it work out well. Strange as it may seem, many of them would rather get their jobs and hold on to them through the strength of their political influence than through the efficiency and faithfulness with which they perform their work.

This is true of some who are actually efficient and faithful. They do not like the smell of "reform" about the new system. They are essentially politicians, part of the organization, and prefer to take their chances playing the game in the old way. Party loyalty is instinctive with many of them and they neither want to cut loose from the machine nor gain immunity from contributing their share when the fight starts. These fellows love the game, and being eliminated wholly from politics, even when it is obviously in their own interests, does not appeal to all of them.

Essentially sound and sane, the merit system is designed to do two things—weaken the power of the political machine and protect the job-holders. The big thing that blocks its way is the thing little understood by its advocates—namely, the fact that the job-holders are, in large part, the machine. To a great extent the machine and the job-holders are one and the same thing. The system offers the job-holder protection with one hand, but it deprives him of power to protect himself with the other. If all the job-holders whom the merit system proposes to protect could be got back of the system, it would very soon be in operation under ideal conditions in every state. Distrust, doubt, party loyalty, instinctive love of the political game, and failure fully to understand the civil service

scheme, place the great bulk of the job-holders everywhere against it.

Until the angle at which they view the thing can be changed, either through education or experience, the progress of the merit system will be slow and its success incomplete.

CHAPTER XXIX

FEWER ELECTIONS AND THE SHORTER BALLOT

IT SEEMS a curious thing that, highly as men and women prize the right of suffrage, so many of them fail to use it, even when "the fate of the nation hangs in the balance."

Regularly, in every city and state, from a half to a third of those entitled to vote do not go to the polls on general election day to register a choice between candidates for President, or governor, or mayor, or judge. And in the primaries, when these candidates are selected from a field of aspirants, which is the only way in which they can get a place on the ticket, except by petition, from one half to nine tenths of the registered and qualified voters decline to take the trouble to cast a ballot.

The result is that the nomination and election of candidates are largely in the hands of a small minority of voters who do regularly exercise their right to vote whenever the opportunity offers. Almost invariably, the majority of this minority is composed of professional machine politicians and the votes they influence and control. In other words, the machines run the country because their adherents regularly vote in primaries and general elections, and the rest of us do not. In a recent Councilmanic election in Boston less than one third of the registered vote was cast.

Thousands of the men and women who curse Congress for its stupidity and extravagance, who rail most violently against high taxes, shudder over the incompetency of mayors and governors, howl about the multiplicity of job-holders and the wickedness of politicians generally, are either unregistered or registered and do not vote. Actually, these voluntary non-voters are responsible for the politicians and their power. They are the people who make powerful machines possible and political organizations necessary.

It is an undeniable fact that, all over the country, the great bulk of the men and women who do vote are practically dragged to the polls by the machine workers, and it is a good thing for the individual communities and the country as a whole that this is true. If the machines did not work and pull and haul to get enough voters out in the primaries to put over the machine candidates, the present state of indifference and ignorance of the average citizen would permit our candidates to be chosen for us by the freaks and fanatics who abound in every community, and are constantly and zealously stirred to political activity in behalf of their half-baked schemes for saving the world.

This problem of getting the voter to vote has engaged the thought of students of politics, not only in this country but in every other where there is a democratic form of government. It is obvious that the people have the power in the ballot to make their government responsive to the will of the majority. It is obvious that it is greatly in the individual as well as the collective interest to have that sort of government. It is obvious that most of the governmental abuses, par-

ticularly the waste and extravagance that make the tax burden so intolerable, could be cured if the people would inform themselves politically and vote regularly and intelligently. But the majority of citizens do not vote regularly at all.

The average voter is like a school boy. The boy knows he ought to go to school. He knows that education is an essential thing for him to have, and he is told by his father and mother that unless he goes regularly to school he will be greatly handicapped in the battle of life. Yet, very few boys would regularly go to school as a purely volunteer proposition. It is the same way with the average voter. He or she groans under the mismanagement and mistakes of the politicians, but they cannot be got to interest or inform themselves about the political conditions and political candidates in their own wards and precincts. It seems to them to be a waste of time and effort. They feel that the politicians will run things anyhow, so what is the use? It would be only one more vote anyway and will make no difference.

The result is that the politicians pursue their way, serene and undisturbed, fully aware that the citizens who denounce them in mass meetings and newspapers, who clamour loudest for independent candidates and constantly cry for better and more economical government, will go fishing on election day, and will be particularly absent from the polls on primary election day. So we have our bosses and their machines in practical control of the country. They are the real rulers of America and they will continue to be just as long as the lethargy of the average citizen lasts, and he regards

primary elections as not important enough to vote in.

Whether there can be devised any effective method of getting the voters to vote is doubtful. Those who have thought and written most deeply on the subject agree that the appalling frequency of elections and the long and complicated ballot constitute two of the chief reasons for the lack of interest and information upon the part of the voter and account for the increasing tendency to leave politics to the politicians.

The average voter simply has not the time to post himself. The political wheel moves too rapidly for him. There are too many candidates, too many offices, and too many elections for him to find out facts enough about them to vote discriminatingly. So he does not bother to vote at all. He has his hands too full making a living, meeting his business requirements, keeping up his end financially and socially, to worry about holding it up politically. When he stops to think, he knows that politics, government, and taxes are intimately and inextricably interwoven and that they are highly important matters to him. And yet he will not do his share toward regulating these matters in the one way he can do it—namely, by voting.

That a shorter ballot and fewer elections would increase the number of voters is generally accepted. The soundest suggestion for shortening and simplifying the ballot, the principle generally agreed upon, is that only policy-shaping officials, such as Presidents, governors, mayors, senators, congressmen, members of the legislature and city councils, should go on the ballot. All purely administrative officials, such as judges,

clerks of the courts, registrar of wills, state auditors, city surveyors, sheriffs, state, county, and city treasurers, state and city comptrollers, and many others of the same type, should be appointed, not elected. The best minds believe that this would not only have the beneficial effect of simplifying and rendering more intelligible the ballot itself, but, by centralizing responsibility in the elective officers, increase their importance and make it easier for the people to hold them to account for inefficiency and mismanagement.

If, in addition to shortening the ballot, the number of elections could be reduced, the contention is that there would be a corresponding increase in the interest of the voters. Political information not only would become easier to acquire, but, through their infrequency, elections would seem more important and worth while than they do now. As things are to-day, in some of the great cities, there are two and three and sometimes four elections in a single year, and the ballot, in Chicago, for instance, sometimes has several hundred names on it. The average voter has never heard of these names. They mean nothing to him, and making a choice seems an absurdity.

The best method suggested for decreasing the number of elections is to lengthen the terms of the elective officers. Instead of electing governors for two years, as is done in many states, make the term four or six years, and provide that they shall not be reëlected.

In some states, like Massachusetts, the legislature is elected annually. In a number of cities the mayor is chosen every two years, and in most of the states the gubernatorial term is for the same period. If it were

possible to increase the term of the members of the House of Representatives from two to four years and correspondingly extend the terms of elective state and city officials, not only would the number of elections be greatly reduced, but a vast amount of money would be saved the taxpayers and at the same time the efficiency of the Government increased. Of these three things there can hardly be any reasonable doubt.

Certainly, if congressmen, governors, and mayors were elected for four- and six-year terms instead of two- and four-year terms, an opportunity would be given them for at least some considered public service. An official would have some chance, at least, to do something before being compelled to begin playing politics to secure a renomination.

As it is, members of Congress no sooner take their seats than they are faced with the necessity of gaining a renomination. For instance, Congressmen elected in November do not take their seats until the following December. The following September they must either run again in the Congressional primaries or drop out. So that they are really members of Congress only a few months before they have to start their campaign to hold their seats. The result is that in that period their every vote and every motion are made with an eye to their effect upon their political chances.

To a modified extent, the same thing is true of the two-year governors and mayors in different parts of the country. Unless a man intends to drop out of politics after the one term, he is literally forced to devote a large part of his time in office to the making of plans to succeed himself.

As to the money that would be saved through the lengthening of the terms of congressmen and other elective officials and the consequent reduction in the number of elections, it would amount to a huge sum. In Maryland, the cutting out of one election every year by lengthening the term of the State Comptroller and the members of the House of Delegates, approximately \$700,000 is saved annually. If this were done in New York, the saving would amount to several millions. If it were done all over the country, it would mean many millions.

Of course, none of these things can be accomplished immediately. They require gradual education of the people, the stirring of public feeling, the enthusiasm of the press, and slow steps in advance, such as the one Maryland took last year when the amendment to the State Constitution, reducing the elections, was adopted by the people.

There are, too, certain arguments against both the shorter ballot and the fewer elections. It is contended, for instance, that these things mark a tendency to get away from a democratic form of government; that they concentrate too much power and responsibility in the hands of a few elective officials; that the people would be deprived of their power to call the individual administrative official to account; that lengthening his term makes it possible for a bad or poor official to stay longer in office and gives him a greater potentiality for evil.

All these arguments can be adequately answered, but even were they sound the arguments in favour of the shorter ballot and the fewer elections are so ob-

viously overwhelming that they must prevail. Certainly, the leading authorities in the country agree that these two reforms are wise and needed, and that if they can be brought about many of the evils of which we now complain could be cured. Assuredly, it is sound to believe that when you increase the importance of the office and add to the length of the term, the inducements to good men to serve as public officials are correspondingly increased, just as the interest and activity of the average voter is increased if the ballot is simplified and shortened and he is required to go to the polls less frequently.

CHAPTER XXX

HOW TO MAKE THE VOTER VOTE

ELECTIONS are more frequent in America than in any other country in the world—and, proportionately, fewer people vote at them.

Other methods of getting the voter to vote, besides shortening the ballot and reducing the number of elections, have been discussed from time to time, but there is no general agreement about them. The idea of compulsory voting falls to pieces the moment you try to visualize putting one half the population over twenty-one years old in jail because they do not go to the polls. In a number of countries the plan of penalizing the non-voter has been tried and in some places with marked success.

In a recent brilliant article in the *Atlantic Monthly* on this subject Samuel Spring pointed out that Belgium had had a compulsory voting law since 1892. Voters who neglect to go to the polls, in the absence of an adequate reason, are punished for the first offense by a fine of from 1 to 5 francs; for a second offense within six years by a fine of from 3 to 20 francs; for a third offense their names are posted in a public place; after the fourth offense the names are stricken from the voting list for ten years, a fine is imposed, and the negligent voter is held ineligible to hold any public office.

This system has, Mr. Spring says, been very successful in Belgium. During the last twenty years only six per cent., and at times as low as 4 per cent., of the voters failed to go to the polls. When it is remembered that many voters die or move or suffer some other disability between the time they register and election day, the conclusion seems inevitable that not more than 3 per cent. of the voters in Belgium regularly fail to vote.

With less success the plan of penalizing the non-voter has been tried in Spain and in parts of Switzerland. In the latter country it has, however, brought the average of the voters who vote up to approximately 80 per cent., and in Austria, where the fining plan has been in effect in certain provinces since 1907 it works fairly well.

The conclusion reached by Mr. Spring is that the practical approach to compulsory voting in this country is to link it directly with the payment of taxes. Those who fail to vote, he says, increase the cost of our Government and thus increase the taxes which must be paid by those who do vote. The tax burden is a serious question, and the most effective way to encourage more efficient government is to link such encouragement directly with the payment of taxes. To-day the income tax is enforced by the Federal Government and many states have an additional income tax of their own. Under the income tax certain exemptions are made. Usually \$1,000 for a single person and \$2,000 for a married person is deducted from the taxpayer's income before taxes are assessed.

Mr. Spring's suggestion follows:

Would it not be simple to arrange to deduct, say, only one half of this exemption, or three fifths, from the income of the taxpayer who does not vote at all elections simply because he is slothful or forgetful? The difficulties involved of checking up would not be great, because the tax collector could take the voting list, and in the absence of adequate explanation from those who do not vote, simply increase the tax bill.

This procedure would seem to be more desirable than adding a penalty by way of a percentage of a tax, because taxes vary and it would be perhaps unfair to allow a wealthy man ten or fifteen times greater credit for his voting than a man of small income. To decrease uniformly the amount that can be deducted from the taxpayer's income before the tax is assessed is a simple, fair, and equitable method of enforcing the vote. It is also possible, where a state income tax does not prevail, to follow the Missouri plan of imposing a poll tax, which shall be paid by the voter who does not vote.

The details of such a change in our electoral machinery must be altered in view of local conditions. For example, it would be impossible to apply compulsory voting in any form to primary elections, because the state cannot force a man to join a party and take part in a party vote. A uniform plan, therefore, should not be suggested. But the fact remains clear that if we are going to have compulsory voting in any form, it can best be worked out by a method whereby the voter who refuses to vote is denied certain exemptions under his tax, which should be enjoyed only by those citizens who walk to the polls and do their duty on election day.

By some such method we shall greatly increase the number of votes cast and decrease the influence of our political bandits and bosses who are piling mountains of taxes upon taxes, because of their inefficiency. This burden in truth is tribute which they exact in order to maintain their political armies who get out the vote.

This plan does not, however, take into consideration the considerable number of persons who pay no income tax at all and who could not, therefore, be touched by the penalty. These could, perhaps, be best dealt with under the Belgian plan of striking them permanently from the voting lists after a certain number of lapses.

Of course, merely getting the voter to the polls is not enough. There is little use in his voting if he does not inform himself sufficiently to vote intelligently. But if the voters who now do not vote can be got regularly to go to the polls, unquestionably they would so inform themselves—and the shorter ballot and fewer elections would make it easier for them to do so.

The crushing weight of taxation is becoming so great that it is becoming almost a spiritual problem in its effect upon the happiness and life of the individual citizen. Thoughtful men agree that it is beginning to discourage initiative and deaden ambition, and, as Mr. Spring points out, it is the most potent force rushing us toward Socialism, if any force can bring us there.

The time is rapidly coming when this issue must be met and met right, if we are to survive as a nation. We must bring voting into line with other functions of government. Intelligent, informed, and regular voting upon the part of the people as a whole is the one and the only way to decrease the cost of government. It is the political bosses and the political machines which live upon the government, that has run this cost up to a point where it is of crushing and terrible weight. The reason they have done it, and the reason they continue to do it—is the indifference, the inertia, and the ignorance of the great masses of the voters. There is no other reason.

The way to decrease the power of the machines, to strike down bosses, and place organizations in the restricted field where they are useful and inexpensive, is to vote, to vote regularly, and to vote discriminatingly. The thing of fundamental and vital importance is to

have the ballot box represent the will of the majority, no matter how uninteresting the issue or how trivial and small the election.

As things are to-day, in nine tenths of the elections in every city and state—and even in Presidential elections—the result is decided, not by the majority, but by a small minority, largely made up of machine politicians.

This problem of getting back to government by the majority is the real one in America to-day. Solve it and it will solve all the others.

PART II

CANDIDATES AND THEIR WAYS

In the following chapters the attempt is made to point out the principal influences that sway candidates while seeking votes and to show the restraints under which they are forced to fight. Also, the factors that enter into the moulding of newspaper political policies, together with the source from which and means by which political issues are evolved, are given.

In addition, some of the reasons are presented as to why it is not possible to be wholly honest with the voters, why all political campaigns are tinged with insincerity and false pretense, and why even men of the highest type cannot afford to be entirely natural and open while running for office.

CHAPTER XXXI

HUMBUGGERY IN EVERY CAMPAIGN

IN THE preceding chapters I have tried to present the essential facts about political machines, the men who make them, and the way they work.

The purpose of this and the chapters immediately following is to tell as plainly as possible the facts about the candidates, the men who seek votes for elective offices. There is a side to this part of the political game that is wholly hidden from the public. The realities are concealed behind a veil of pretense held up on one end by the politicians and on the other by the newspapers.

No candidate and no campaign are exactly what they seem. The part that is open and aboveboard is always less vital than the part that is secret. The voters see the public performance, but not the rehearsal. They completely lack information of the real moves by which the candidate becomes a candidate. They are in the dark as to how the issues are evolved and why, when, and by whom. They see and know nothing until the curtain goes up and there before them is the smiling candidate, playing his part in complete make-up and wearing a full set of false whiskers.

In most cases the deceptions are deliberate, the stage is carefully set, the scenery selected, and the lights

chosen to convey to the voters an impression only partly real. Often the candidate is a natural demagogue and faker; often he is at heart an honest and courageous man, but, whatever his type or character, when he goes before the voters he loses frankness and lacks candor. He partly smothers his convictions and compromises with his conscience. He is under restraint—even the best of them—and there are things about himself—his views, his purposes, his campaign, and the inception of his candidacy—that he can not and does not tell. This applies to candidates who run as independents just as much as it does to those of the recognized political parties.

It is not a reflection upon the many honest and sincere men who hold elective offices or who seek such offices. It is merely a statement of facts, and the point is that, under our system, complete frankness with the voters is not possible, because there is no way of obtaining complete frankness from both sides in a political fight. A downright, outspoken candidate, who honestly, openly, and fearlessly expresses exactly what he believes to every group of voters on every issue, declining to dodge or evade, and refusing to appeal to prejudice or cater to class, would be overwhelmingly beaten by the candidate on the other side who would promptly take advantage of such honesty to gather for himself the large number of voters alienated by the other fellow.

This is human and natural, and there is no way to change it. It does, however, make complete honesty in candidates impossible. No man, however genuine, can afford in a fight to give his opponent the tremendous

advantage that complete frankness about himself and his views would give. Hence, as a matter of self-preservation, all candidates deceive the voters more or less—some to a large extent and on important issues, others to a small degree and on trivial questions—but they all humbug a little.

This does not mean that there are not plenty of sound candidates, who, on the vital issues of the campaign, express themselves with complete honesty and fearlessness, and whose moves back of the scenes have in them nothing of which they need be ashamed. What it means is this—even in everyday private life, there is a certain amount of restraint in human intercourse. Men do not blurt out everything that is in their souls when dealing with other men. It would be a terrible world if they did. We are all humbugs to a certain degree. The difference is that when a man—even the highest and best types we have—enters public life and begins to seek votes, he is forced into a position where he has to humbug a vast deal more than in private life. He is faced with the necessity of making a favourable impression upon a large number of widely scattered, highly diversified groups of voters, notoriously swayed by prejudice, who are being fished for from every conceivable angle by his opponent. He has to watch his step with the utmost care. He has to hide facts, in themselves harmless, and he has to guard and weigh his words on the minor issues and on matters of no real importance, for fear of a blast from the opposing camp that will scatter his carefully herded voters like a covey of partridges at the sound of a gun. Moreover, he is forced to fit his public views and utterances into the

prejudices of the elements back of him and, also, to some extent at least, into the notions of the men who have put the money up for his campaign. The net result is that, however much he may dislike it, he is forced into a policy of compromise and concealment.

If the candidates of the best type are compelled to compromise with complete frankness in this way, it is easy to imagine the extent to which the humbuggery of the candidates of the lower type goes—and these are in a large majority.

Here is an illustration given me by a man who ran for mayor in one of the great cities of the country a few years ago. A better man has seldom been nominated anywhere, nor one with higher purposes, greater sincerity, or a finer sense of public service. The fight was a hot one and concededly close. He had for weeks been going about the city speaking nightly in five or six different places. One night about 10 o'clock he found himself in a small hall in which there were about 300 persons. It was not until he reached the meeting that he learned that his audience was composed exclusively of anti-vivisectionists.

"These people," whispered the ward executive, as he was being introduced, "don't care a damn about the tax rate, or the schools, or the health department, or any other issue of the campaign. All they care about is this anti-vivisection stuff. If you are with them on that, they will be with you, and if you are against them, they will be against you to a man. They are worth about 1,500 votes. There are no reporters here and if you say the right thing we can get them all."

What this candidate really believed and would like

to have said was that he was wholly and strongly opposed to the anti-vivisection movement, that he considered it the worst sort of nonsense, that anti-vivisectionists generally are misguided, soft-headed people who are working against the real interests of humanity and checking the advance of science.

What he did say was this—that he was extremely interested in the subject—that there was much merit in some of the arguments against vivisection, that he was greatly impressed with the character of the men and women in the anti-vivisection movement, and that, if elected mayor, he promised to look thoroughly into the question and, if satisfied of its soundness, to give the movement his cordial support!

What he said to me afterward was that this speech cost him his self-respect, and yet he saw no way out of it at the time, and if he had to do it over again would have said the same thing. "If," he said, "I had only myself to consider, perhaps I would have had the nerve to say what I really believed and risked defeat. But if I am defeated I am not the only sufferer. It means the defeat of my running mates. It means the loss of control to my party. It means disappointment and loss to the men who have financed my campaign and put up the money to make my fight. It means a blow to the hundreds who have worked and fought for me and to thousands who have some sort of stake in my success.

"Had I the right to kick the bucket over merely to gratify my own personal desire to be absolutely honest and sincere? I know I humbugged that crowd and that I got their votes under false pretenses, but was I not justified, under the circumstances, in playing the

humbug? As it turned out, those 1,500 votes would not have changed the result, but they very easily might have. Does not a candidate when he runs at the head of a ticket accept a certain degree of candidatorial responsibility that justifies him in dodging a dangerous issue for the sake of winning?"

It is not the purpose here to argue the point as to whether a candidate, at the head of his ticket, takes on a responsibility that justifies him in evading a dangerous issue, or in concealing his real views on a question not the dominant one in his campaign. I am not pretending to discuss the merits or the ethics of the matter. The only idea here is to present the facts, and the truth is that, while the incident recounted above is, in a way, unique, every candidate in every campaign is confronted with situations in which he has to choose between losing votes and humbugging his audience.

Not one in ten thousand chooses to lose the votes.

In the competition for popular and press support sincerity in candidatorial speeches and political platforms has practically disappeared. The primary purpose is always to catch the votes. Belief in the soundness of the position is, in most cases, a secondary matter, and almost invariably expediency is the keynote of every public utterance. Not only this, but it very frequently happens that the position a candidate is forced to assume publicly is the very reverse of his actual convictions.

In proof of this it is only necessary to point to candidates in every state in the Union who publicly shout dry when they are personally wet, and those who proclaim

themselves 100 per cent. wet when they personally believe in prohibition.

One of the wettest of wet candidates not long ago told me that he did not see how any man could think the question through and not favour prohibition. Yet this man howls himself hoarse on every occasion in denunciation of the whole dry movement.

On the other hand, I know a candidate who has run several times—and been elected—in a dry district, whose personal convictions are that the Volstead act is an outrage and that it was a crime to put the prohibition amendment in the Constitution.

In every state in the Union there are candidates like these. They can be found all over the country, and they include the men who run for the very highest offices in the gift of the people as well as those who run for the smaller and less conspicuous ones.

Nor is the wet and dry issue the only one that makes hypocrites and humbugs of the men who are after votes. Later on I shall detail some of the others, but the thing I wish to explain now is not so much the way in which the candidates are forced to conceal their real convictions from the voters as the extent to which the moves that make candidates and by which campaigns are conducted are hidden.

Sometimes these moves are not bad at all. Sometimes they are thoroughly bad. But even when not actually sinister in themselves, they show the candidate as a compromiser, a dealer, and a supplicant for secret support, rather than as the straightforward, uncompromising, sincere friend of the people he wants the voter to believe him.

I have talked with a great many candidates on this subject in different parts of the country. They include men of all parties who have been candidates—some for the Presidency of the United States, others for mayor, governor, the United States Senate, Congress, judge, and others. However vigorously they may, and must, publicly deny these statements, I have never found a single man who did not, privately, agree as to their complete truth, or who was not willing to admit that every candidate everywhere, for every office for which the people vote, is forced to a compromise with his convictions—if he has any—that he can never be wholly natural and straightforward, that he is compelled to “pussyfoot” and “trim” on certain issues and at certain times, no matter how strongly and boldly he may advocate or oppose a particular proposition.

I have never come across a candidate who did not concede that complete frankness with the voters is an impossible and impracticable thing, and that any candidate who tried it would be defeated. Up to this time I have heard of no candidate who tried it. There is unanimous agreement that, to a certain extent, the voters must be fooled and cannot know all of the moves behind the scenes. Only the demagogues, who cannot be frank even with themselves, disagree about this. Often the candidate does not himself know of all the things done in his behalf, however shrewdly he may suspect.

As I have said, it is not wholly the fault of the candidates. Part of the blame is with the voters. Apparently most of them want to be fooled. Most of them

think with their emotions and vote from prejudice or passion or from personal influence or interest. But, more than this, the great bulk of them are so uninformed and so uninterested in elementary political knowledge that the bare facts are unpalatable—too crude and ugly to face, and the dragging of them out into the light causes an instinctive shrinking.

It is not that in all cases the facts could not be revealed without shame. Very often deals are made, money taken, alliances contracted, understandings entered into, and things done that are bad enough to destroy any candidate about whom the truth were told, but it is also true that there are plenty of campaigns in which nothing actually discreditable goes on back of the scenes—and still the voter is “framed” and not told the whole truth.

Even in these cases the public would revolt if they saw the whole show from beginning to end, not because anything really wicked had transpired, but because it would be like discovering that the handsomely dressed woman you admired on the street, or on the stage, when seen in the privacy of her boudoir was sallow and wrinkled, flat-chested, and bow-legged. She might be perfectly pure, but it would be a shock just the same.

Of course, the mere fact that fear of the effect on the voters forces candidates and campaign managers, to make so many moves “under cover” has a natural tendency to make these moves unwholesome, and to encourage candidates, and the friends of candidates, to do things that will not bear public scrutiny. If from first to last the light could be turned on every political move of every candidate from the moment the bee

stings him until he is elected, the immediate effect would be to startle the voters, and the following effect would be to cleanse politics of some of the worst of its diseases and largely drive the humbugs out of public life.

CHAPTER XXXII

WHY THE NEWSPAPERS DO NOT PRINT ALL THE FACTS

THE situation is like this—both sides in a campaign are naturally concerned in making a favourable impression on the voters. There is no nourishment in being a candidate for office unless you get elected.

The voters are chock full of prejudices, largely based on lack of information and misinformation. Except in cases so rare as to be almost negligible, no candidate can be elected without making for himself, or having made for him, certain financial arrangements and effecting certain compromises on issues and platforms.

The vital details of these arrangements, compromises, and choices are often sordid, but always furtive and closely guarded. Usually the facts are known to not more than two or three men. It is, as the politicians say, "sub-cellar" stuff.

Both sides engage in it because they have to. Each knows, in a general way, what the other does—where his money comes from and with whom he has dealt, but is not in a position to prove it. Charges without proof usually act as a boomerang and are promptly responded to by counter-charges. Once in a while one side or the other makes a misstep and the secrets slip out with devastating effects, but not often. The men who know them, who do the actual dealing and "framing," are

much too careful. The facts are closely held and the general public, nine tenths of the time, never has an inkling of them.

Obviously, it is in the candidates' interests not to disclose them. The only other agency through which the public could get the facts is the newspapers, and the trouble about the newspapers is that they do not function that way.

There are several reasons for this. In the first place, very often the newspapers do not know them. The average newspaper is not a great deal better informed politically than the average voter.

The political information of a newspaper comes to it through its political reporters and correspondents. These reporters are of two classes. There is the class—and it includes most of them—who never get below the surface. They do not get at the fundamental facts because the candidates and the political leaders, the comparatively few men who know them, take particular pains to see that they do not get at them.

These fellows take the press stuff handed out at headquarters and absorb the "guff" put out for effect by the press agents or by small political fry who are not of the "inside circle," but they do not get at the basic things at all. They write more or less accurately of the obvious political happenings, but there is neither depth, substance, nor authority to their writings and they are not in a position to give their newspapers real information for their guidance because they have not that sort of information themselves and cannot get it. Hence, the newspapers, even if they desired, could not give such information to its readers.

The other class of political reporters is much smaller. These are the fellows whose personality and ability is such that the facts cannot be kept from them. They gain the friendship and confidence of political leaders and party candidates to a degree that makes it possible for them to see the whole inside working of the game.

They get at the real facts, all right, but they get at them in such a way that they cannot print them without betraying trust and violating confidence. If they were the type of men to do that sort of thing they would never have got close enough to the inside to know what was really going on. They do not go off on tangents like the other fellows, but they write around the facts instead of presenting them. And they know a whole lot about which they cannot write at all.

So, one class of reporters is just as helpless about presenting the facts to the public as the other. One class cannot print them because they do not know them and the other class cannot print them because they do.

The net result is that the public, whose sole source of information is the newspaper, is kept in the dark about the really vital things from start to finish. All over the country the newspapers overdraw the virtues and minimize the faults of the candidates they happen to support, just as they exaggerate the faults and belittle the good qualities of the candidates to whom they are opposed. Almost invariably they make their man out very much better than he really is, just as they make the other fellow out very much worse than he is. There are, of course, some exceptional

newspapers. In the heat of campaigns, however, most of them go to absurd excesses in both directions.

This is, perhaps, a human and natural thing, just as it is human and natural for the candidate to present the favourable facts and hide the unfavourable ones about himself, but it certainly does greatly increase the humbuggery of our political system and add to the confusion and bewilderment of the voters. The candidates, the press, and the politicians all play their part in hiding the true picture from the public. The newspapers consistently over praise one set of men and just as consistently over denounce the other.

Such a thing as absolute political fairness on the part of newspapers is extremely rare, even among those that conscientiously strive for it.

Here and there certain newspapers make a real effort to be fair, but if they enter the fight at all it is such a difficult thing that the ones that achieve even a reasonable degree of it stand out like a lighthouse in a fog. To advocate one candidate and, at the same time, be wholly just to his opponent, lays the newspaper open to the charge of feebleness in its support, of being at heart for the other side, of having "sold out" or "quit". So the average newspaper humbugs along with its candidate, presenting the favourable and concealing the unfavourable facts.

Those newspapers that attempt to keep out of the campaign by adopting a policy of neutrality find themselves worse handicapped in presenting the facts than the advocates. To preserve their neutrality they must avoid the appearance of attacking either side. The result is a perfectly colourless presentation of the surface

happenings, from which the voter can get even less real information than from the over praise and exaggerated condemnation—which he discounts—of the partisan press.

There are a few newspapers whose political policy is a matter of reasoned conviction—the result of a real effort to be for the sound thing, the best man, and the genuine interests of the country or the community—but these considerations do not affect the majority. The vast bulk of the smaller papers of the country are frankly run on party lines. There is in every state a list of Democratic papers and a list of Republican papers. Outside of the great cities, the really independent paper, or the paper that makes even a pretense of independence, is so rare that it has not yet been discovered.

CHAPTER XXXIII

HOW THE NEWSPAPER'S POLITICAL POLICY IS FORMED

PRACTICALLY 75 percent. of the county press—the smaller papers of the country, who serve the rural communities, are straight-out Republican. The remaining 25 per cent. are Democratic. The Republican press is unceasingly and regularly served with Republican propaganda, sent out by the Republican National Publicity Committee, with headquarters at Washington. The Democratic committee does the same for the Democratic county press, but far less efficiently, effectively, and regularly.

Many of the owners and editors of the county press not only depend largely upon party support for the existence of their papers, but are themselves interested and active in party politics. It is, of course, greatly to their interests to print their party propaganda and support their party candidate, and they naturally do so.

There are approximately 18,000 daily, weekly, and semi-weekly newspapers in the United States. Of this number 15,000 can be classed as the strictly party county press. No such thing as fairness in political fights is attempted in these papers. Their game is to make the best out of their own side and the worst out of the other, and their ammunition and material in all

national campaigns comes from the national publicity headquarters.

In local campaigns they follow along similar party lines. The voters have no chance to get a true and impartial picture of politics from these papers.

With the great metropolitan papers there is a difference. They do not, as a rule, accept or print propaganda from publicity committees. They are financially independent of parties and politics and, except in rare cases, their owners and editors are not actively interested in politics. Most of them are prosperous enough not to have any strings tied to them financially or politically.

They are—most of them—in a position to be wholly independent. It would be a fine thing if they functioned that way, but the fact is that, while there are a few great papers whose policy is determined by conference of the editorial executives who are, or ought to be, the men best equipped to decide, the bulk of the city papers do not follow that method.

The political policy of many of them is dictated by circulation reasons or advertising pressure or local expediency in some form. For many of them it is moulded by their competitor. If, in a great city, one paper advocates one party and one set of candidates, it often pays the other paper to become the vehicle of the opposition side. Or, if there is but one popular side, both papers will leap to that side in order not to give an advantage to the other.

In some instances the political policy of the metropolitan paper is determined by the dominant financial interests back of it, or by the personal friendship or

private ambition of the owner, who may or may not live in the same town with his property. In some cases the metropolitan paper is just as blindly partisan as the county paper, although not so dependent upon party support and not open to the blandishments of the political publicity committees.

The truth is that the paper whose policy is wholly based on the public interests is almost as rare in the cities as in the counties. Expediency and personal reasons largely dictate their course. This does not mean that there are not some great papers that serve the public well, and which can be counted upon to oppose vigorously corruption and wickedness and fearlessly to advocate progress and reform, but in most cases it is the expedient as well as the right thing for them to do—the thing which newspapers that depend on the confidence of their readers for circulation and upon circulation for advertising cannot refrain from doing.

The fact remains that all over the country, except in rare instances, the political policies of newspapers are formed either by the local newspaper situation, the probable effect on circulation, or advertising, or by the personal, political, and financial predilections and interests of their owners. There are few newspapers anywhere in the United States not affected politically by one or the other of these reasons.

As a whole, therefore, the press of the country is not at bottom concerned in presenting full and accurate information about campaigns and candidates regardless of consequences. Even those few whose policies do reflect the honest convictions of the men who run

them do not always present that sort of information. As has been pointed out, in the first place, not infrequently they do not know the full facts themselves, and, in the second place, there has grown up a curious restraint about printing them when they do know them. Sometimes this restraint is based on fear of libel suits, sometimes on fear of making powerful and revengeful enemies, sometimes because of the impossibility of getting proof, and sometimes it is just because of the habit of hiding the facts, and the feeling that there is something indelicate, not to say indecent, in printing them.

Any well-posted political reporter or managing editor can always tell you the inside story of the fight in his city or state, together with the real facts about all the candidates, but he does not print these things in his own paper. Travelling correspondents, who go out on tours of political observation, always get clear-cut, unbiased, real information from the local newspaper men in the states they visit. These men are delighted to have the whole truth about their local political fight printed in a paper 500 or 1,000 miles away, but for one reason or another they do not print it at home.

When I was in Boston, just before the last Congressional election, I was told by half a dozen political editors the real story of Pelletier, the disbarred District Attorney, and printed it in the *Baltimore Sun*, but no Boston paper printed it.

"We can't use this stuff here," they said, "but it is all true; and you are perfectly safe in using it in the *Sun*."

It was the same way in Delaware, where in every newspaper office the dramatic details of the tremendous fight between T. Coleman du Pont and Thomas F. Bayard, involving the feud in the Du Pont family, were perfectly well known, but were printed in no newspaper and never got to the people.

It was the same in the other states—in New Jersey, Iowa, Indiana, Rhode Island, Ohio, Louisiana, and Georgia—it was easy enough to get privately the inside political story of the fight from the really well-posted political reporter. He knew it and could tell it but he could not print it. Yet he was always more than glad to have it printed somewhere else providing it could not be connected up with him. He liked giving the facts and they always “checked up.”

Franker and fuller information about political conditions and candidates in most states can be printed in papers outside these states than by the papers inside. Often political reporters, acting as correspondents for out-of-state papers, will send far fairer and truer accounts of the real situation in their communities than are printed in any local paper. Every newspaper man knows that.

This is a curious situation but it exists all over the country and helps to prove the statement that the veil of pretense behind which the realities are hid from the voters is held up by the candidates on one end and by the newspapers on the other.

CHAPTER XXXIV

ONCE A CANDIDATE ALWAYS A CANDIDATE

CANDIDATES are a widely diverse and numerous class of citizens.

There are in this country 533 Federal officers elected by the people. These include the President, the Vice-President, 96 members of the United States Senate, and 435 members of the House of Representatives. There are, besides, 48 governors, who are elected for terms ranging from one to four years, and, approximately, 1,550 mayors of incorporated towns of more than 5,000 inhabitants, whose average term is two years. There are, approximately 1,800 judges of state, county, and municipal courts who are elected throughout the country.

Then there is an army of state senators, members of state legislatures, county clerks, sheriffs, county commissioners, surveyors, state and city comptrollers, aldermen, city councilmen, and others. A conservative estimate of the total number of elective offices in the country indicates that the number is not less than 15,000 nor more than 20,000. Now, for every one of these elective offices there is a minimum of two candidates and often three or four in the general election. It is likewise conservative to say that there is an average of five for each of these offices from President down

who, while they do not become the party nominees, are bona fide candidates just the same.

Most of them are weeded out in the primaries or conventions, or make some deal involving future political consideration, or drop out, discouraged for one reason or another. But they are all, successful and unsuccessful, in the candidate class.

It is not far wrong to say that, linking them all together, there are not less than 150,000 persons at this time, scattered through the country, whom it is fair to classify as active candidates. There are probably a good many more than that, as most of the persons at all active in politics are potential candidates, who have their political lightning rods up all the time, and await only the opportunity to break into the active class.

The interesting thing about these candidates—all of them—whether they win or lose, is that they are chronic candidates. Once a candidate always a candidate! It is an apparently incurable disease. No man has yet been discovered who, after election to an office, did not want either to hold on to that office for another term or run for a better one—if there is a better one. “Few die and none resign” is such a true saying concerning the office-holding army that the exceedingly rare exceptions, like John Sharp Williams, of Mississippi, merely prove the rule.

None of them voluntarily quits. They may retire with ostensible relief. They may decline to run again on the ground of poor health, or publicly proclaim that the strain of the job is too great, or that they cannot live on the salary, or because of the wishes of their families, or for any other of a number of excuses, but

these are all hollow and insincere. They really get out because, as the politicians say, they "cannot make the grade" again. Either they have lost their political support, or the tide is against them, or they cannot raise the money, or the cards are "stacked" for some one else.

But it is never in the least voluntary. I repeat that every man who has held elective office wants to keep it or to get another better one. Look at the governors, past and present, of almost any state in the Union; look at the United States Senators; look at the mayors of the big cities—and others not so big.

Was there ever one among them who was not eager to hold on to his job? Was there ever one among them who did not let go with deep regret and a feeling of soreness? Was there ever one of them who did not have the hope in his heart that with another turn of the wheel his chance would appear to "come back"?

If there has been such a one I have not heard of him. Look, even, at the judges who resigned from the bench because they could not "live on the salary." Those who do not change their minds and fight to go back, trot around with the hope in their hearts that some time or other there will come a "call from the people" to which they can hearken. And they are all ready to "hearken" when it comes.

As for the Presidency of the United States, no matter how hard and bitter his experience may have been, there has never been a President who did not want to stay on in the White House. Harassed, hated, weary, sore, and disappointed, there is no such thing as giving the office up gladly—and there is no

such thing as not hoping to return. Big men, of course, accept the turn of the political wheel with philosophic calm, but at heart, the President of the United States has the same feeling as the county sheriff when the time comes to relinquish his power and authority.

It is not only the successful candidate who gets the office who becomes a chronic candidate. Exactly the same thing is true of the unsuccessful ones—even those who aspire but do not get as far as the primaries. The same bug bites them all. It becomes a fever. Once let his friends or a newspaper so much as mention a man's name as "available material" or the "right sort of man for this job," or speak of him as having behind him "a considerable public sentiment," or say that he is "specially well qualified" to represent the city, or state, or nation—and from that time on he is running.

He never stops. Perhaps no one but himself knows about it. Perhaps the people or paper that mentioned him have forgotten all about him. That makes no difference. He is in a "receptive frame of mind" for the balance of his life.

CHAPTER XXXV

ALL CANDIDATES SEEK MACHINE SUP- PORT

OF COURSE, it is not possible to tell the story of the "under-cover" moves of one candidate and apply that story to all candidates. It will not fit. No campaign and no candidate are exactly like any other campaign or any other candidate. The things the candidates do and the things that are done for them are always different. Every situation is a new situation: every fight is a new fight.

The only way to give an idea of the preliminary manœuvres of and for a candidate, which are the manœuvres the voters do not see and the newspapers do not print, is to take the average candidate for an office such as mayor, or governor, or United States Senator, and describe the sort of thing that is usually done for and by him, it being understood that all the candidates cannot be measured by this yardstick—although most of them can.

What is the first thing such a candidate does when the bee stings him—that is, when the idea of becoming a candidate is first conceived?

The first thing he does is to seek the support of the organization of his party. Obviously, that is the only intelligent thing to do. That is the easiest, least ex-

pensive, and surest road to the nomination, and there is not the slightest thing discreditable in trying to get that support, so long as he neither truckles to the boss nor makes pledges inconsistent with the public interest or his own self-respect.

On the contrary, it would be a stupid thing not to try. But, whether he is successful in getting the machine back of him or not, does the candidate make public his efforts in that direction? Does he tell the voters when the campaign begins that he sought the support of the bosses and got it, or that he sought their support and did not get it? He does not.

What he does is to conceal the fact, so far as he can, of any touch at all between himself and the boss. If he gets the support, he assumes the attitude of having had it come to him wholly unsolicited and, if he does not get it, he assumes an attitude of uncompromising hostility to the machine and becomes an anti-machine candidate.

In any case, he guards from the voters with extreme care the fact that he either knows the boss, has seen or talked with him or communicated with him directly or indirectly prior to his avowed candidacy. To concede such a thing one way or the other is supposed to have an unfavourable effect upon the voters. It does swing a certain number of them, who shiver at the mere mention of the machine.

As a matter of fact, if the thing were done boldly, in the open and everybody knew about it, the effect, in most cases, would not be bad at all. But it is supposed to be a matter that must be hidden.

As a rule, the prospective candidate does not himself go to the boss. What he does when he has made up his

mind to run is to find some friend of his, or some friend of a friend of his, who knows the boss or some one very close to the boss. Through this devious kind of channel a message is taken to the boss that, say, H. Sappington Smith wants to be a candidate for mayor or governor or Senator—and what does the boss think about it?

The candidate is usually careful himself not to go, because he may want, if the effort to get the machine support is unsuccessful, to be in a position to run as an anti-machine candidate in which event the keynote of his campaign would be a fierce attack on the bosses and the machine and an appeal to the people to overthrow them. And that sort of campaign cry is supposed to have considerable appeal to the voters. It always does catch some of them.

Here is the kind of thing that happens: The friend of the candidate gets in touch with the friend of the boss, and information somewhat to this effect is given—Mr. Smith, who has a good record and is a good man, wants to be mayor, or governor, or Senator, or judge. He has a number of influential friends in the community upon whose support he can count and who will contribute to his campaign. The necessary money can be raised for him and he is a good vote-getter. Also he can count on the support of one of the local newspapers and on help from various quarters. Sometimes a good deal more than this is said. Sometimes the boss is told he will be treated fairly if the candidate wins. Sometimes there is more concrete talk about money.

I do not want to leave the impression that what is given above is exactly what is said. There are endless varieties of the conversation, just as there are endless

varieties of candidates, and just as many varieties of friends. Sometimes the friend says a good deal more than the candidate would "stand for" if he knew it. Occasionally the candidate is "double-crossed" by the "friend." Sometimes a deal is made of which the candidate knows nothing and concerning which he is careful not to ask. There are also candidates who, by past experience, know the boss well enough to deal directly with him, and there are likewise "friends" who know the candidate well enough to make bargains for his "delivery" without telling him about it. Likewise there are candidates whom the boss digs up himself and brings out.

All sorts of things do happen in these preliminary moves to get the organization support, but the fact is that, as a rule, nothing sinister is said or done. The out-and-out purchase of nominations through the boss is the exceptional thing, not the rule. Most of the time the conversation is somewhat along the line indicated.

Now, the boss when approached in this way—and they all approach him in one way or the other, no matter how fiercely they may deny it later—can do one of several things. He can indicate that he does not think the candidate suggested is available. He may be committed to some one else, or he may have another man "under cover" who suits him better, or he may realize weaknesses in the candidate that the candidate does not know himself.

If his attitude is unfavourable, the "friend" reports back to the candidate, who can then do one of two things—either drop out of the field and wait for the next opportunity, or enter as an anti-machine candidate.

in which event he makes his fight under the flag of "Down With the Bosses". And he does this secure in the belief that the voters will not learn through the newspapers or any other source that he would have been glad of the machine support, but will accept the view that he would have repudiated and rejected such support had it been offered him.

The truth, of course, is that there is no real inconsistency and no shamefulness in the fact that a candidate, having sought the support of the machine, is unwilling to fall out altogether merely because the machine does not choose to back him but goes into the fight anyhow and bucks the machine.

On the contrary, it is a thing that, if the whole truth were told, except in cases of peculiar hypocrisy and sordidness, is certainly rather to be commended than condemned. Yet the idea that such a candidate ever had the remotest thought of machine support or would have, under any circumstances, permitted the boss to get back of him, or at any time saw a boss or talked with a boss except to insult him, is guarded from the voters with the utmost care.

Somehow or other, he is forced into a false position toward the voters over circumstances that, were all the facts known, would not be in the least discreditable—and which do not in anyway detract from his merits as a candidate.

CHAPTER XXXVI

BUSINESS MEN'S MOVEMENTS

THE boss may meet the first approach of the hopeful candidate who seeks machine support by indicating his willingness to "go along" with him. In that event, the usual procedure, desired by both the boss and the candidate, is that the latter "frame" things up so as to come out as a result of some business men's movement or as indorsed by some group of influential party men or non-partisan group. The idea, of course, is to hide the machine support and let it come in behind the business men's movement, rather than in front of it. Sometimes it is not possible to do this, but it is regarded as most desirable when it can be done.

Or sometimes the candidate, keeping carefully behind the scenes, has his friends circulate petitions in support of his candidacy. These are signed by numerous voters urging him to enter the field. Or sometimes his newspaper organ or advocate will work up a "public demand." While all this is going on the candidate holds himself ostensibly aloof. He assumes an attitude of reluctance. He tells the newspaper reporters that he has not made up his mind—that it is a matter requiring earnest consideration, that becoming a candidate would involve a heavy sacrifice of his time

and money, that he has no desire for public office, that he hopes he will not be forced into the fight.

All the time he is himself directing the moves, working up the sentiment, sometimes furnishing the money for the petitions, or at least knowing where it comes from, getting his friends to write letters to the newspapers urging his candidacy. There is nothing inherently wrong about this sort of thing. It is only the false pretense about it that makes it wrong. It ought to be possible for the candidate to be wholly sincere about his machine backing, or the lack of it, because, in most cases, he has done nothing of which he need be ashamed in getting it, or in trying to get it.

It ought to be possible for him, except in the exceptionally sordid cases, to have the full truth about his efforts in this direction told without injury. But in no campaign have I ever heard of it being fully told. On the contrary, every effort is made to camouflage the facts before they are presented to the voters, whether the machine support is secured or whether it is not secured, and various ways are resorted to in order to convince the voters that the worked-up sentiment is 100 per cent. spontaneous.

After the petitions or the business men's movement, and the newspaper propaganda has been sufficiently worked up, the candidate makes his announcement—"yields to the public demand" for him. *✓* This announcement comes after conferences with his close friends and advisers and is framed so as to gain the most advantage. In it he takes his stand as a regular party man if he has been successful in getting the machine support, or against the machine if he has been unsuccessful.

Also, he outlines his attitude on the issues of the campaign. How these issues and his attitude on them are determined will be explained later.

Pretty much the same sort of procedure is gone through by the anti-machine candidate and by the candidate whose tentative advances are met by the boss with the statement that he is not opposed to him, but that if he chooses to go into the fight, and develops his strength, the organization will decide then whom it will support. In other words, the game is played much the same way by the organization candidates, the anti-organization candidates, and the candidates who go in and merely take their chances of becoming one or the other.

It is regarded as essential to hide the initial moves, and to work up a "public sentiment" in one form or another that will appear spontaneous and unsolicited to the voters, and under cover of which the candidate may make his public announcement. And these movements are all usually made under the direction of the candidate, and generally with his money and complete knowledge, although he ostensibly holds himself aloof and keeps the position of having the office seek him rather than him seek the office.

As I have before said, this yardstick cannot be applied to all candidates. There are some who really are reluctant and some who actually are forced into the fight by a genuine public sentiment. There are some who neither seek nor permit others to seek for them the support of the organization or of the newspapers, or any other group—real independents—but these are rare men indeed. I do not want to do any sincere man an

injustice, but it is beyond dispute that 90 per cent. of the candidates for high public office, all over the country, operate along the lines I have indicated. There are numerous variations, but the general idea and the general plan are the same.

One of the first things a candidate does in the early, behind-the-scene stages, which the voters do not see, whether he is organization, anti-organization, independent, or fusion, is to employ a press agent. This is an indispensable thing for any candidate running for any office of importance, from President to Congressman. Publicity of the right sort is the very life blood of a campaign. Next to money, there is no more important thing.

Of course, the easiest and least expensive method of getting publicity is to secure newspaper support. Then the candidate and his campaign managers are largely relieved of the burden—and a part of the expense. Usually they can count on their newspaper advocate presenting all the favourable facts and none of the unfavourable facts about them. They can also, in most cases, count on their newspaper advocate to take up voluntarily the cudgels in their defense when the attack opens from the other side. They can, as a rule, also count upon adequate space for their statements, interviews, and speeches.

Naturally, candidates will do much to secure this kind of newspaper support, or, in fact, any sort of newspaper support. They angle for it by coming out in advocacy of the pet hobbies of such newspapers and by fitting their public views into the policies of the newspaper. Or, sometimes, they try to bring personal

or political or business or advertising or social influence to bear on the owners of newspapers, and not infrequently they send select committees of their friends to the newspaper office to plead their cause and urge support.

CHAPTER XXXVII

PUBLICITY BUREAUS AND POLITICAL PRESS AGENTS

BUT even with newspaper support the candidate for any important elective office in these days cannot get along without his press agent or publicity committee.

Usually this means in state or city campaigns that he employs one or more former newspaper men or some smart advertising agency, who really make a large part of the campaign for him. In most cases the press agent writes the public statements of the candidates, and very often his speeches, and is close in his confidence. He has to be. He acts as the source of information for the political reporters of the less-experienced type, and his sole job is to get to the public as much favourable "dope" for his candidate and as much unfavourable "dope" for the other candidate as is possible. It is also part of his job to keep, if he can, any unfavourable news about his candidate from reaching the voters. In other words, he is the man who puts on the candidate's "make-up," and he has to have, if he is worth anything, considerable ability, judgment, and discretion. His job is to "sell" the candidate to the voters. Very often he is an abler man than the candidate.

In national campaigns these press agents become

super press agents, and the publicity bureaus take on huge proportions, spend great sums of money and employ large numbers of highly paid writers, who, for weeks at a time, grind out "dope" for the partisan press of the country, gilding their candidate until he gleams with every known virtue, and blackening the character, public and private, of the other candidate just as inkily as possible without inviting a boomerang or getting caught by the libel laws. Presidential publicity bureaus specialize on "claims"—claims that their candidate and his party are the farmer's friend, the labourer's friend, the people's friend, and, at the same time, the friend of the sound business interests of the country.

They also specialize in the "campaign lie", and the manufacture of these by both sides is one of the principal activities. It is a fine fake game, this national campaign publicity stuff. Its whole idea is to hocus-pocus the voters into voting for one man and against the other. An enormous amount of money is spent in the effort, and the thing is often done skillfully and with great effect. Ninety per cent. of it is humbug and fraud.

Usually, in a Presidential campaign, the candidate, whoever he may be, has, either personally, or more often through his intimate friends, given assurances to the big financial interests upon whom he largely depends for the financing of his campaign, of his essential soundness and dependability upon what they consider the vital things. On the Republican side this is invariably concerned with the details of the tariff.

The National Republican campaign fund is invariably

secured—the bulk of it—from beneficiaries of the protective tariff. No candid Republican in a position to know the facts would think of denying this. What these gentlemen want is assurance of the kind they consider dependable that the candidate is “sound” on the tariff. Then they supply the money and do not bother in the least about the stuff the publicity bureaus put out. They know that that is pure humbug, solely designed to catch the voters. They even stand, with complete equanimity, publicity promises to revise the tariff downward, or more completely regulate big business, or various other species of publicity buncombe put out in the campaign.

The same thing is true on the Democratic side. The only difference is in degree. The Democrats never are able to raise as much money as the Republicans. Being the low tariff party, they cannot appeal with the same force to the high tariff beneficiaries for big contributions. But they do appeal to much the same class—that is, the big financial interests—and they do get much the same sort of money for the same sort of reasons. As a matter of fact, there are many instances where the same men give liberally to both parties—such gifts always, of course, being made with the utmost secrecy and never showing up in the published financial statements later sworn to by the party treasurers.

The plain fact is that on both sides the big money for the national campaigns, whatever the statements may show, comes from the big business men and bankers of New York, and these men do not give to either side, or both, without some sort of assurance that satisfies

them that, if elected, neither one of them is going to "run wild."

Sometimes the Presidential candidate does not know what assurances have been given or by whom or to whom, but they have been given all the same. In cases where they are not given there is no money. After they have been given the heavy financial contributors regard the publicity stuff wholly as part of the game—which is exactly what it is.

It is the publicity bureaus and press agents, in local as well as national campaigns, who work up the stage rages of the candidates, manufacture their "righteous indignation" and "deep sympathy" with this or that worthy cause calculated to appeal to a group of voters. In Presidential fights tons and tons of literature portraying one set of candidates as of heroic size and the other set as utterly unworthy of support are sent out. The country is literally flooded with it, and the party press throughout the land helps get it to the voters. On a smaller scale the same thing is done in state campaigns. It is all beautifully sugar-coated.

I wish to repeat that, hypocritical as all these things sound, they do not necessarily mean that all the candidates who do them, or for whom they are done, lack real sincerity or a desire to serve the public. Nor does it mean that, when elected, they do not make reasonably good public servants. It is, of course, not worth while to deny that most candidates do lack these qualities and that the only thing most of them want is the job. All of them, however, are not like that. Some of them are of real conviction and courage, but the very best of them have to go through the ballyhoo stage, playing

the game of hide and seek, howling over "outrages" in which they do not believe, appealing to prejudice, straddling issues, concealing their real feelings—to get the votes. They have to do it. There is no way out of it. It is not the candidate's fault. It is the system—the growth of many decades—the price we pay for universal suffrage, or, rather, part of the price.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

HIDDEN MOVES OF PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRANTS

THE moves, back of the scenes, by which the Presidential candidates are made, differ in degree from those by which state and city candidates are created, but the basic idea is the same.

It may be of interest to describe briefly some of the least obvious of these manœuvres. Take a man who has Presidential aspirations, a year and a half before national conventions—most of them begin work long before that time, but that is about when the real activity generally starts. Suppose, for instance, this typical candidate has a public record or standing that justifies thought of him as a Presidential possibility. He may have been a member of the Cabinet, or a United States Senator, or an outstanding governor of a great state, or a conspicuous success in some profession or business, or he may have performed some public service that commends him to the people.

What is the first thing he does when he begins to yearn seriously toward the Presidency, and determines to make a try for it? The first thing he does is to gather around him not more than three or four friends and interest them in the idea. Such a man is always big enough, one way or the other, to have a few really influential intimates who can be counted upon to make

his cause their own. Usually, no matter where the candidate lives, these friends are in New York, and, usually, they are men of wealth connected with the big financial interests of that city. One of them at least is apt to be a man of national political experience, with an insight into the game and a sure knowledge of fundamentals.

After conference, the Presidential aspirant and his friends decide to go ahead. What is the first thing needed? The first thing is to place the candidate in a favourable light before the people, and, at the same time, avoid giving him the least appearance of seeking the nomination. Above all, he must assume and hold to a dignified attitude and be free from the slightest suspicion of angling for support. In other words, what he needs is judicious publicity.

This is obtained for him usually by "planting" articles about him, his success in business or politics, the "story of his life," or a character sketch of the man, in one of the big magazines or periodicals. This is not so hard to do. Usually one of the close friends of the candidate knows, or can get to know, some of the men who write for these magazines or periodicals—men of more or less literary reputation and standing. Sometimes they know the editors or owners and can interest them.

These magazines and periodicals are usually hungry for material and, without political or personal interest in the candidate, and often without thinking that there is any political purpose to be served or realizing that he is a candidate, they are glad to print well-written, humanly interesting articles of the kind. One article in one periodical naturally leads to others in other

periodicals. The man about whom they are written begins to take on a news value, and as he becomes better known, little news stories about him begin to seep into the daily press.

This sort of thing is skillfully and cleverly done. A considerable part of it is manufactured in and goes out from Washington. Most of the time neither the periodical press nor the daily press knows that there is a purpose and a machine back of it. The whole idea behind this phase of the activity is to advertise the candidate, to "sell" him to the public, and the usual procedure is to employ very highly paid publicity experts of the best and most influential types.

Most of the publicity is so arranged that it has the appearance of entirely spontaneous and wholly untainted news. As a matter of fact, it is all thought out and planned with the utmost care. It is so indispensable to the candidate at this embryo stage of his candidacy that there is no use in his going ahead at all unless he can get it.

The essential thing is to have the people think of him in connection with the Presidency, to know his name, to have a certain amount of familiarity with his good points. That is the foundation without which no candidatorial structure can be reared.

There are many ramifications to this part of the game and, directed by able men who know how to play it, it is tremendously effective. It is first impressions that are the most important, in politics as well as in most other things. Sometimes they are mistaken impressions, but, right or wrong, they are harder to wipe out than the later ones.

What is the second essential in the preliminary campaign of the Presidential candidate? Undeniably it is money. Publicity alone, no matter how well done, is not enough to "put over" a Presidential candidate or any other sort of candidate.

Nor can a candidate be put over merely with money. It is the combination that is truly effective and really essential. Campaigns—any big campaign—cost a lot of money, and most of it can be legitimately used. Even the early stages which we are discussing cost money. Financing a national campaign these days, as has been pointed out in earlier articles, does not mean the raising of a few hundred thousand dollars. It means the raising of several millions. And no candidate for the Presidency is seriously taken in these days unless some such sum as that can be located, or at least sighted, for him.

CHAPTER XXXIX

RICH FRIENDS OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS

Now when the prospective Presidential candidate begins his preliminary manœuvering, it very early becomes apparent that for a considerable part of his campaign fund he must rely on a few selected men. Very probably one of these is himself. If he happens to be a rich man, and a good many Presidential aspirants are rich men, he is expected to, and does, put up quite a large slice of the fund personally.

For instance, if a Henry Ford, or a Frank Lowden makes a fight for a Presidential nomination, no one bothers about the money. Everybody knows that these men have it and will put it up, so the financial problem is solved from the start.

With the candidates who are not themselves rich, however, it is a different proposition. They have to find an "angel." Usually, they discover this bird of beautiful plumage among the little group of three or four close personal friends who live in New York and whom the candidate first consults about his candidacy. There is scarcely any man of Presidential calibre who has served in any sort of high public office, who has not made a friend or two among the men of millions, who can be counted upon for financial support, of the kind,

for instance, given General Leonard Wood by Colonel Procter in the Wood campaign for the Republican Presidential nomination of 1920.

The situation with these very rich men is about this: debarred for one reason or another from being seriously considered as Presidential timber themselves, the game of making a President tremendously attracts them. Unable to become President themselves, the next greatest thrill for them is in being the close friend of the President—the man, or one of the men, who put him in the White House.

The struggle to do this is, of course, one of the greatest and most interesting games in the world. Inspired by the friendship of a big man, who has a real chance for the Presidency, there are more than a few rich men who enjoy spending their money playing this game.

Sometimes these men of millions have an ax to grind—want to be ambassador somewhere or land a Cabinet position, or protect a great business interest; but sometimes they are actuated solely by the thrill of the game, the bigness of the stakes, or the strength of a deep friendship. Occasionally, it is the good of the country they want to serve.

Not long ago, a very rich man said this to me: "There comes a time in the career of every man who has made a big financial success, where a few more millions or a few less mean nothing to him. When that time comes, if he is a man of real intelligence, there is nothing else for him in life except some form of public service, or some kind of public recognition and honour," which explains, I think the candidacy of a good many very rich men. It also explains the willingness of some

of them who cannot be elected to high office themselves, to spend money electing their friends. Particularly is this true of men to whom two or three hundred thousand dollars is but a small part of a year's income.

Later—after the nomination has been secured—funds are raised in Wall Street and from both business interests and party people. Then, the collecting can be done more or less openly, and appeals can be sent throughout the country; but in the preliminary campaign, before the national convention, a great deal of money is needed, can be spent, and is, but it is neither openly contributed nor openly expended. If the candidate is not himself rich enough to put up this preliminary fund, it is furnished by one or more of his close friends of the type I have described. And there are few candidates of Presidential size who have not some friends of this class.

Now, aside from the early publicity and the money for the preliminary expenses, there is still another phase of the pre-convention work which the public does not see and never does hear about. In most of the big states of the country—and the little ones, too, for that matter—the party, or organization, or machine, is in the control of two or three men, sometimes of one man.

As a rule the selection of the delegates to the national conventions of both parties, in the different states, is largely in the hands of a few state and city leaders or bosses. These delegates are selected as a result of primaries, and everywhere the machine controls the primaries. If the machine state and city leaders can be lined up back of the candidate it means votes in the

convention. They will control most of the Presidential primaries and dominate most of the state conventions.

What the little group of advisers around the Presidential candidate tries to do is to get into personal touch with these men about a year ahead of the convention. Usually, this is done largely through one or two, or at most three, men—of the type of Frank Hitchcock, men who know the game and know the people in the different states and in whom the leaders have confidence. These men, acting as the confidential representatives and friends of the candidate, slip quietly into a state, having made an engagement, usually by telegraph, with the men they wish to see.

These men are practical politicians. Some of them are governors of states; some of them United States Senators; some of them city bosses, like Murphy, of New York, or Vare, of Philadelphia. It is not necessary to make any specific promises to most of them. Nor is it necessary to “buy” them. What they want is an assurance from some man in whom they have confidence and whom they know is close enough to the Presidential candidate to speak for him, and who will be just as close to him after the election, that they will be treated “fairly” in all matters pertaining to their state should the aspirant become President. What they want is assurance that they will be able to get a hearing, that these men they are talking to will look after them so far as patronage is concerned—after the election—if the candidate wins.

In some of these conversations arrangements are made to help out in the state with money. There may be a mayoralty campaign in progress, or a gubernatorial

campaign, or a senatorial campaign. The confidential friend of the Presidential candidate arranges to send in secretly some money to help out. The amount ranges all the way from \$2,500 to \$25,000, and it goes direct to the boss or the state leader who is in trouble. Sometimes, in this way, a hundred thousand dollars and more can be most effectively distributed through the country.

And, it has great effect. It helps the local state or city boss at a time when he needs help and in the way he most appreciates. Many a state delegation has been picked up by just such judicious cash contribution from the right man to the right man, at the right time.

It is all "sub-cellar" stuff. Not only does no one outside of the two or three men who meet ever know of the money transaction, but no one else knows that the confidential friend has been in the state. All of this, it must be remembered, is from a year to a year and a half before the national convention. But it is the really critical period of many a Presidential campaign, in spite of that. Not a few of our Presidents have really been "made" a year and a half ahead of the convention, by means of a confidential contribution of \$5,000 or \$10,000 to some state boss with a fight on his hands.

The confidential agent of the candidate, about this time, is travelling all over the country, but always quietly. He arrives unheralded and he leaves unsung. No one knows of his comings or goings. Sometimes he makes arrangements to meet local state leaders in New York or at Hot Springs, Va., or Atlantic City, or Chicago. There is generally a quiet dinner at some

club, with a long talk afterward. Where money is not given, assurances are. An understanding is reached. It may be broken later. Unforeseen conditions may arise which make it impossible for a mutual line-up, but if the confidential agent is the right man, and can talk the right language, tremendously effective work can be done in these little quiet meetings about the country. More than one man has been made President in that way.

CHAPTER XL

THE WOOD AND LOWDEN CAMPAIGNS OF 1920

OF COURSE, all this time, while his friends are working for him and secretly building up his organization, the Presidential candidate holds to his attitude of aloofness and dignifiedly declines to discuss the mention of his name in the newspapers.

There are, however, occasions when the confidential agent cannot carry through a deal by himself and the candidate personally has to arrange for a secret conference with some big factor in the situation, who is too important to be dealt with except directly. It may be that an ambassadorship is settled in this way, or a Cabinet member picked. Or it may be merely assurances of "fair" treatment in the matter of patronage, or a confidential exchange of his real views on the railroad or labour or tariff questions.

There are certain important men who are interested in views; there are certain others who can be satisfied with assurances of "fair" treatment and are chiefly interested in patronage, and there are certain others who are interested largely in money. Some one mighty close to the candidate—able to talk for him, and to inspire confidence in his influence with him after the election—has got to see a certain number of selected

men in all three of these classes located in the pivotal states a sufficient length of time ahead of the convention.

Publicity is essential for the general public, but publicity, no matter how favourable, has no great weight with these men. They are extremely "hard boiled" and they have got to be talked to. And they are talked to along the lines I have indicated, in the interests of every serious candidate for President for whom a serious campaign is proposed.

As to how much the candidate himself knows about these talks depends altogether upon the candidate. Sometimes the candidate is experienced enough politically, with a "hard-boiled" streak of his own that enables him to know the whole situation and be cognizant of everything done and said for him. And occasionally he is of the type to very effectively take a hand in the preliminary "fixing" himself.

However, he may be so constituted as to be wholly useless along these lines. Not only that, but sometimes the candidate is the type of man whom it is better to keep in the dark about these confidential conversations with state leaders, city bosses, and pivotal political factors. But, no matter what the type of candidate, it can be accepted as certain that, if his campaign is a real one and if it is being backed by substantial and practical friends, the kind of thing I have described is done for him.

If it is not done for him, and if he lacks also the preliminary publicity and financial resources which I have described as essential, it can likewise be accepted as certain that, barring accidents, he will not develop

as a formidable factor at the national convention. In other words, unless he has the forces back of him that operate on these lines a long while ahead of the convention, he will not be nominated, except as an accident or a piece of luck. Sometimes he is not nominated even when he has these forces operating full strength for him, but they undeniably are a tremendous advantage.

I do not mean to say that all candidates for President are nominated as a result of these methods. National conventions are uncertain assemblies. They are made up of delegates from every state in the Union and the average delegation is a thoroughly bossed and controlled delegation. The average delegation is made up of hand-picked men who can be swung into line when the word is given out. Notoriously, delegates to national conventions are unemotional and unswayed by public clamour or enthusiasm. The galleries go wild, but the delegates sit tight. The only time on record—certainly in the last half century—that the delegates to a national convention were swept off their feet occurred in the Democratic convention of 1896, when William Jennings Bryan made his famous “Cross of gold and crown of thorns” speech, which was credited with gaining him the nomination. Certainly no convention has been stampeded since that time—and there are some skeptical persons who maintain that even that one was not.

The delegates to a national convention are, as the politicians say, “twenty-minute eggs,” and such a convention is the super-market place for political deals and bargains, trades and treachery. The unexpected seldom happens, but it sometimes does. Occasionally

candidates who have campaigned for two years in the way I have indicated clash with other candidates who have similarly campaigned, and go crashing down, defeated by the stronger fellow with the better preliminary organization.

Or it may happen that two such candidates knock each other out in the convention and open the door for a "dark horse" candidate. Just such a thing happened in the Republican convention in Chicago in 1920. General Leonard Wood and ex-Governor Frank Lowden had for many months been campaigning exactly along the lines described. Each had his publicity bureau. Each had adequate financial resources, and each had his confidential agents going quietly through the states making alliances.

When they reached the convention the fight between them grew so bitter and the revelations of their "under-cover" preliminary campaigns were so shocking to the public, which had been, as usual, wholly in the dark, that they were both put out of the running. The result was that Warren G. Harding, who had not taken himself or been taken very seriously as a candidate, and who was preparing really to run again as United States Senator in Ohio, was nominated by a small group of leaders, who met early in the morning in the room of George Harvey (now Ambassador to England), in the Blackstone Hotel. The convention ratified the selection of the leaders some hours later the same day by formally nominating him, but the real job was done in Harvey's room about 3 A. M.

That is the kind of thing that may—and occasionally does—happen in a national convention, but that was

an accident, and it does not detract from the fact that serious candidates for the Presidency conduct preliminary campaigns in the way I have indicated—and not many of them get far if they do not. There was an enormous outcry over the “revelations” of the Wood and Lowden campaigns for delegates, and the effect on the voter, unaccustomed to facing the actual political facts, was pretty bad. There was a general shrinking back from both of them on the part of the public, and the newspapers made a prodigious outcry about the exposé, the enormous sums of money that had been spent, the secret deals for delegates that had been made, and the “fake” publicity on both sides.

As a matter of fact, there was done for Wood and Lowden very little that had not been done for candidates before, is not being done for candidates now, and will not continue to be done for candidates in the future. Perhaps the money expended was on a little more lavish scale, but that is merely a matter of degree. Their real crime was in getting “caught” at these preliminary manœuvres, which are always made but always, if possible, concealed from the voters. In the cases of Wood and Lowden the facts came out.

CHAPTER XLI

HOW POLITICAL ISSUES ARE MADE

Now as to issues. Political issues are not made by either candidates or parties.

Candidates and parties conceive neither issues nor ideas, except in cases so rare as to be negligible. Issues and ideas are forced on candidates and parties and are made live questions in political campaigns by various outside agencies, elements, and groups.

Political platforms and positions are constructed not with mental bricks manufactured out of raw material by party leaders but from a practically finished product made on the outside. There is, of course, considerable paring down, shaving, changing, modifying, and moulding by the party leaders and candidates. Rough edges are smoothed off, jagged points hammered flat, and sometimes the whole thing is re-coloured and revarnished, but the article itself is handed to or taken by the platform makers from outside sources.

The idea that issues spring fresh from the brain of the candidate or his party is a mistaken one. The whole business is a process of adoption and adaptation, and there is no originality about it so far as the politicians are concerned.

The same thing is true of Congress and the state legis-

tures. Occasionally a member of these lawmaking bodies will himself originate a bill, but in at least 98 per cent. of the time the initiative comes from the outside and can be traced to some organization, association, class or body of men and women, or to some newspaper or individual constituent. This applies to small as well as big matters in the way of legislation, and to small as well as big issues in a political campaign.

Legislatures, Congress, city councils, and candidates are consistently and continuously on the defensive toward these multitudinous groups, classes, organizations, elements, and newspapers, and most of the time they act in response to pressure from these outside sources.

Every candidate for an elective office has in his district, city, county, state, or, in the case of a Presidential candidate, his country, many of these groups and one or more newspapers. Each of these groups and many of the newspapers are wedded to their own particular idea or issue. To them that issue is the vital one, and all others are relatively subordinate and trivial. The group mind is closed on that question, and, as a rule, it votes blindly for the candidates who are sympathetic to its view and just as blindly against those who are unsympathetic, regardless of the merits of the candidates, their character, records, and associations, and equally regardless of all other issues that may arise.

Some of these groups vote compactly—almost as a unit—when there is a clear-cut case of one man who is with them and another who is against. Some of them, of course, are more loosely tied together, and can be split up to a certain extent, affected to some degree by

other questions, prejudices, personalities, and party ties, but always their own particular interests or ideas have a tremendous effect upon their votes, and there is always the fear among candidates that they may vote solidly against them.

In some localities one group will predominate, and the candidate, while seeking votes and after election, too, is compelled to mould his attitude and actions so as to avoid alienating the friendship and support of this powerful body of voters, who hold over him the power of political life and death. In other localities another group will be in the ascendancy, numerous enough to hold the balance of power in elections, and candidates there are forced to favour the issue that binds this group together, and ally themselves publicly with it.

In still other cities and states there will be two or three really powerful groups, who clash head on over the same issue, and none of which can be classed as dominant. In these cases candidates and parties are forced to choose one side or the other. They cannot get the support of both. So one candidate comes out on one side and the other on the other, and they go to it.

Sometimes both candidates are sincere. Sometimes each is on the side favoured by his intelligence and conscience. But also there are times when each candidate, at bottom, believes in the other candidate's side and completely disbelieves, when he stops to think about it, in his own. This sounds pretty bad, but it is an actual fact, and it would be perfectly easy to cite cases in many cities and states throughout the country. It has also happened in Presidential campaigns.

What happens in these cases? Why, one of several

things—either the candidate goes through his campaign a conscious and deliberate humbug, or he hypnotizes himself into believing that, after all, his real convictions are not well founded, or he tries to keep his self-respect by telling himself that “the end justifies the means,” or he just stops thinking—halts his mental processes. Or he may be or become hardened and callous enough simply not to care. Whether he goes through the campaign under such conditions, suffering in his soul or without such suffering, depends, of course, upon the character and fibre of the man himself.

To a sensitive, intelligent, high-principled candidate it means wretchedness and loss of serenity. It pretty nearly spoils life for him and takes away all joy in his job after he lands it.

To the demagogue and to the candidate whose mental and moral machinery is geared for low speed, of course, it makes no difference at all. It does not affect his happiness in the least. All he is concerned about is getting elected—no matter how. One side means no more to him than the other, and he can change his convictions just as easily as he can change his clothes—and with less effort. There are a great many candidates like that. There is, however, a grade of candidate in between these two extremes—men who find some way of meeting the outside pressure on issues without complete loss of self-respect, but, even in these cases, there has to be some compromise with conscience, some “pussy-footing,” “trimming,” and evasion. The right thing, as the candidate really sees it, has got to be fitted into the expedient thing. It is either that or get out of the fight.

Occasionally there is a candidate who takes this view: "I have got to hold in during the campaign in order to be elected, but, after election, I will vote and speak exactly as I feel and believe."

A lot of them think they will act that way after election. A lot of them would like to—but few of them do, and the reasons are perfectly plain. In this country the term of all elective offices, except that of judge and of United States Senator, is so short that a candidate hardly gets on the job before he is obliged to think about his prospects for renomination—that is, if he has any desire to stay in office after the one term. That 99 per cent. of them do is a statement that will not be disputed by any well-posted person. In many cities and states the term of a mayor or a governor is two years. The longest term is four years, and these are exceptions.

Take the case of a candidate for Congress—suppose he is elected in November, 1923. As has already been mentioned, he does not take his seat until December, 1924—thirteen months later. He must be renominated the following September, nine months after he gets on the job. He finds after his election the same sort of pressure from the outside groups that was exerted during his campaign. The result is that he must in every vote and every act and speech have his political weather eye open to the danger of offending some element that may beat him in the next campaign. Consequently, he is under just as much restraint after election as before.

If he is one of the rare variety that, regardless of the clamour of the groups in his district, votes as he be-

lieves, he exposes himself to the fate of more than one good man in the 1920 election, who, after a period of fine and fearless service for several terms, were beaten in their districts because they voted against the soldiers' Bonus bill.

CHAPTER XLII

THE GROUPS, ELEMENTS, AND AGENCIES THAT FORCE ISSUES

ALL this insincerity and trickiness about issues, I repeat, is not to say that there are not some honest and sincere candidates who, in the main issue of their campaign, are 100 per cent. "on the level," who believe in what they say on this issue, heart and soul, and who would far rather be defeated than for a moment occupy a false position in reference to it or sound a single insincere note.

That is true, but campaigns in these days are not fought wholly on one issue. There may be one dominant issue upon which a candidate can be wholly earnest and honest, but these multitudinous groups in every community, about which I have been speaking, force a lot of side issues into every fight—and these cannot be ignored. They mean votes.

The situation is such that the honest and sincere candidate, who appeals to the people, say, for instance, because of his unquestioned sincerity for or against the League of Nations, and who hopes to win his fight because of his frankness and fearlessness and sincerity on that issue, finds that he is being pressed by the other groups as to his attitude on their issues.

These, to the candidate, are trivial and uninteresting.

He cares nothing about them. He knows they have no business in the campaign and that the vital thing is his issue—that if he is defeated on that issue a great cause is beaten and a whole policy fails or succeeds. Upon it may hang national, or even international, consequences of great moment. He may—in rare cases—consider victory for himself not the really big thing, but victory for the principle he advocates a tremendous thing. Yet he finds himself confronted with the bald fact that unless he placates in some way certain groups, concerned with things in which he either disbelieves or is uninformed or uninterested, he risks defeat for his cause, his party, and himself.

What is the answer? It is perfectly simple. Almost invariably he goes after that group vote, even if, to get it or to keep it from being swung solidly away from him, he has to say things and do things in which he does not in the least believe, or which he regards as humbug. There is no way out of it.

Again I say, this yardstick cannot be used in measuring all candidates. There are exceptions to all rules, and, occasionally, there are a candidate and a campaign free from buncombe on one side. Occasionally, there is a candidate who goes through a fight without shifting his foot—standing squarely for the things he believes and refusing to cater to any group. And, once in a while, he gets away with it—but not often. And, while it is true that sometimes there is complete sincerity on one side of the fight, no one I know has ever heard or known of complete sincerity on both sides.

Often the outside groups and newspapers are so powerful and work up “public sentiment” to such a

pitch that both candidates in a fight are forced on the same side on these group issues. That is the way it is in many districts with the wet and dry issue. When that is done it, of course, nullifies the power the group has as a solid voting block and enables the candidates to split it up on other questions and, perhaps, get the interest and attention of the individuals composing the group centred on what the candidates consider the vital issues.

I am not pretending to discuss the merits of these group issues. Some of them are good and worth while. Others are bad. There are two sides to all of them and there is always room for honest difference of opinion. The point is, not as to their merits, but that the militant political activity of most of them, or even their latent voting power when they are not politically active, makes fearlessness and frankness upon the part of the candidates who run for office so difficult as to be almost impossible.

The truth is that a very large proportion of candidates for all offices everywhere are in a perpetual state of fear. Most of them are frightened for fear that, inadvertently, they will make some "break" that will put them out of politics. And, of course, most of them stay scared that way after they are elected, because there is always the necessity of being renominated and re-elected. Once a candidate always a candidate!

Before going further it may be well to enumerate some of these groups, elements, organizations, and agencies, that originate ideas, force issues on parties, mould political platforms, and keep candidates for office in a perpetual sweat.

Here they are:

The Anti-Saloon League,
 The Association Against Prohibition,
 The American Farm Bureau,
 The newspapers,
 The National Civil Service Reform Association.
 Organized labour,
 The American Legion,
 The anti-soldier bonus element,
 The railroads,
 The Ku Klux Klan,
 The National Chamber of Commerce,
 The Nonpartisan League of Nations Association,
 The League of Women Voters.

These are merely the better known and stronger of the groups. There are many times this number, and they differ according to the locality. Almost every state has a distinctive group of one sort or another that makes local issues. Most of those given above make national issues, and the list is by no means a complete one.

There are in Washington, for instance, 145 separate and distinct headquarters, representing different groups or special interests of one sort or another. A large number of these represent special business interests who have representatives whose job it is to look out for their interests in Congress. In other words, they are plain, paid lobbyists, representing a certain class of manufacturers. Many of them, however, are headquarters of associations or bodies of one sort or another who do not represent special business interests, but are behind some idea or plan of a more or less abstract nature.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE "SPECIAL INTERESTS" AT WASHINGTON AND THEIR POWER

OF THE 145 different representatives of special interests and groups in Washington whose business not only is to exert pressure upon Senators and Representatives after election, but in one way or another get into the campaigns with their issues and ideas, there are about 60 who are really effective.

These have behind them sufficient voting or financial strength to compel consideration by candidates for elective office and by the holders of elective offices. From them and the forces back of them to a large extent come the issues in campaigns all over the country and from them originate many of the measures that engage the attention of legislative bodies—both national and state.

All of the groups and interests enumerated in the preceding chapter centre in Washington. That is the focal point.

They actively engage in state fights and apply pressure to the state legislatures, but it is in Washington that their full force is concentrated. Every conceivable idea and interest is represented there by a "legislative agent," whose job is either to put into legislative form the ideas indorsed by his group, or prevent inimical

ideas from getting into that form. The pressure from some of these groups never leaves the candidate. It starts with the announcement of his candidacy and it continues until his retirement from the political field. It is incessant and endless, and candidates, both before and after election, must give ear if they desire to survive politically.

In every state some of these groups and interests must be reckoned with by candidates. Some of them have back of them the power to swing many votes one way or the other. Others have the capacity and willingness to make large contributions to campaign funds, or to refrain from so contributing. And the successful candidate going into office finds himself under very real obligations to some group or some interest that has helped in a close contest. In most cases the voters do not know of this obligation.

Probably the most effective and formidable of these groups to-day is the American Farm Bureau Association. With more than a million dues-paying members, organized in every state, with more than 7,500 separate units, and a great central organization that functions efficiently, and with organs of publicity that reach every member, its power in campaigns, national and state, is enormous.

Organized labour, the prohibitionists, and the anti-prohibitionists adopt similar methods of bringing pressure for their legislative propositions, but none of them is as effectively organized for this sort of political warfare as are the farmers. The thing that makes this pressure count is the voting strength behind it. That

is what Senators and Representatives and all other elective officials fear. They must have votes to get elected, and after election they must face the voters again in order to hold their jobs.

In a smaller way the smaller groups and special interests apply the same sort of pressure. Also, in a smaller way, what is done in Washington is done in the state legislatures all over the country. It is the same game everywhere.

Of course, in Washington are centred the highest priced and ablest of the special-interest representatives.

All of the important legislative agents have personal friends among the Senators and Representatives. Some of them are worth many votes. A combination among them would almost dominate, but, while there are occasionally understandings, trades, and arrangements, the interests they represent are so widely different that they do not act together. Everybody is on his own.

They work with and watch closely the committees, and they are unquestionably the best posted group of men in the country on the legislative situation in Congress. No matter how intricate the tangle and confusion, there is never a moment when these men lose track of the particular bill in which they are interested.

A book could be written about these men—the way they work and what they accomplish. As a rule, they are able, intelligent, alert, and, in the main, high grade, with nothing sinister in their composition. They do not bribe members of Congress. Members of Congress, either in the Senate or the House, cannot be bought with money. There may be exceptions, but it is cer-

tainly true that the great bulk of them are above that sort of thing, and even if they were not, not many of these legislative agents would buy them. They are not that type at all.

That is not the way votes in Congress are gotten these days. Votes there are gotten now largely through fear. Senators and Congressmen fear to offend large and powerful interests or groups in their states, and their votes are largely moulded by their fear. They may have had financial assistance in their campaigns from these interests, or support from these groups, and feel under obligations to help them, or they may want financial assistance in their next fight and fear to offend groups that may damage them politically either by contributing money to the other side or by swinging votes against them.

What I am trying to show in all this is that men who run for office, both before election and afterward, are subjected to a persistent and unrelenting pressure from the groups and elements in their communities, which makes intelligent and independent conduct in office, and sincere and honest expression while seeking office, tremendously difficult—and really impossible except in isolated cases, and by men of extraordinary character and courage. And that type of man has to be lucky, either in the time and place of his fight, or in the conduct and character of his opponent, to “get by.”

It is the kind of pressure that keeps candidates continuously on the defensive, both while they are running and after they get in. It compels them to dodge and evade, forces them to be furtive and insincere.

CHAPTER XLIV

PRESSURE ON NATIONAL AND STATE CONVENTIONS BY OUTSIDE GROUPS

WHEN a candidate, in city, state, or nation, having made his preliminary campaign, of which the voters know nothing, finally steps from behind the screen and stands before the voters, he has got to have something more than his personal appearance and private or public record with which to appeal to them.

As I have explained, he does not, nor does his party, originate the ideas or issues in which the voters are interested. They have been initiated by the outside groups, agencies, or newspapers—and they are already, pretty live propositions, when he enters the field.

The candidate and his party try to do two things—first, reach out and get hold of the popular side of the most vital issue, and, second, avoid being manœuvred by the other side into an unpopular or unsound position on the less vital issues. This applies to all candidates, from President down, who have to face the voters.

In nearly every campaign and every locality there are issues on one side of which public sentiment is so overwhelmingly centred, that candidates of all parties promptly and without question adopt the same attitude. For instance, in overwhelmingly wet districts all candidates declare themselves wet and in dry districts they

are all dry. If in the district or state there is a divided sentiment on this subject, one candidate will be found on one side and one on the other, but where the sentiment is overwhelmingly dry or overwhelmingly wet they will both be found on the same side—and often they are sincerely on that side.

Anything like originality upon the part of candidates and parties in the framing of issues is extremely rare. The character and sentiment of the community help make the issues, and the candidates and parties adapt themselves to these issues as seems most expedient to them. The platforms in national campaigns, or in state campaigns, are framed with the idea of attracting as many voters as possible and alienating as few. The party managers warily watch the situation, and the platform-making becomes a competition between the parties as to which can say the things best calculated to win support from the bigger and more powerful groups without losing the support of others, such as the business and financial interests.

The result is that the platforms are largely meaningless, and are coming more and more to be recognized as such. Three years ago the Democratic and Republican national platforms were so much alike in all save one or two planks as to be almost a joke. Each national convention had been subjected to the same pressure from the same groups, which had sent delegations out to the convention cities to appear before the respective committees on resolutions. Among these groups were, of course, the organized labour representatives, the farmers, and the prohibitionists. There were, however, numerous others, and they all

had their hearing by the leaders and by the committees, and each party yielded to the pressure to the same degree.

The game is a comparatively easy one to play for the big groups. They practically have the parties in a position where they cannot refuse their demands, unless they are too extreme, or unless there is a counter group with popular strength enough to make it possible to ignore both. Under ordinary circumstances, the powerful groups get almost what they want out of the national conventions. The ability to play one party off against the other is the chief reason for this.

For instance, the Republican convention, which usually meets first, knows perfectly well that, if it refuses to insert a plank in its platform to meet, says, the wishes of the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Democratic convention, which meets the following week, will promptly take advantage of this failure, insert the farmer plank, and garner the very greatly desired support of the agricultural element.

And it works the other way, too—if the Republican convention, meeting first, inserts the farmer's plank, or the labour plank, or some other plank, as the result of pressure from some group, then the Democratic convention, meeting a week later, is afraid not to insert a similar plank for fear that the influence of this group will be swung solidly for the other side and against its candidates.

The net result is that the two party platforms are often absurdly alike. They differ upon such issues as the League of Nations or the tariff. There is always one question upon which they diverge and which is

fought out as the main issue. There has to be one, or there would be no justification for a party or a campaign, but the other planks of the platforms differ in wording only. The purpose of them is to render friendly every big group of prejudiced voters in the country so as to prevent them from flocking to the opposition.

It is such an obvious fact that these national platforms do not represent original thought or honest convictions, but are put together because of outside pressure and for reasons of expediency, that there is no room for argument about it. And what happens in national conventions in a smaller way happens in the state conventions.

In the state campaigns often the issues are made by the newspapers. A virile and aggressive newspaper will pick out some abuse in the state or city government, or lay its finger on some needed progressive idea, or make some political proposal such as the commission form of government, fewer elections, the abolition of useless offices, the extension of the merit system, reform of the judiciary, shorter ballot, abolition of racing, construction of good roads, Sunday baseball, daylight saving, a greater zoo, better pay for school teachers or policemen, or any of a multitude of similar things. Interviews will be got, editorials and cartoons printed, and the proposition made into a live question with a genuine public sentiment behind it. Along comes the candidate and his party and grabs it.

Probably, if there seems sentiment enough, both parties grab it. Sometimes the idea has been originated in the newspaper office. Sometimes the initiative

came from an outside group and the newspaper grabbed it first. That is a detail, but the fact is that in all campaigns everywhere that is the way most issues get to be issues. Occasionally the candidate will take hold of an issue so vigorously that, after a while, it will come to be his issue, and the people will come to believe that he himself originated it. And he will believe it, too. Sometimes the candidate, in grabbing such an issue, does so because he sincerely believes in it. Often he does not believe in it at all, or is wholly uninterested in it, but is forced to accept it because it is a sure bet, that if he does not the other side will, and then, where is he?

It all goes to show what I started out to show: that from the time a candidate conceives the idea of becoming a candidate until the day he is forced out of politics there is no chance for him to be wholly honest, frank, and natural with the voters. From start to finish, he humbugs them—sometimes consciously and deliberately, sometimes unconsciously and reluctantly, humbugging himself along with the rest; sometimes deceiving them only a little and on relatively trivial matters, and sometimes becoming a complete humbug and faker, wholly insincere on the big as well as the small things.

Political campaigns—most of them—are inherently insincere. It is a game of “frame-ups,” of hidden moves, of concealed and smothered convictions, of fake indignations and forced sympathies, of secret deals and, sometimes, sinister alliances, of sidestepping and evasion, of expediency and compromise. Try as he will, even the highest and best type of man who seeks votes for an elective office cannot wholly escape these

things, either before or after his election. Not until he is retired—and permanently—to private life can he completely throw off restraint and become wholly natural.

Once more, I repeat, it is not the fault of the candidates. Many of them are honest, courageous, and sincere, with a real desire for public service. The chief trouble is the utter impossibility of appealing squarely to the intelligence of the voters and getting an impartial verdict on merit. It simply cannot be done. The voters are not like that. Notoriously, most of them vote from prejudice and, as has been shown, a vast number of them are formed into groups, which, in every party campaign, are apt to hold the balance of power and the fate of the candidate and his cause in their prejudiced and often uninformed hands.

The insincerity of candidates and parties is a natural and inescapable result of such a condition.

What is to be done about it? Some one else may know, but I do not. It appears to me, as I have before said, to be part of the price we pay for universal suffrage

CHAPTER XLV

WHAT REALLY STIRS THE VOTERS

IN THE last chapter, and in some preceding ones, the fact was stressed that the overwhelming majority of the voters are swayed by their inherent prejudices and are impervious to argument and reason. It is perhaps worth while to discuss some of the things which affect them most strongly and some which surprisingly fail to do so at all. In the 1924 and 1928 Presidential campaigns certain facts concerning the popular reactions were made so much plainer than before that they have become recognized political axioms. For example in the Coolidge-Davis campaign there was a dual demonstration—first that “Prosperity absorbs all criticism”; and second, that the people do not under certain conditions react against or resent corruption. In that campaign the Democrats had a tremendous and unanswerable indictment against the party in power. A shocking series of governmental frauds had been exposed and a trail of crookedness involving Cabinet members, reaching to the very door of the White House itself, revealed. It was one of the most shameful party records in the history of the country. The exposure came early in the year of the Presidential election. There was every reason to believe the people would revolt. The Democrats were jubilant, the Republicans thoroughly alarmed. It had in the past been assumed that revealed corruption in

office meant party disaster. Yet long before the campaign ended it was clear that the people were neither deeply stirred nor really interested in the story of corruption. The Democrats drove home the facts and preached the doctrine of party responsibility. The Republicans deliberately and consistently ignored the charges. Theirs was a campaign of complete silence on the subject. The only way it was ever referred to by any Republican at all was to point out the personal honesty of their candidate for President, Mr. Coolidge. And that gentleman from start to finish went through the campaign without once mentioning the names of Doheny, Fall, Daugherty, Sinclair, or Forbes, without once remotely referring to the oil leases, the pending prosecution of the corruptionists, or the crimes against the government. He treated the whole rotten business, which had filled thousands of newspaper columns and was discussed daily by his Democratic opponent, as if it had never happened at all. He made a few platitudinous speeches, spoke favourably of the Bible, the Constitution, the Flag and Prosperity, but the most direct challenge, the most persistent demand for a statement, failed to bring from him so much as a word on the subject of governmental corruption such as had not been paralleled in half a century. It was a most remarkable performance, and the result—not merely an overwhelming election of the Republican Presidential candidate but a corresponding Republican sweep for both House and Senate—taught the students and the practitioners of politics some new rules and shed an illuminating light upon the electorate. It showed that, in a time of prosperity and complete employment such as then existed,

the issue of corruption against the party in power is not a winning one, even though proved up to the hilt. It showed that under such conditions the voters are too immersed in their own affairs and too well satisfied with conditions to want a change. Neither charges nor criticism stick when the country is prosperous and the vast bulk of the voters are employed at good wages. It is when work is slack and wages low that the reaction comes. In such times there is a general tendency of the voters to strike at the party in power, to blame their discomfort upon the administration. In such times the people are so ripe for political revolt that no concrete reason is needed for the revolution. In such times corruption in governmental office is a fatal political liability—but only in such times. The Coolidge-Davis campaign demonstrated that to the complete satisfaction of the practical political world. It had for many years been generally accepted that the American people would not tolerate proven crookedness in government, that they would instinctively revolt. There was a deeply rooted belief that “turn the rascals out” was a potent and irresistible slogan, provided there was unmistakable proof that they really were rascals. Practically everybody believes that any political party caught red-handed in corruption was certain to be swept out of power by popular resentment at the next election. The theory of party responsibility for personal guilt was generally considered sound. It is so considered no longer. In its place has come the generally accepted belief that “Prosperity absorbs all criticism.” The old idea that the general run of American voters—these emotional and largely unintelligent voters who make up the great bulk

of the electorate—are so inherently honest themselves that they spontaneously revolt against governmental and political corruption—has been pretty completely scrapped. In addition to the oil scandals of 1928, there were in various states between 1924 and 1928—states such as Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio—a series of corrupt exposures in political campaigns and public office that attracted national attention and were sensational in the extreme. Yet in these states the people showed no sign of resentment at the polls. In Pennsylvania they elected Vare, boss of the notorious Philadelphia machine, to the Senate, from which body he was three years later ejected on the facts brought out during the campaign. And actually his rejection seemed to strengthen his political hold rather than to weaken it. In Illinois it was revealed that a candidate for the Senate, holding the office of chairman of the Public Utilities Commission, had had his campaign financed to the extent of \$250,000 by a public utility magnate, the rates of whose companies the candidate had the power to regulate. Yet the people of Illinois elected him. He, too, was rejected by the Senate, ran again—this time for Congressman-at-large—and they elected him again.

In Indiana a succession of crimes among Republican officials led to the sending of a lot of them to the penitentiary. Yet the Republicans in that state triumphed over the Democrats at the following election. The doctrine of party responsibility was ignored and the politicians rearranged their views as to what influences affect the voters. It seemed fairly well proved that when times are good, work is plenty, and wages high they look upon corruption in politics with a curious degree of

tolerance and complacency. Under normal conditions there is a tendency among the voters to discount charges of corruption. They are rarely fully believed, generally looked upon as part of the political game, never fully understood. There have been some astonishing instances of men revealed as dishonest running for office immediately after the revelation as a "vindication"—and getting it.

The bitter truth is that the prejudice against corruption is not one that can be counted upon to sway the bulk of the voters—except when they are more or less discontented. With the sort and degree of prosperity with which the country was drenched during the six years following the death of Harding and the succession of Coolidge to the Presidency, only a relatively small proportion can be stirred into excitement or resentment. That was certainly proved by the developments in state and nation in the four years from 1924 to 1928.

It was in the 1928 campaign between Herbert Hoover and Alfred E. Smith that we were given the most striking and convincing demonstration of the prejudices that do stir them. In that fight, for the first time one of the two great parties nominated a Catholic for the Presidency. Immediately the religious issue was injected. It could not be kept out. The decent men and the decent press of both parties deplored it. They denounced it as un-American and unworthy. They insisted it had no place in the campaign. It was never discussed openly except by fanatics. Yet from start to finish it was there, underneath but unmistakable. It was of course a dreadful thing, particularly in a country one of the principal stones in the foundation of which was

religious freedom. Nevertheless it swayed a vast number of voters—probably more than any other thing in the whole campaign. Also it engendered a degree of bitterness that lasted long after the election and is still manifested in more than one state where party lines were torn to pieces and the voters greatly aroused.

The results of the voting were extraordinary. Mr. Hoover would almost certainly have been elected if his opponent had been a Protestant. Prosperity was still running high and the country is normally Republican and was then normally dry. But he would have got no such popular or electoral majority as he did—and particularly he would not have split the Solid South. That told the story more completely than anything else. This section, since the Civil War, had been unshakably Democratic. No Republican candidate for President had ever stood a chance there. No Republican effort was ever made there. No Republican money was ever spent there. The great racial prejudice against the Negro in politics had kept these states unswervingly in the Democratic column. For more than sixty years there had been no break in the South. It was the Democracy's stronghold. But in 1928 the break came. With the nomination of Smith it became immediately apparent that in the Southern States a condition different from that of any previous campaign existed. For the first time in the recollection of anyone the South was in revolt against the Democratic ticket. For the first time since Reconstruction days the Republicans were making a serious effort for a national ticket in a Southern state. The election-day result was that three of the heretofore immovable Democratic states—Virginia, North Car-

olina, and Florida—flopped emphatically over to the Republicans, the great state of Texas was saved for the Democrats by the narrowest margin, and in every Southern state the normal Democratic majorities shrank enormously.

It was an amazing evidence of the strength of the religious prejudice. It is true that the attitude of Smith on Prohibition and his long and conspicuous connection with Tammany greatly increased his unpopularity in the South (and in other sections, too), but the big, basic reason for the revolt against him was prejudice against his religion. No clear-headed student of politics doubts that for a moment. More completely than ever before the religious issue was proved the most deadly and dangerous possible in politics; the issue against which argument and reason are wholly ineffectual, infinitely stronger than the strongest party tie. The Hoover-Smith campaign and its results have given to the practical politician a clearer insight into the popular reactions than they ever had before. They know now what will stir them in a period of prosperity and what will not. They know now more definitely than before that the great bulk of the voters are swayed by their feelings not their thoughts; their hearts, not their heads, their appetites, and not their minds.

Aside from the religious issue, which stirs deeply rooted and inherited prejudices that have come down to us through the centuries, the sort of issue that most easily excites the voter to the point of jumping the party fence is one which has a more or less moral side and at the same time affects the personal conduct of the individual. Such an issue is Prohibition. Since the enact-

ment of the Eighteenth Amendment the people generally have not really been interested in anything else. It has in the past ten years been the one real question before them (the religious question was of course never openly up) that has swayed any considerable number of voters. The country has been divided between wets and dries, each side imbued with great bitterness toward the other, and neither susceptible of conversion. Such a question has, of course, done much—perhaps more than any other—to heighten the hypocrisy of candidates in dealing with the voters, to promote humbuggery, and to discourage candor and courage upon the part of those seeking office—and those holding office.

To sum up, it has been made too plain by the political happenings of the past six years to be disputed that, in a time of prosperity, the American voter as a whole cannot be got interested in any material issue and cannot be counted upon to react against corruption in politics or government to the point of expressing resentment at the polls. On the other hand it has been made equally clear that no matter how good times may be, a religious issue excites a large proportion of the electorate as nothing else can, and that more votes are changed by it than by any other. The only other subject capable of arousing them to a pitch where they swerve from their normal political allegiance is the sort which on one side seems a great moral issue, and on the other an unwarranted interference with the personal liberty of the individual—to wit, Prohibition. Aside from these two classes, if there is any other kind of question of public policy to which the voters respond when there is no general unemployment, it has not been discovered.

As has been said, when work is slack and there is widespread discontent due to economic conditions, then there is a different story. Then the disposition of the masses of the voters is to strike at the party in power. Any reason will furnish the excuse. Any criticism under those conditions will register. Actually they need no reason then. This has been the lesson of the last six years. The more thoughtful observers of the political game were convinced of it before. Practically everybody knows it now.

CHAPTER XLVI

LOBBYISTS BIG AND LITTLE

SINCE the chapter in this book concerning "special interests" and "legislative agents" was first written seven years ago, there have been some highly interesting developments in Washington along these lines that seem to make an additional discussion of lobbies and lobbying worth while. In 1929 the Senate appointed a Lobby Investigating Committee, of which Senator Caraway of Arkansas was chairman. The unprecedented savagery of the committee plus the sinister sound of the word "lobby" gave to its hearing a news value that neither the revelations nor the results seem to justify. The combination—Senate savagery and sinister suggestion—produced an incredible number of newspaper columns in every section of the country. That, however, is normal enough so far as news values are concerned. The newspaper yardstick is a curious one. Almost always it measures for the surface sensation rather than for the substance of things. This is not the fault of the newspapers, though it is customary to blame them. It is merely an accurate gauge of the capacity for interest and understanding of the so-called popular mind. One of the things the great rancid reading public particularly loves is a show—the bloodier the better. The Caraway Committee, with a sure first-page instinct, for a long time provided what amounted almost to a daily mas-

sacre. Its police-court methods, the insulting manners of its more active members, the browbeating and bulldozing of witnesses, the apparent assumption of congenital criminality in those who appeared before it, the constant intimation that men under oath were not telling the truth—all these things in the earlier days combined to furnish an exhibition unique in Senate investigations. Nothing quite as rough has been seen in Washington before.

These criticisms of the committee—they are neither overdrawn nor undeserved—should not, however, for a minute lead anyone to believe either that the witnesses with whom it dealt were all admirable and pure persons who without cause were badly treated and were entitled to sympathy; or that the work of the committee, despite its often unnecessary offensiveness, and its publicity plays, was not without very real benefit.

It would be a great mistake to think that either of these statements is true. In the first place while none of the witnesses was exactly of the criminal class, while none had violated any known law, and some were men of standing and character, yet a considerable proportion were cheap fakers and plain humbugs, the nearly nefarious nature of whose activities needed to be aired and whose equivocations and evasions richly merited the way they were "roughed." The trouble about the committee was that it did not always discriminate, and that it "rode" the righteous just as hard as it did those very obviously not to be so classed. Nevertheless, no clear-headed person will dispute the worth of the committee's public service. Without going into details its beneficial results can be summed up as follows:

First, it laid bare the unprecedented impropriety of a United States Senator who surreptitiously placed a tariff lobbyist on the Senate payroll and then sneaked him into the secret sessions of the Finance Committee. By its exposure and excoriation of Hiram Bingham of Connecticut, followed by a formal vote of Senate censure, the committee certainly strengthened the badly sagging ethical standards of the body to which it belonged, and prevented it from sinking to a new low level. It saved the self-respect of the Senate and heightened the dignity of membership, which was not so high. This was a service not only to the Senate but to the country, because the Senate is so vital a part of the government that its personnel, standards, and general behaviour mean something to all of us.

Second, more clearly than before the committee demonstrated the almost unbelievable stupidity of the big business men and bankers in dealing with public questions. It did this by showing the ridiculous ease with which shallow charlatans and fakers extract large sums of money from them for the exercise of an influence with persons of high position—an influence which they completely lack, with persons whom in many cases they know only by sight. The committee did a perfectly fine job in showing up the false pretenses of these gentry with whom Washington is thickly infested and in illustrating the utter uselessness, so far as the effect on Congress is concerned, of many of the organizations which maintain highly paid representatives with unlimited expense accounts at the capital. Also it was a splendid thing to tear the covers off the low game, from the playing of which every President has suffered

and from which there is no protection, of having a "personal friend" capitalize his friendship by accepting employment wholly based upon a supposed ability to "deliver" the White House.

Finally, I think the committee performed a considerable service in concentrating attention upon the extraordinary development of lobbying in this generation, the vast difference between the lobby of the past and the lobby of the present, and the amazing degree to which lobbyist activities have come to dictate legislative action in the country—not in a sinister sense but in one recognized as entirely legitimate and participated in by millions of people. Though entirely unofficial they have become a more powerful force in the government than the legislative branch itself.

To make this clear it is necessary to state a few "fundamental facts." To begin with there is practically no bill of any importance in Congress which does not financially help or financially hurt somebody, or in which some person or organization has not either a friendly or an unfriendly interest. This means of course that automatically somebody proceeds to work either for or against every pending measure not entirely trivial in character. This is natural, inevitable, and right; but those who do so at once become lobbyists no matter what their purpose or how pure their methods. There is no other word for such activity, which reaches back into the misty past and is certain to continue into the distant future. There is no way to abolish lobbies without interfering with the inherent right of men to advocate what they believe to be for the general or individual good, and to oppose what they deem bad. As to regula-

tion, that is another question. Beyond doubt there should be some form of regulation by which the fraudulent lobbies could be cleaned out and their game of extracting fees from the muddled-minded business men spiked—these business men who think there is something occult and mysterious about politics and politicians which makes it necessary to pay somebody with a “pull” when dealing with them. The great trouble is to find a way effectively to limit lobbying without overstepping the boundaries and clashing with the entirely legitimate prerogative of citizens to organize and agitate in the interests of ideas they cherish. No success has been achieved in the various states that have tried. So far as the law is concerned the great change in lobbying methods makes it exceedingly difficult to distinguish between the legitimate and the illegitimate. The old-time lobbyist dealt in the personal corruption of members of the legislative body. He bought and bribed them directly and indirectly. In the sixties of the last century, for example, many members of Congress accepted stock in the projected transcontinental railroads to which Congress was then engaged in granting subsidies. Much later than that there were members of the Senate and House who sold their votes for cash or stock tips, who permitted Washington lobbyists to lose to them large sums of money at poker, who accepted gifts of jewelry and stock.

Such methods of lobbying, however, went out of fashion long ago. They would to-day be not only ineffectual but stupid and dangerous. I doubt whether in this generation there have been half a dozen efforts to influence a vote in Congress through financial induce-

ment. I doubt whether there are to-day a dozen members of Congress susceptible to that sort of influence. As a matter of fact, since the early Harding times there has been no real smell of scandal about Washington and for years before that none. The big money days for the lobby and the lawyers who call themselves "legislative agents" to get away from the word are of the past in Washington. Probably the two juiciest lobbies Washington has ever seen were the lobby for securing the return to its original owners of the alien property, seized by us when we declared war on Germany, and the lobby to secure a reduction in the federal inheritance or estate tax rate. Many and fat fees were involved in these two enterprises, and an almost incredible number of persons had a financial stake in them. Both sprang directly or indirectly from the war, and the amount of money involved was very great, ran into hundreds of millions, and a small percentage of it amounted to several. So desperately anxious were the owners to get their property back that they were willing to pay almost anybody with a supposed influence to help. The slowness of the federal government to return the property, long after all excuse for delay had vanished, helped the lobby along, and the general idea that the pickings were big and fat was undoubtedly true. The reason the lobby for the reduction of the estate tax rate was so strong and well financed was that it was retroactive, which meant that a great many millions were involved in that bit of legislation. Whether or not the lobby in either of these cases accomplished a great deal is doubtful, but that the fees of the lobbyists ran to several millions is well established. In both

cases lawyers who were former members of House and Senate, who had the privilege of the floor, and were supposed to have a personal "drag" with their former colleagues, were employed. At any rate a lobby law could and should stop that particular lobby game. There is certainly something worse than bad taste in a former member of the Senate accepting a fee to influence Senate legislation and going on the floor to do it. The better type among them will not sell their services that way, but a great many do.

While, of course, the adjustment of income-tax cases still affords lucrative employment for the "fix-it" type of lawyer, that sort of thing does not constitute actual lobbying, and the two instances above given stand out as the most conspicuous of this generation. A huge lot of money was spent by those concerned. Many lawyers who "delivered" nothing and had nothing to "deliver" got thousands. It is, however, doubtful whether any money in either the alien property or the estate tax lobby found its way into the pockets of any member of Congress, except in the indirect form of dinner entertainment. The direct purchase is a thing of the past. The change in the methods of the lobbyist has kept pace with the times. As ex-Senator Thomas of Colorado not long ago declared, "The men who seek special favours in Congress to-day do not bribe. They rely almost exclusively upon the manipulation of public sentiment." In brief the prime weapon of the old time lobbyist was money; the prime weapon of the modern lobbyist is propaganda.

Propaganda in this country really started with the war. Before 1914 the word was infrequently used here

and not generally understood. To-day we float on a mighty flood of it that seems to mount higher and higher all the time. Washington is the great national propaganda centre. From there literally hundreds of organizations, societies, causes, parties, interests, leagues, associations, and federations have their bureaus and representatives. They constitute the great national lobby, and the combined output of propaganda is stupendous. Every one has its more or less elaborate and expensive publicity department (one press agent receives \$25,000 a year and has a \$15,000 assistant). A torrent of propaganda pours forth daily covering the desks of the newspaper correspondents, clogging the outgoing mails, and trickling in steady streams to all sections of the country. Propaganda is one of the most amazing and significant developments of the past decade. For instance, one organization through its Washington representatives last year, besides publishing a monthly magazine with a huge national distribution, prepared thirty-six special articles for other periodicals and issued 9,025 separate "releases" to newspapers. All of this of course is designed to manufacture and manipulate public sentiment. That has become the great national pastime—and millions play it. The stronger organizations such as the American Farm Bureau Federation (which at the moment is the most powerful and effective of all our national lobbies), the Anti-Saloon League, the Association Against Prohibition, the American Federation of Labour, do not rely solely upon propaganda to put their propositions over—they follow the propaganda up by entering actively into politics before election. They go into the local campaigns, support candidates who

favour their ideas, and present their issues directly to the voters. Through the power of organized minority they not infrequently hold the balance of power and can compel commitments from both parties before election. In other words they do their really effective lobbying before election in the several states and do not have to bother with persuading or winning over a member of Congress after election. They have him then. Either they were largely responsible for his election or they demonstrated in his state campaign sufficient strength not to be safely ignored. The Farm Bureau Federation as our most potent lobby is perhaps the best example of the effectiveness of organization and propaganda on a national scale. Its active head, Chester Gray, had a very rough time before the Lobby Committee, which "showed him up" pretty thoroughly. In a radio speech in 1930, Mr. William Hard, able Washington journalist, who had made a study of the Federation methods and results, had this to say:

"The American Farm Bureau Federation at the present moment claims to have within it and behind it more than one million dues-paying farmer members. It is at the very tap root of the present farmer-controlled coalition situation in the Senate. Out of this lobby originated in 1921 the agitation which produced at that time our first Congressional 'Farm Bloc.' The ensuing political process has been intimately and authoritatively described by Mr. O. M. Kile, a former official of the Farm Bureau Federation, in his book on the 'Farm Bureau Movement.' He says:

By May of 1921 both groups (the farm group in the Senate and the farm group in the House) were in good working order and were in constant conference with the Washington office of the American Farm Bureau Federation, which is their recognized clearing house for agricultural information. By the middle of June these agricultural "blocs" were in effective control. The Farm Bureau got practically everything it asked for. In rapid succession were passed the Capper-Tincher Grain Exchange Control Bill, the Packer Control Bill, the Federal Aid Road Bill, and the various farm-financing and crop-exporting bills.

"From that day to this," continued Mr. Hard, "the process thus started has known no pause. The American Farm Bureau Federation, in company with numerous other almost equally influential farm organizations here represented, as, for instance, the National Coöperative Milk Producers Federation, has marched steadily onward to greater power. Our recent important farm measures have not had their genuine origins in the minds of statesmen. They have not had their genuine origins in the minds of our political parties. They have sprung primarily from the brains and from the energies of our farm lobbies."

To a lesser extent what Mr. Hard says of the Farm Federation can be said of practically all the important lobby organizations in Washington. They all work along similar lines. It is a mere matter of degree. The profound central fact in this whole matter is that initiative, leadership, and creativeness in legislative ideas have passed in a considerable degree from our political parties and from our legislative bodies to organized economic or reformistic private groups. And while the

motives and aims of these groups are entirely legitimate, they often are represented at Washington by slick, shoddy fellows whose claim to close friendship with those in high places is false, and whose pretended influence is without substance. The Caraway Committee did a very good job in demonstrating this, though the demonstration at times was cruel. However, regardless of the character and calibre of many of the professional Washington lobbyists, the fact remains that in these days the lobby is no longer a mere parasitic appendage to government. It is one of the greatest, and sometimes one of the most beneficent, of the actual driving forces of government—and sometimes not.

CHAPTER XLVII

THIRD PARTIES

THOSE who have intelligently read the earlier chapters of this book ought to know without being told that this is essentially a two-party country, that our government is based on the two-party idea, and that the practical political difficulties in the way of the permanent establishment of a third party or the absorption of one or the other of the two great parties by a new party are actually insurmountable. It is easy enough to organize for a single campaign a new party and to put a third ticket in the field. That can be done in either state or nation—and has been done frequently. But when it comes to keeping the new party alive after the election, there just is no practical way of doing it. A generation or so ago it might have been done, but the nature and strength of the precinct organizations of the two big parties have become such now that they could not be duplicated; they leave no room for the growth of another organization. And without the precinct base there cannot be even a pretense of party permanency. Despite these facts, clearly comprehended by every practical politician, there is a never-ending discussion of new parties and third parties. The Democratic party, being the minority party, having elected a President only four times since the Civil War, and having suffered a series of crushing defeats since 1920, invariably figures in these

speculations as the party to be absorbed or be replaced. The idea is not in the least a sound one, though it is widely held and by a lot of people who should know better.

One of the easiest things in the world is to talk about the future. Nobody can check you up. If you deal with the past or the present things have got to click—but when you treat of the future, so long as you maintain a pretense of logic, the only limit to what you can get away with is your imagination. For example, in this matter of the Democratic party there are at the time of writing, as there usually are between Presidential elections, two distinct schools of prognosticators. The first predicts that with exactly one more defeat, which they say will be at the next election, the Democratic party, already fast disintegrating, will either completely disappear or be overshadowed by a new and more virile third party. The other is equally convinced that, so far from disintegrating, the Democratic party was never more vibrant, and is bound to win in the next election, triumphantly assuming control of the Government. Both of these schools of thought about the future contain a lot of very convincing fellows indeed, and they make out equally plausible cases. Those who think the party is about to blow up and away are largely composed of what for a better name we call political publicists. They express their views after every election in profound analytical pieces for the heavier magazines. The monthlies and weeklies break out in a regular quadrennial rash of such articles from them. On the other hand, the “We are going to win next time” boys are largely Democratic politicians or Democratic can-

didates or Democratic office-holders or Democratic payroll attachés. There is always a lot of them in Congress and around Washington, and very vocal indeed.

Now, while these two views are in complete conflict, and obviously both cannot be right, for all I can tell one or the other may be. But I do not think so: I think they are both wrong. Further, I think they are not only in conflict with each other but in conflict with the facts and figures. The political realities seem to me to disprove them both.

Let's take first the idea that the Democratic party is doomed and one more defeat will bury it. That is the favourite thesis of the post-election analyst. In my opinion it is without foundation. The reason the Democratic party will not die is not because of its imperishable principles and splendid traditions; or because it has an unbroken life line 130 years long; or because through five generations it has produced more influential and interesting figures than all the other parties combined; or because of its magnificent contributions to the upbuilding of the Republic, though that is what the standard Democratic orator will tell you. That is rhetoric—not reason. Except indirectly those things have nothing to do with the present virility of the party. Its traditions are moss-covered and forgotten; its great men and great deeds are recalled by the student of history, but in this fast-moving age they mean little or nothing to the country as a whole. As for principles I may as well admit now that if the Democratic party of to-day has a single distinctive principle or policy I don't know what it is. Nor have I heard of anyone who does. Those great, imperishable Democratic principles

promulgated by Thomas Jefferson, the founder of the party and for a generation its leader, long ago ceased to be merely Democratic principles and have become American principles to which all parties and all politicians profess devotion. But to-day—if to-day there is a belief or opinion concerning any public question in the country the possession of which stamps a man as a Democrat, I cannot think what it is. I make this admission the more freely as a Democrat because exactly the same thing can be said of the Republicans. In the 1928 campaign there was no essential difference between the two party platforms. Except for details they were identical. There was no plank in the Democratic platform upon which the Republican nominee could not have stood, not one in the Republican platform upon which a Democrat would have felt uncomfortable. It is true that the general disposition of the Democratic party still is more strongly to champion the common people and to oppose the special interests than the Republican. It is concerned more with the distribution of wealth than in the production. It is more nearly identified with the cause of the masses than with the classes. Democrats are perhaps less smug and hypocritical, more zealous for reform, more receptive to new ideas, more vigorous in their denunciation of corruption and incompetency, more liberal in their tendencies. But this is not because they are Democrats. This is not because of “principles.” This is because they are the minority party. These things are inherently characteristic of the minority parties. They are wholly logical and inevitable. The smaller the party and the slimmer its chance of success, the fuller it is of virtue, the more

vigorously it champions the down-trodden, the more loudly it proclaims the purity of its soul and the more violently it assails things as they are.

It is the party in power, the party with responsibility, the majority party that stands pat, covers up, points with pride, and strives to preserve the *status quo*. Naturally the minority party has more freedom of action. As that majestic man, Senator James Watson of Indiana, said some years ago, "It is harder to defend than to attack; easier to indict than to alibi." What I want to make clear in all this is that my contention that the Democratic party is indestructible—and I do so contend—is not based on any bosh about its principles. This belief of mine is, I think, much sounder for that very reason, sounder because it is founded upon practical political facts with which principles have nothing whatever to do. The Democratic party is composed of local combinations of politicians in each of the forty-eight states. It is in fact the only party with a completely national organization, the Republicans in some of the Southern States not being sufficiently organized to put up state candidates. In all the states the Democrats have virile and going state machines. In more than half, the Democratic machine is concededly stronger than the Republican machine—in New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Maryland, Missouri, Massachusetts, to say nothing of the thirteen states of the South, where the Democratic state machine is completely dominant and practically unopposed. In most of these states the Democrats are the majority party in state elections; in all of them—and some others—a virile, fighting force, usually dominant in state affairs. These Democratic

state units are the Democratic party just as the Republican state units are the Republican party. They are the essential foundation of any national party. Without them there cannot possibly be a party in a national sense. To found a party except on the state unit base is to build upon the sand. Any party not so based is nothing beyond a six months' hurrah that sinks out of sight right after the election. Those who think that it can be done are dreamers who know nothing of precinct politics. The interesting and significant thing is the almost complete independence of each state unit of every other state unit and the slender ties that unite them into a national party. In each state the men who run state politics under a party label and those who follow and officiate with them select a member of the national committee, which means very little, and once every four years choose delegates to a national convention. That is all there is to it. For the rest, the state units are primarily concerned with state politics, the election of state officials, and the preservation of their organization. With these things national principles and issues have nothing whatever to do. Upon these things the fate of the national party ticket in a Presidential election has no effect whatever. In 1930, less than two years after its most crushing Presidential defeat since the Civil War, more than half the forty-eight states have Democratic Governors—twenty-five to be exact. Nearly half have Democratic legislatures and in Congress the Democrats have thirty-nine members of the Senate, 165 of the House. As a result of the 1930 off-year elections in the fall, it is conceded, there will be many more Democrats in the House, several more in the Senate.

There is by no means a bad chance that the Democrats will gain control of the House in November. Always in the off year the pendulum swings back and the minority party, whichever it is, inevitably increases its representation.

In the face of these facts, to talk of the Democratic party disappearing or disintegrating or of a new party swallowing it up or taking its place, seems to me supremely ridiculous. The big point is that the Democratic party, based on its state units, is bound to survive as long as the state units survive, and the state units survive regardless of what happens to the party in national elections. Take New York for example. New York has gone overwhelmingly for every Republican Presidential candidate since 1916—for Hughes, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. Yet the Republicans have not been able to elect a Republican mayor of New York City or a Republican governor of the state for ten years. Take the state of Maryland. The defeat of the Democratic party in 1924 did not prevent the state from re-electing the Democratic Ritchie in 1926 by an unprecedented majority. The Democratic party nationally may go down to defeat again in 1932, 1936, and 1940. That would not prevent Maryland from electing Democratic governors, senators, and congressmen regularly in the off-year. It would not affect in the least the hold of the Democratic group on Maryland. None of the states where the people who play politics under the Democratic label are dominant or virile would be affected in the least. The state units would not be shaken. So utterly independent are they that they would not even be discouraged. And so long as the state units

survive and flourish, the party nationally survives and cannot be displaced. There just isn't any way to do it.

As to third parties, they are "the bunk." Essentially this is a two-party country. No third party can be built up into a going concern for more than one campaign except on the state-unit base. You can organize, as the late La Follette did in 1924, committees of followers in each state. You can establish headquarters and hold a national convention of informally selected delegates. You can name a national ticket and you can even carry a few states. But after the election you disappear because you have no state-unit base. And after the election the state units of the two old established parties are doing business in the states and you are not, and cannot. You have neither the money, nor the interest, nor the energy to carry on for four years. It would require an appalling lot of all three. The best and most convincing illustration of the futility of third-party movements and of the permanence of the two old parties was given in 1912 when Theodore Roosevelt bolted the Republicans and organized the Bull Moose or Progressive party. Every possible element for permanency seemed present. The new party had for its Presidential candidate a flaming leader with a great personal following. It was amply financed, well organized, and had issues galore, not the least of which was that Roosevelt had been robbed of the regular Republican nomination. In the election the new party carried eight states, while the Grand Old Republican party, which had been in unbroken power for sixteen years, was dreadfully beaten. Mr. Taft, its candidate, carried only two states, Utah and Vermont. Logically it would seem that the Re-

publican party would disappear and the Progressive party, which had shown far greater strength, take its place. Logically you would suppose that was bound to happen, and a good many people thought it would. But it didn't. On the contrary, four years later the Progressives had completely disappeared, and the Republican party reunited would have regained control of the Government but for an error of judgment its candidate, now Chief Justice of the United States, made in California. Four years later it did come back to power. Since 1912, no practical politician has taken any stock in third-party or new-party ideas except as one-campaign incidents. There was a third-party ticket in 1924 and there will probably be other third-party tickets in the future—but they will be with the idea of defeating the party in power at the polls, not to take its place in the country. It may be tried but it won't get beyond first base. The election in 1912 proved it cannot be done. It is all a question of state units. The roots of these in both the old parties are too deep to pull up, and there is no room or chance in the states for another to grow, except spasmodically and temporarily.

I think I have said enough—or rather I hope I have—to convince the reader that the first school of thought—the one which thinks that with one more or two more defeats the Democratic party will disintegrate, disappear, and another take its place—is wrong. Now let me turn to the other school—the one that thinks the Democrats are going to win next time. They may be right but it depends upon so many things. In the first place the Democrats are distinctly the minority party. There are approximately five million more Republicans in the

country than Democrats, which naturally means that in normal times, when the Republicans vote their ticket and the Democrats theirs, the Republicans are sure to win. The Democrats are particularly handicapped because so considerable a part of the Republican party in the pivotal states is immovable, unreachable, unpersuadable—to wit, the Negro vote. It is a simple statement of fact to say that a considerable number of Republican Presidents have been elected because of the solidarity of the Negro vote. Without it they would have been beaten. It is the basic party asset. New York, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, New Jersey, Connecticut, West Virginia, Missouri—without the Negro vote the Democrats would have carried these states in many a Presidential election. In my own little state of Maryland, where the total vote reaches only 400,000 the Republicans have 65,000 Negro ballots in the box before the Democrats can begin to count. It is that way in many another state. It is the great Democratic handicap—has been since the Civil War. It is no answer to say that it is offset by the fact that the inability of the Negroes to vote in the South keeps that section Democratic. I am not arguing about the right or the wrong of it. I am simply stating the facts. If the educational tests and poll taxes that discourage the Negro from voting in the South could have been applied in all the states, there would have been far fewer Republican Presidents. This might not be a Democratic country even then, but we would at least have an even break. As it is, there are only two ways for a Democrat to win the Presidency—either through the splitting of the Republican party as it was split in 1912, or by attracting a sufficient number

of white Republican voters to overcome their normal numerical Republican majority. There are no other ways.

About once a generation one or the other of these things happens. They occur for several reasons. After a long period of power, the majority party divides either on issues or personalities into factions that cannot be cemented during the campaign. Or business depression and acute economic distress create a wave of resentment against the administration. Or there appears on the other side that rare combination—a great leader with an irresistible issue. Soon or late the “break” will come. If it does not come in 1932, it will in some other year, and not too far distant either. Whether it comes early or not the Democratic party will survive—make no mistake as to that. It will last until the next break comes—and a good many breaks after that. At any rate in our time there will be no new party and no third party in this country, except as a temporary one-campaign feature.

CHAPTER XLVIII

WHITE HOUSE TECHNIQUE

THE idea that there is such a thing as Presidential technique, by which one President is able to "handle" Congress and another President not, is without foundation. It is a theory easy to set up and quite widely held, but there is nothing in it. The general belief is that a President who knows politics and is politically astute, suave, and friendly can get along very much better with Congress than the President who is not wise to the ways of the politicians and does not personally endear himself to House and Senate leaders. It is held that, to be successful with Congress, a President must be a politician. The facts do not bear out this theory, and it is not entertained by those whose experience covers a sufficient number of generations to justify a judgment. This is not to say that a President who stupidly and needlessly antagonized Congress, who went out of his way to make enemies and did everything in the wrong way, would get as cheerful coöperation or as complete as one who, under the same circumstances, had the asset of personal good feeling. He wouldn't, of course, but the point I am making is that the difference in results, except in isolated instances, would be trivial and that the vital factors in the White House relations with the legislative branch are neither the personality nor the political skill of the President. I do not mean to

sweep these up as altogether trivial, but merely to state that they are relatively so. For example, take the case of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. From the 6th of March until June 16th he had a most extraordinary success in the special session of Congress called by him immediately following his inauguration. It enacted by overwhelming vote a vast and complicated programme, practically remaking our governmental machine, extending Federal control over industry, agriculture, and finance, lodging in the hands of the President unprecedented powers, heading the nation in a direction no one dreamed we would take, and the end of which no one can guess. It was an astounding performance, amounting really to a social and economic revolution. Many of the measures passed shocked the orthodox ideas of the men who voted for them. Some did so in conflict with their convictions, privately asserting their disbelief in the wisdom or soundness of the administration proposals. Yet the opposition to even the most gigantic and radical of the Roosevelt bills was both feeble and futile. In three months' time he got everything he wanted from Congress in the way he wanted. That body not only swallowed blindly every White House dose, but actually abrogated its authority, among other things, over the national purse strings. Self-abnegation could no further go.

How was it done? How did Mr. Roosevelt achieve this amazing Congressional success? A good deal has been written about his personal charm and political astuteness. Certainly he has vastly more of both than his immediate predecessor, and there is a somewhat general disposition to attribute his results to that fact. The contrast is drawn between the smiling and somewhat arch

temperament of Mr. Roosevelt and the glum and politically inept Mr. Hoover. It is said there is a different atmosphere about the White House, and there certainly is. But anyone who thinks that what Mr. Roosevelt accomplished at this special session of Congress is a matter of atmosphere, or due to his winsome ways, is slightly soft in the head. The truth is that Mr. Roosevelt had, in those first three months of his administration, the ideal set-up for the successful handling of Congress—such a set-up as few of our thirty-two Presidents have had, such a set-up as would have enabled any President to do the same sort of thing. This will not be a palatable thought for the ardent Rooseveltians, who have been thrilled with the “action” at Washington and are convinced that we have now in the White House an inspired and irresistible leader, but it is none the less true. These will consider it an effort to disparage their hero or detract from credit due. It is nothing of the sort, and it is susceptible of proof.

What Mr. Roosevelt has had, and what has enabled him to put through a programme startling in its character and scope, with real resistance only from a few Democrats like Senator Glass, whose intellectual integrity compelled him to say publicly what a good many others said privately, can be listed as follows:

First, he has 65,000 Federal offices to distribute to a party twelve years out of power and very, very hungry.

Second, he had a party majority of regulars in both House and Senate so large as to preclude any balance-of-power group.

Third, he had a thoroughly scared country, which means a thoroughly scared Congress.

The last of these three assets is so vastly more weighty than the other two that it alone would suffice to make Congress amenable to the Presidential leadership. When to it is added the patronage and the party majorities, the White House equipment is complete. For the period the combination lasts, its force is overwhelming and opposition useless. So far as the patronage and party majorities are concerned, they are desirable and effective but not essential. There have been Presidents as personally engaging as Mr. Roosevelt and even more politically astute—Woodrow Wilson, for one—who, with both patronage and party majority, found themselves blocked, baffled, and bedeviled by a recalcitrant Congress. In the first six months of his term Mr. Wilson made a remarkable record in the handling of Congress, passed a great constructive programme, and was the undisputed leader of his party. He did not have a scared country, but he did have a public sentiment which, added to the patronage and party majority, made him potent during those early days, and in his second term a great war, which made him a practical dictator until peace came. There have been few more winning men, personally, than Mr. Wilson, but the great legislative achievements of his first administration and the supreme power voted to him after his second election were due neither to his personal nor political gifts, abundant as they were. He might have been five times as charming and twice as politically skillful and still not have achieved any results at all. What enabled Wilson to succeed in his first term was the prestige and public sentiment a newly elected President always has, plus patronage and a party majority. What gave him control in

his second term was the national crisis. There was no question of political finesse or Presidential technique. With the passing of the crisis, the exhaustion of the patronage, and the disappearance of his party majority which occurred in 1918, Mr. Wilson was completely powerless in Congress, just as every other President has been, just as Mr. Roosevelt will be when his crisis passes and his patronage has given out. The notion that Congress is swayed by the personality of the President and influenced by his adroitness at the political game is a joke. No one who knows Congress takes any stock in it. Members of the House and Senate do not follow a President because they like his looks, his manners, or his ways. They do not follow him because they are invited to dine at the White House or because the President calls them by their first names. They do not follow him because he grins or growls, slaps them on the back or kicks them in the pants. When, and if, they follow him, it is because it is to their personal political interest so to do and against that interest not to. There simply is no other reason. That is the whole story. Members of the House and Senate in the main are an exceedingly practical lot. The basic idea in the minds of these men is to hold onto the job they have or secure a better one. So far as most of them are concerned, that is the sole idea, and their every official act is with that end in view. Nine tenths of them will, promptly and without shame, "rise above principle" at any time or on any issue in order to insure personal political protection or promotion. The great bulk of them will always follow a President they hate if following him helps them in their individual districts or states, and without hesitation will desert or op-

pose a President for whom they cherish affection and esteem if desertion means votes at home.

This may seem a hard-boiled and cynical view to take of our so-called Washington statesmen, but not to those who know them. Personal political preservation is their first consideration. Against it party ties, platform pledges, principles, policies, and personal loyalties all give way. Things, big and little, are weighed by the individual Senator and Representative in terms of his local situation. There are, of course, a few exceptions, but they are rare, and the rule is well recognized. In face of these facts—and they are facts—to believe that there is such a thing as Presidential technique in the handling of Congress, and that a White House incumbent who smiles and jollies and “old boy’s” the “gang” and can talk precinct politics, gets better results, under the same conditions, than the grim, unattractive Executive, who does not know the political language, is to disregard the known character of the Congressional animal and ignore Presidential history and experience. It isn’t a question of temperament or technique. It isn’t a question of political skill or personal charm. It is a question of conditions. When the conditions are right, any President equipped with patronage, prestige, and party majorities succeeds with Congress in his first session. Every President, under those conditions, has a “honeymoon.” The Presidents who have no such periods are those who lack the party majorities and the prestige. Then they have trouble with Congress from the start, and it is attributed, generally and ignorantly, to lack of political skill or personal animosity. For example, Mr. Hoover. It is perfectly true that he was politically inept and had

no really effective political aides. It is also true that he was not popular with his party leaders in Congress and did not endear himself to the politicians on either side. But those were not the reasons his recommendations were rejected and he had to continuously fight and compromise to get anything at all. The reasons were entirely different. In the first place, succeeding a Republican President, he found every available Federal office already filled by a Republican and hence had no patronage with which to operate. In the second place, he at no time had a functioning party majority. Throughout his whole term the troupe of thirteen Progressives and anti-administration Republican Senators held the balance of power between the parties in that body and were able to frustrate any administration proposal.

The only period when Hoover had his way with Congress came in the first part of 1932, and then, alarmed at the state of the nation, Congress abandoned politics for a time and enacted a seven-point Hoover programme, the outstanding feature of which was the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Except for that, he was without weapons to compel compliance. Mr. Coolidge was in exactly the same situation, and though, because of the great prosperity of the country and his own popularity, his failures were less impressive than Hoover's, they were even more uniform and complete. Actually, I think, Mr. Coolidge was the most impotent President we ever had. Not only were his recommendations rejected and disregarded with such unanimity that it became ridiculous, but bill after bill was passed over his veto. Literally he got nothing. Yet he was considered a politically astute and successful President, and he certainly

was a popular one. His non-success with Congress was really phenomenal, owing not in the least to his lack of political strategy or technique, but entirely to the absence of any of the requisites for Congressional success. He did not have either Federal patronage, a party majority in both branches, or a scared country. That the unprecedented success of Mr. Roosevelt is due to the almost unprecedented combination of assets with which he started seems to me to be too clear to argue. It was, as I have said, the ideal set-up. The big thing he had was a scared country—and it was most thoroughly scared. When he took his oath, the national crisis was in its most acute form. The banks of the country had completely collapsed, and their closing by Presidential decree was automatic and inevitable. Business was flat on its back. Fear stalked through the land. Congress self-confessedly unable to cope with the situation, and awed out of its natural assertiveness by the public temper, looked to him for leadership. And when he supplied it, Congress followed—and most meekly. It swallowed the huge legislative doses prepared by the Roosevelt professors without stopping to examine the medicine or even consider the effect. The nature of the crisis and the character of the popular sentiment made this no time to debate or define, to amend or modify. Disgusted—and rightly so—with the stupidity, futility, and smallness of Congress, and badly frightened by the things that faced them, the people unmistakably wanted Mr. Roosevelt given a free hand and his plans not interfered with. And they did not care very much what those plans were or whether they understood them or not. The limit had been reached. The elevator was on the bottom. The

time when inertia and dawdling could be tolerated had gone by. With that feeling so plain and so general in the nation, Mr. Roosevelt needed no technique or finesse or personal charm or political astuteness to get what he wanted. Without that national frame of mind he might have exerted more of those qualities than he possesses and he never would have been able to secure from Congress consent to the huge proposals of the professors, nor induce it to abdicate its authority to the point where it has become a body of glorified recording clerks, perfunctorily registering White House decrees. It is no criticism of Mr. Roosevelt to say that, under the same circumstances, any other President would have had a similar success with Congress. It is simply a statement of facts. Other men in his position, of course, would have had other proposals. They might have been better than Mr. Roosevelt's or they might have been worse, but they would have been accepted with just as much alacrity and just as little opposition. Patronage and party majorities naturally help a President, but it is a genuinely frightened country, a real national crisis, a public in a panic, that gives a President real power and makes him irresistible. Under those conditions there will always be—as there was during the Roosevelt special session—under-cover resentment, a good deal of Senatorial grumbling, and some outspoken opposition. But there can be no effective resistance. To sum it all up, the point I make is that any President's success in the "handling" of Congress is exactly equal to the degree in which he possesses those three assets—Federal patronage, party majorities, and a scared country. It isn't a bad thing to have a scared country.

APPENDIX

In which are presented the facts about the vote, from its source in the state constitutions, to its final casting and counting.

There are also here given the wide and significant variations in registration requirements in different parts of the country, along with the way in which the foreign-born vote comes into being, and the modern methods by which the Negro is disfranchised in the South.

APPENDIX

CHAPTER I

THE SOURCE OF THE VOTE

THERE is a widespread belief in this country—at least among laymen—that the Constitution of the United States confers the right to vote upon its citizens.

This is a mistake. The Constitution does no such thing. It provides, in the Fifteenth Amendment, that there shall be no denial or abridgment of the right to vote “on account of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude.” It provides in the Nineteenth Amendment that there shall be no discrimination on account of sex. And that is all it does provide.

The Constitution plainly states that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,” but that is where it stops. It confers citizenship but not suffrage.

The right to vote comes from the state. It rests upon no Federal Constitutional guarantee and the Federal Constitution has nothing whatever to do with it. The principle upon which our whole political system is based is that the right to vote in the states comes from the states and that they alone possess the power to confer the franchise. So long as they do not give preference within their boundaries to one citizen over another for any of the reasons set out in those two amendments, the states may make whatever regulations or restrictions as to who shall vote, how, when, and where, that they please.

It would be possible, for instance, for any state so to amend its constitution as to provide that no one within the state should vote who was under eighty years old. Or it could provide that every voter must be able to sing "The Star Spangled Banner" from memory; or that every voter must pay taxes on \$1,000,000 worth of property; or it could provide that no one more than twenty-five years of age could vote; or that no one who smoked cigarettes or had red hair could vote.

These are, of course, absurdities. In these days no state indulges in such preposterous legislation. Ordinary common sense rules them out. Yet such a state constitution would not in any particular conflict with the national constitution, and the state would be completely within its rights in making even these ridiculous requirements.

There was a time, before the United States had a constitution, when some of the colonies went to lengths in the regulation of the vote almost as incredible as these. In Connecticut, for instance, the privilege of voting was withheld from those whose conduct was known to be "grossly scandalous." Rhode Island at one time denied the ballot to men not of a "sober and peaceful conversation." Some states barred Jews. Some barred Catholics, and South Carolina long made the open profession of Christianity a voting requirement. The time for that kind of thing has, of course, long gone by, but the right of the states to do as they will with the vote and the voter has never been surrendered.

It was most jealously guarded in the framing of the Constitution and it stands now almost as intact as it did then. The fact is that to this day the Constitution of the State of Vermont retains a provision making "good behaviour" a voting qualification, while that of Connecticut implicitly states that the voter must be of "good moral character." Both of these provisions are most liberally interpreted, not to say ignored, but they are there just the same and could be rigidly enforced if desired.

In plain words, the right to vote in a state is wholly in the hands of the state. It can be exercised only upon the terms

the state lays down, and these terms may be anything the state chooses, always provided there is no discrimination between citizens because of race, colour, sex, or previous condition of servitude. These are absolutely the only limitations.

The Federal Constitution does provide that those who vote for Senators and members of the House of Representatives shall have the same qualifications as are required of them to vote for members of their State Legislatures.

This has been construed by the Supreme Court as meaning that the right to vote for members of Congress has its origin in the Constitution and that the power of the states is to restrict that right in any way they please, not in conflict with the two amendments. This, however, is a technical distinction, and for all practical purposes the states confer the right to vote for Congress as well as for all other offices.

The idea is, of course, that no state should make any less rigid or more rigid requirement of the citizen when he votes for a federal officer than when he votes for a state officer. There has never been any inclination in any state to do either, and this particular constitutional provision has never, as far as I know, served any purpose. It does, however, along with the two amendments mentioned above, constitute the only reference in the whole Constitution to the subject of suffrage.

CHAPTER II

THE FIVE CLASSES THAT CANNOT VOTE

THEORETICALLY, the ballot has been placed in the hands of every citizen of the country twenty-one years old, male and female, white and black, rich and poor. Practically, it does not work out that way. Actually, there is no such thing as universal suffrage.

Every man and every woman has a perfectly equal chance to vote if they can, but not all of them can. While the states do not go to the extremes they once did in the restric-

tion of the vote, there are almost as many variations of voting requirements as there are states. The idea that the states permit every citizen or any citizen more than twenty-one years old to walk up to the polls and cast a ballot without qualifying effort on his part and without test on their part is just as wrong as is the idea that there is an inherent right to vote under the national Constitution.

The fact is that whether the citizen was born in the state in which he lives or born somewhere else; whether he has lived in it thirty years or five; whether he is a native or a naturalized American and whether he is an educated or an illiterate person, he is hedged about by voting requirements, rigid in some states, lax in others, but all designed to do two things—first, promote the orderly and honest conduct of elections, and, second, eliminate certain citizens who do not measure up to state standards.

In some states these standards are high; in some they are absurdly low, but the standards are there in all of them, and you must measure up to them if you are to vote. At the very highest they are simple and easy, but in every state there are some who cannot meet the requirements, and, accordingly, lose their votes. There are states in which this element forms a considerable portion of the population. There are others in which it is extremely small, but there is no state in which it does not exist.

Before dealing with the ways in which the states regulate the voting, it will be better to point out the classes of citizens who, regardless of the variations in state regulations, are deprived of the right to vote. These are:

First—Citizens of the District of Columbia. There are approximately 250,000 men and women twenty-one years old living there. None of them can vote. As they are not citizens of any state and as the state is the only source of suffrage, they are among the disfranchised.

Second—There are the felons—those persons who have been convicted of certain felonious crimes and have automatically lost their right to vote. Their only hope of a restoration of this right is through executive pardon.

Third—The feeble-minded and insane. As in the case of felons, all the states debar these from participation in elections. Even if the state laws did not prevent, the fact that most of them are confined in state or private institutions would keep them from the polls. Counting those who are in and those who are out, there are probably 1,000,000 of these two classes, criminal and insane, in the country.

Fourth—There are the soldiers, sailors, and marines of the United States Army and Navy. Some states disfranchise these by statute, but the great bulk of them are automatically ruled out because of the restricted nature of their calling and their lack of permanent voting residence. At this time, the combined services number approximately 250,000 enlisted men and officers. Some few of these have managed to preserve their vote, but the number is negligible.

Fifth—There are the Indians on the Government reservations. There are about 110,000 of these who have no suffrage rights. They are not regarded as citizens of the United States or of any state, but as wards of the Government. In states like North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin, however, where there are a number of civilized Indians not kept by the Government, they are expressly given the vote by state statute.

When you add these five classes together they constitute a considerable total of disfranchisement. I have presented them first because they happen to be only those which all the states disbar, with practical uniformity, but they are not a drop in the bucket compared to those two other great classes of citizens whose votes are lost. These are:

First—Those who are debarred from voting by reason of some special requirement of the individual state, or by reason of some special situation in their state.

Second—Those who debar themselves through inertia, indifference, and unwillingness to go through the simple routine necessary to cast their ballots.

When it is stated that the last census shows there are in

the United States more than 54,000,000 men and women more than twenty-one years old classed as citizens, and that of this number only 26,786,758 went to the polls at the Presidential election in 1920, the tremendous extent of this disfranchisement, both voluntary and involuntary, can be appreciated. These figures mean that nearly 28,000,000 men and women presumably qualified to vote did not vote. In other words, less than 50 per cent. of the citizens of the country took part in the election of a President of the United States.

Take out the District of Columbia, the felons, the feeble-minded and insane, the soldiers and sailors and Indians, and then eliminate the paupers, vagrants, delinquent taxpayers, and tramps debarred by some of the states, and it is still clear that the great bulk of those who do not vote are not those who cannot vote, but those who will not. This is true even when allowance is made for the many thousands of Negroes in the South who never go to the polls, the reason for which will be presented later.

This enormous number of voluntary non-voters constitutes a condition which many thinking men regard as the most vital political problem in America to-day.

Except under extraordinary and exciting conditions, the proportion of registered and qualified voters who regularly stay away from the polls is, on the average, more than one third of the total. This applies to all sections of the country and to all kinds of elections, from those for county clerk to those for President of the United States. The present trend is toward an increase in this proportion, and not a decrease. What these facts mean is that elections in the United States, as a rule, are decided by a minority of the qualified voters and not by a majority. There have been in the last few years, in such cities as St. Louis, Chicago, Buffalo, and Boston, local elections in which less than one fifth of the total vote has been cast. The seriousness of this situation, what it means politically and in the cost of the government to the taxpayers, is generally recognized by students of politics, but not at all by the average man and woman.

CHAPTER III

CRIMES THAT PREVENT VOTING

IN NO two of the forty-eight states of the Union are the requirements for voting identical.

What qualifies a voter in one state does not qualify him in others. In some states he has to be one thing, in others another. There is an almost complete lack of uniformity about the regulations. In some, the standards are extremely high; in others, extraordinarily low. In some states an utterly illiterate, ignorant, and impecunious person can meet successfully every test for the casting of his ballot. In others, unless he can read and write, satisfactorily answer certain searching questions, and has money enough to pay for the privilege, he cannot vote.

The more fundamental of the voting qualifications are contained in the constitutions of the states, but the bulk of the restrictions is in the registration laws and the form of the ballot.

In every state, registration is a necessary preliminary to voting. It is in the registration of the voters that the tests are chiefly applied. There is no such thing as an unregistered voter, and no matter in what state you live unless your name is recorded in the local registration books you cannot vote. This means that at certain intervals and on certain dates fixed by law the citizen must appear before local boards of registry sitting in his neighbourhood. Under oath he must satisfy these boards that he possess the qualifications laid down by his state.

If he adequately meets these tests his name and other personal facts about him, including his age, home address, occupation, place of birth, and length of residence in state and neighbourhood are written into the registration books. When that is done he is a fully qualified voter. On election day when he appears at the polls and gives his name it is checked off on the books and he is handed a ballot, which he

sometimes spoils in marking, so that it is not counted. That, however, is his own fault, and is due either to extreme stupidity or gross carelessness. If he is a duly registered voter he has his chance to vote—but not otherwise.

Except for some of the states of the far South, unquestionably Massachusetts has the highest voting standards and makes the most rigid requirements of all the states. Perhaps the bars are as low in Iowa and Kentucky as anywhere else. It would seem easier for a voter to comply with all the Iowa requirements than in any other state. Maryland is in between—a typical average state, with no educational test, property qualification, or poll tax, but with a form of ballot calculated to eliminate the extremely illiterate and certain peculiarities of its own that keep off the books a good many citizens who would qualify in almost any other state.

In Maryland a citizen in order to vote must have been a resident of the state at least one year prior to his registration and he must have lived in the Congressional or legislative district six months. He need, however, live in his ward or precinct only one day.

If he meets these residence requirements, is twenty-one years old and of sound mind, he is then entitled to register, provided he has not been convicted of one or more of the following “infamous” crimes:

Arson.

Bigamy.

Bribing or packing juries.

Evading tobacco inspection laws.

Burglary.

Burning wilfully any public building, church, or school-house.

Carnal knowledge of female child under 14 years of age.

Counterfeiting.

Embezzlement.

Larceny.

Incest.

Manslaughter.

Mayhem.

Murder.

Perjury.

Subornation of perjury.

Rape.

Robbery.

Sodomy.

Persons convicted of any of these offenses after they reach the age of twenty-one years cannot be registered in Maryland unless pardoned by the governor. Unless pardoned they cease to be citizens. Nearly all the other states have similar lists of disfranchisable crimes, although none of them are exactly the same.

I present the Maryland registration requirements because it is not possible to give the variations in all the states and the great majority are moulded fairly closely along the Maryland lines. It is really an average state—if the far South is excepted.

CHAPTER IV

REGISTRATION AND PRIMARY VARIATIONS IN THE STATES

IT IS an interesting fact that not a single one of the states absolutely duplicates another in the matter of registration requirements.

Fundamentally, they are all alike, and yet in detail they all differ. Among some these differences are trivial; among others they are distinctive and glaring, but the basis and the idea in all are the same. The differences in detail seem to reflect the different character of the people and the different community problems and conditions in the several sections. The lack of uniformity in this matter of registration of voters is one of the striking instances we have of the right of the states to govern themselves. What it means is that certain classes of citizens who can register and vote without difficulty in some parts of the country, for President and members of Congress, as well as for local and state officials, find themselves utterly unable to vote at all in other parts. And this

would be just as true if the states of the South were eliminated from consideration. For instance, there are certain classes of persons who vote readily enough in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, who could not, or would not, pass either the educational qualification or pay the poll tax in Massachusetts and some of the other New England States.

I have not attempted, of course, to give all the details of registration requirements. To go into these would mean a long and dry discussion of unimportant things. The aim of this book is to draw an accurate outline of politics and present the fundamental facts about the vote rather than make a minute analysis of election laws. What I have done is to set forth the tests applied by the Maryland law to the aspirant for suffrage.

In the main, these tests are typical of a majority of the other states, and any native or naturalized citizen of a state who meets them can have himself recorded as a qualified voter by appearing before the local board of registry. There is one of these boards in every election precinct in the city and district in the counties. It is not difficult to find them. Their exact location, with the days and hours when they are in session, are always conspicuously printed in the local newspapers. A small degree of intelligent initiative is required of the citizen to find out in what precinct he lives so that he may locate his own particular board of registry. And he must go to the board; it will not come to him.

There are one or two states, notably Pennsylvania, where in certain sections and under certain conditions registration is permitted by proxy plus an affidavit, and a personal appearance is not necessary. And there are some states, Ohio for instance, where it can be done by mail. This, however, is distinctly the exception and not the rule. Nearly everywhere the voter must himself appear and make oath to his answers.

But, after all, this matter of getting oneself registered is simple enough. It is neither a hardship nor an ordeal and is extremely easy to do. The complete process of registering a voter ordinarily consumes less than five minutes and it does

not—except in two or three states—have to be done annually. In a majority of the states there is a new registration every two years, but the trend is toward a longer interval, and, several states recently have amended their laws so as to have a general registration but once every four years. There are, of course, every year, supplemental days of registration on which voters who have come of age or become otherwise qualified since the last election may get their names on the list. Once on the registration books, the citizen is fully equipped to vote in the general election without further formality.

But the primaries are a different proposition. Their vital importance is not generally grasped. There is a strong and, unfortunately, growing tendency to leave the primaries to the politicians, to consider that it is not worth while to take part in them, that it is sufficient for the average voter to vote in the general election, where if he does not like his party candidates he can vote against them. A more short-sighted view could not be taken. As has been before stated, the plain fact is that the primaries are infinitely more important than the general election. Until this is understood by the average man and woman, politics will continue to be run by politicians for their own profit, which is merely a way of saying that they will run our governments, county, city, state and national, for their personal purposes. The reason the average citizen fails to see that this makes him pay the bill is that he is not clear-headed politically and lacks elementary political information.

There are various primary methods in the different states, but all except one—Rhode Island—hold primaries of some sort. Rhode Island, in this respect, is the most backward state in the Union. It has no legalized form of primaries, but delegates to its nominating conventions are selected at “town meetings.” This, of course, is a form of primary but a very bad and very archaic form. There is no other state in the country that has not progressed beyond that stage. In most of the states to-day, the primaries are completely legalized and are held, not under party auspices, but under

state control. The expenses are paid by the state and every legal safeguard that surrounds the general election is placed about the primaries.

Again, no state exactly duplicates any other state in its primary law, but the differences are largely unimportant and, in all the more progressive and advanced states, the procedure is simple and along similar lines. In the typical state, when the applicant for registration appears before his local board to qualify as a voter, among the questions asked of him is this—"To what party do you belong?" If you answer that you are a Democrat, Republican, Socialist, or Member of the Labour or the Prohibitionist party, you will be so recorded on the registration books. Or if you decline to state your party affiliation you will be recorded as "declined." However if you fail to register as a Democrat or as a Republican, you are completely and effectively debarred from voting in the primaries. Under the law none but registered Democrats may vote in the Democratic primaries and none but registered Republicans may vote in the Republican primaries. As these are the only two parties strong enough in any state except North Dakota, where the Non partisan movement has broken down the regular parties, and in Wisconsin, where the Socialists dominate politics in the cities—unless you affiliate with one or the other of them you cannot participate in any primary election, and you thus lose at least 50 per cent. of the effective value of your vote.

It is worth while repeating that nearly all candidates for all offices must be nominated before they can be elected, and it is in the primaries that they are nominated. In almost all cases, every man for whom you vote in the general election must first have been selected as a result of primaries. This is almost as true in the states where nominations are made by conventions as in those where the direct primary prevails. The latter are vastly in the majority. The only exception to this are the "independent" candidates, who are nominated by petition, but they are so infrequent and so uniformly unsuccessful that they do not affect the general situation.

There is no question but that the primary voter is doubly

as effective a political factor as the general election voter. In the first place, he has two strings to his bow, while the fellow who fails to vote in the primary has but one. In the second place, there being always a smaller number of voters in the primary than in the general election, the individual vote looms larger in the former and counts for more in the result. This, of course, is not true of the extreme Southern States, where the party situation is so one-sided that the primary brings the voters out in force to nominate candidates, while at the general election they dwindle to a negligible number because of the absence of anything like a real contest.

In 39 of the 48 states the direct primary system of making nominations is in effect. In 9 states nominations are made by conventions which meet after the primaries. Under the first plan, the party voters vote directly for the candidates in the primaries, and the candidate receiving the most votes automatically becomes the party nominee. Under the other plan, the voters do not vote directly for the candidates, but for delegates to party conventions, which later meet and select the nominees.

Maryland has the direct primary for the selection of all candidates in Baltimore City, but a modified form for the selection of gubernatorial and senatorial candidates. While the voters vote directly for the gubernatorial and senatorial candidates in the primaries, the candidate receiving the greatest popular vote does not automatically become the party nominee. A vote for a candidate is also a vote for delegates pledged to him from the particular county or legislative district where the vote is cast. To secure the nomination, he must have a majority of these delegates in the state convention that follows the primaries.

Under this compromise plan, it is conceivable that a candidate might get a popular majority in the state in the primaries, and yet, because of this "county unit" plan, as it is called, fail to get the nomination in the convention. The idea back of it was to prevent Baltimore City, where the majority of the voters live, from politically dominating the state. It is in effect in a number of other states.

In nearly all the states, where the nominations are made by the direct system, by a modified plan such as in Maryland, or by the conventions, those who participate in the Democratic primaries are limited to Democrats, and those who participate in the Republican primaries are limited to Republicans.

The outstanding exception to this rule is the State of Wisconsin. In that state they have what is known as the "open" primary system. Every registered voter may vote in the primaries, regardless of how he is registered, to what party he adheres, or whether he adheres to any party. When he appears at the polls he is given the primary ballots of all parties—Democrats, Republicans, and Socialists—bound together. In the booth he tears out and votes the ticket he prefers and deposits the others in the discard box. The party candidates receiving the highest vote automatically become the nominees of the parties.

Under this system there is, of course, nothing to prevent members of one party from voting for candidates of the other, and they do.

To a limited extent, this is also true in Missouri and in one or two other states. Unquestionably, thousands of Republican voters supported Senator James A. Reed, a Democrat, in the Missouri primaries of 1922. In Wisconsin the Republicans are the dominant party, and because of that fact and the strong appeal made by La Follette, thousands of Democrats regularly vote in the Republican primaries. In most of the states, however, that sort of thing is impossible and, as in Maryland, the law rigidly limits participation in party primaries to those voters who are registered as declared adherents of the party.

The big difference between the direct primary system and the convention system is that in the first case the voters vote directly for the candidates, while in the second they vote for delegates to the conventions, which then nominate the candidates. The results are the same, only the methods differ. The advantages of one method over the other are endlessly debated, but there is no intention here of discussing their merits. All I want to do is state the facts.

Independent candidates are required to get the signatures of a certain number of registered and resident voters to a petition asking that their names be placed on the ballot. When these signatures are secured the petition, along with the necessary deposit, is filed with the Board of Supervisors of Elections, and, under the law, the board must place the name on the ballot. In Baltimore, for instance, 1,500 names are required of an independent candidate for mayor and 500 for independent candidates for the City Council. In most cities the number of names is proportionately very much greater—and independent candidates are even less frequent.

In most of the states, the primaries of the two parties, while completely separated, are held at the same time, in the same place, and are conducted by the same judges of election as serve in the general election.

CHAPTER V

EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS AND POLL TAXES

It is a singular thing that, while the general scheme is the same, the constitutions of the states should so greatly vary on the subject of suffrage. The idea in all of them is, of course, identical—namely, to lay down the rules by which the people of the state can express their will at the polls. Yet, each state has found a manner all its own of doing this. There is not a single one of them that has failed in some way to express its individuality. They are as different as persons.

It is a striking picture of the real character of the country—an illuminating example of how tightly the American people may be knit together by a basic idea and a common purpose, and yet how markedly they differ on details and methods. These variations in all the states in the matter of regulating the vote, which is supposed to be the most prized attribute of citizenship, are, perhaps, the most force-

ful illustration we have of that principle of local self-government which lies at the very heart of our federal system.

How amazingly they vary in detail in spite of close adherence to every vital voting principle can be grasped when it is stated that in the simple matter of the length of residence required in state, district, ward, and precinct there is not a single state exactly like any other state. The periods necessary to live in the different states before registration stretch all the way from the three months of Maine to the two years of Alabama, Rhode Island, North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Virginia.

For the district, the time runs from twenty days in Michigan to one year in Mississippi, and in the ward and precinct the shortest time is the one day of Maryland, while the longest is one year in Mississippi. Kansas, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, and South Dakota are among the states requiring the briefest period of residence, but of them all Oregon is the least rigid in this respect. There you may register if you have lived in the state six months and no time at all is specified or required for residence in district or precinct.

But, after all, these time limits are the least important of the differences. The legal divergence is in the special qualifications and disqualifications which each state has laid down for its own citizens. In a number of states these consist of annual poll taxes that range all the way from the fifty cents in certain sections of Pennsylvania to the \$2.50 in Massachusetts. In others there are educational qualifications which require ability to read and write as a prerequisite for registration; in others there is a property qualification, which means that the voter must pay taxes on a certain amount of property—\$134 it is in Rhode Island—and in others there is a moral qualification, not strictly enforced, pretty generally ignored, but imbedded in the constitution just the same. In addition to all this nearly every state has barred from voting in its own particular domain certain classes in addition to the felons and insane barred by all.

As before stated, the highest voting standards are in

the far South, although Massachusetts is about as rigid as any. It is difficult to state where they are the lowest: probably in that great group of central western states. In the South the Negro problem has led to the erection of the highest bars to registration consistent with the Federal Constitution. Take Alabama, for instance. There the Constitution provides that the voter either must pay taxes on real or personal property or be able to read and write. In addition to one of these, he must have employment and have paid his poll tax of \$2 a year. Unquestionably the requirements are fewer and easier in the states of the Middle West and the Middle Northwest, such as Iowa, Kansas, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Nebraska, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, and Wisconsin, than they are in the South, New England, or the Far West.

It is a curious fact that the educational test, the property qualifications, and the poll tax should be confined to the states of the extreme East and Northeast, the Far South and the Far West, while conspicuously and completely absent from the whole of the great central area of the country.

The following, I think, will best tell the story:

States with education test: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, South Carolina, North Carolina, Washington, Wyoming,

The poll-tax states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, Texas, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia.

States with some sort of property qualification include: Oregon, Alabama, Louisiana, Rhode Island.

It will be seen that in none of these lists is there a single Central or Middle Western state. The plain deduction seems to be that the desire of the people in the Coast States to restrict voting to the intelligent and substantial classes is considerably stronger than in the interior. The natural pro-

tective reason for this is that these states are affected more closely by the tides of immigration than the others, and are, therefore, more deeply impressed with the desirability of keeping the vote out of the hands of the wholly illiterate and unworthy.

Of course, in the South the real answer is the dread of the Negro vote and the registration requirements are high largely because of the desire to make them impassable for the Negro. In California, Washington, and Oregon—all three Pacific Coast states—the Chinese-Japanese problem is to them much the same as the Negro problem in the South. They are filled with the same apprehension of “yellow domination” as the Southerner is of “black domination” and are as strongly imbued with the same deep-rooted determination to maintain at all costs in their states white political supremacy.

Certainly, however, there is not a trace of fear of either the black or the yellow vote in such states as New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts. It is necessary to search for some other reason for the higher voting standards of these states, and, in the absence of any other, it is reasonable to assume that the people of this section simply believe in restricting the vote to those citizens who have at least a certain degree of intelligence or some small stake in the community. No other conclusion seems possible.

It is almost generally supposed that all the Southern States have educational clauses in their constitutions, but that is a mistake. The following Southern States are without clauses of that kind: Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia.

Prior to the year 1890 there were only 3 states in the entire Union that had educational and intelligence tests provided for in their constitutions, while at the present time there are no less than 16 states that have such tests; and the belief in some well-posted quarters is that it is only a matter of time until all of the 48 states will have them.

The following are the literacy tests in the 16 states.

MAINE—The would-be voter must show that he is able to read and write the English language.

NEW HAMPSHIRE—He must be capable of writing and reading five printed lines of the State Constitution, unless he is sixty years of age, or physically unable to write.

MASSACHUSETTS—The registrars shall examine under oath an applicant for registration relative to his qualifications as a voter and shall (unless he had the right to vote in May, 1857) require him to write his name in the general register and to read in such manner as to show that he is neither prompted nor reading from memory. Registrars shall be provided with copies of sections of State Constitution printed on pasteboard slips, each containing five lines in double pica type, said slips to be placed in box and applicant required to draw one and read aloud in English the lines printed thereon, in full view and hearing of registrars. No person failing to read the Constitution as printed on slip shall be registered as a voter.

CONNECTICUT—Every white male citizen of the United States, who shall have attained the age of twenty-one years, and resided in state for one year, and in the town or county where he offers to vote, for six months, and shall sustain a good moral character, and be able to read any article of State Constitution, or any section of the statutes of the state, shall on taking such oath as may be required by law, be an elector.

DELAWARE—Must be able to read the State Constitution in English and to write his name.

VIRGINIA—A person able to read any section of State Constitution submitted to him by the officers of registration and to give a reasonable explanation of the same; or, if unable to read such section, must be able to understand and give a reasonable explanation thereof when read to him by the officers.

NORTH CAROLINA—Shall be able to read and write any section of State Constitution in English.

SOUTH CAROLINA—May vote if he can read and write any article of State Constitution.

GEORGIA—Allowed to vote if able to read and write a paragraph of the Federal Constitution.

ALABAMA—Those who can read and write any article of United States Constitution in English language.

MISSISSIPPI—Every elector must be capable of reading any section of State Constitution; or shall be able to understand the same when read to him, and give a reasonable interpretation thereof.

LOUISIANA—Shall be competent to read and write, and demonstrate such ability by making written application under oath for registration in either the English language or his mother tongue, which application shall be written, dated, and signed by him in presence of registration officers, without assistance from any person, or use of any memorandum.

OKLAHOMA—Must read and write any section of State Constitution.

ARIZONA—Must be capable of reading the State Constitution in English and of writing his name.

WYOMING—Must read State Constitution in English language.

CALIFORNIA—Shall be competent to read State Constitution in English and write his name.

CHAPTER VI

BALLOTS AND THE WAY THEY ARE SPOILED

IT OUGHT to be clear by now that this privilege of voting so freely conferred by the sovereign states has a good many strings tied to it.

As I have tried to show, in some states these strings are much tighter and stronger than in others. Unquestionably the character of the strings reflects the character of the people. It may seem at times that some of the safeguards with which the states surround the vote are irritating and unnecessary. Some of them, perhaps, are, but even a little reflection should convince any clear-headed person that such a thing as completely unrestricted universal suffrage, unregulated by registration laws and Constitutional qualifications,

would produce a condition of hopeless chaos and confusion, which would prevent an honest count, promote fraudulent voting, and render it impossible for the people ever to register accurately and fairly the will of the majority at the polls. It would create an unthinkable and intolerable situation.

The comparatively simple processes through which the citizen is required to go in order to qualify as a voter are concededly essential to the orderly and decent conduct of elections. The point I wish to make here, however, is that after he has gone through this routine necessary registration and has complied with the constitution, there is still another hurdle he has to take. When on election day he has been handed his ballot and shown the booth into which he retires, he has got to know how to mark the ballot to insure its being counted. Otherwise all his effort has been wasted and it would have been better had he never taken the trouble to register at all.

In every state, at every election, a good many ballots are thrown out because they have been improperly marked either through carelessness, ignorance of the exceedingly easy rules, or confusion over the arrangement and form of the ballot. This happens all over the country. There are amazingly few election precincts anywhere wholly free from it. A few years ago it used to amount to a great deal more than it does now, but even to-day, when the tendency of the law in every section is to interpret generously the intent of the voter and not hold him rigidly to the letter of the law, the number is considerable. Of course, because of the form of the ballot it is easier to vote in some states than in others, but no matter which form is used there are always some rejected ballots.

In this country there are really only three varieties of ballot:

First—There are states like Kentucky and Iowa, where the ballot is primarily designed to promote the voting of the straight party ticket. All of the candidates of a party are grouped together and there is printed at the head of the group the symbol or emblem of their party. A single cross mark opposite this emblem is a vote for all the candidates of that party. If a man desires to split his ticket

and vote independently he must pick out from each group the names he prefers and make his cross mark after each one.

Second—There are the states like Maryland, where the ballot is primarily designed to promote independent voting. On this ballot the candidates of all parties for each office are separately grouped. Opposite the name of each candidate is printed the name of the party to which he belongs, but there is nowhere on the ballot any party symbol or emblem and no square in which one mark can be used to vote for all party candidates. The voter is required to pick out of each group the candidate he prefers and make a cross mark opposite each name.

Third—There are the states like Massachusetts, which combine the features of both the other forms. The Massachusetts ballot is constructed on the Maryland plan, with all the candidates for a given office separately grouped, instead of the candidates for all offices being separately grouped by parties. There is, however, on the ballot space for the party symbol or emblem and a square in which the voter who desires to vote a straight party ticket can do so with a single cross mark. Thus, equal facilities are afforded for the independent voter and the party voter.

Now, no matter which of these forms of ballot is used there are always some ballots rejected in every election precinct. In some states, like Massachusetts, Alabama, and others in the South, the proportion is considerable. In New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, the number of ballots spoiled in one way or another by the voters on election day will run into many thousands. In Maryland an average of three votes to a precinct are regularly not counted because of some mistake on the part of the voter, and about the same percentage holds true in Missouri. Even in elections where there is a short ballot and the chances of mis-marking are minimized there are always a certain number of votes rejected in every state and in every election.

It is a great mistake to think that this spoiling of ballots is confined to the illiterate and ignorant voters, or even that

it is largely by them that it is done. The fact is that the proportion of rejected ballots is greater in those precincts supposed to be exclusively populated by the intelligent and prosperous than it is in the precincts of the poorer and presumably less enlightened classes. It has been a standing political joke in Maryland that an exceedingly well-known member of the faculty of Johns Hopkins University has not had his vote counted for years. Invariably he goes to the polls and carefully and accurately marks his ballot with his fountain pen. Invariably, it is rejected by the judges of election when they come to count.

The reason for this is simple enough. One of the aims of election laws in most of the states is to prevent bribery. With a secret ballot the only way in which a bribed voter can show he has "delivered the goods" is by making some distinguishing mark on his ballot. When, in the count, the party judge, who has been "tipped off" to look out for it, finds a ballot marked in some agreed-upon way, he knows the goods have been delivered and the bought voter has voted "right." The law in Maryland tries to prevent this sort of barter and sale by providing that any ballot containing any distinguishing mark other than a cross mark within the square or any ballot marked with anything except an indelible lead pencil, shall be thrown out.

The rules for marking the ballot in Maryland are very simple. I give the Maryland rules because they do not differ greatly from most of the others, and yet are as rigid as any.

First—It is necessary to use an indelible pencil and one is provided for the use of the voters in the booth. It is attached to a string. If by any chance it should be missing the thing to do is ask the judges of election for another, but the voter must not use one of his own or a fountain pen.

Second—No other mark other than cross marks should be made on the ballot. Any other distinguishing mark or a cross mark made with evident purpose to be distinguishing is construed as an attempt to identify the ballot and renders it invalid.

Third—The intersection of the cross mark should be wholly within the square and care should be taken not to make more cross marks than there are offices to fill.

That is all there is in Maryland and practically all there is in any state in the Union. It would seem easy enough to comply with these requirements. The most illiterate Negro in Southern Maryland can and is taught to do so, and yet men and women of more than average intelligence systematically spoil their ballots.

What they do is simple enough, too.

First—Many of them, like the Johns Hopkins professor, use their fountain pens or their own lead pencils.

Second—There is always one voter in every precinct who thinks his ballot is not legal unless he personally writes his own name on it, which, of course, causes it to be promptly thrown out.

Third—There are voters who feel impelled, after having properly and accurately marked the ballot, to write across its face some facetious, truculent, or profane message, such as "I am a good old Democrat," or "We will get a million majority," or "Hurrah for John Walter Smith," or "To hell with John Walter Smith," or "Brcening is a big slob," "Hill is a big bum." All of these sweet messages actually appeared on Baltimore ballots in a recent election.

Fourth—There are the very frequent voters who vote for too many candidates for each office—make too many cross marks on their ballot. It used to be that this mistake invalidated the whole ballot, but now if the ballot is marked for too many candidates for one office it is not counted for that office, but is counted for the other offices if they are properly marked.

Because of one or another of these reasons more than 3,000 persons in Maryland who qualify as voters regularly disfranchise themselves in every election. The same proportion holds true in other states, and I think it is fair to say that the number will reach a quarter of million voters every year, taking the country as a whole.

CHAPTER VII

DISHONESTY IN THE COUNT?

IN THE last chapter I dealt with the votes cast and not counted—the rejected ballots, spoiled in the marking.

Perhaps this is as good a place as any to discuss the votes cast and counted, to tell how the count is made and what takes place in the booth after the polls close on election day. It ought to be emphatically said that in the main the count is an honest count. This is true throughout the country as a whole.

I do not mean to say that there is no longer any cheating in elections or that there are not places where fraud is still practised, and where efforts to steal elections are not made. The millennium has not arrived, and there has not yet been devised any scheme of voting and counting that is 100 per cent. crook-proof.

What I do mean to say, however, is that, so far as the general election is concerned, the day of the dishonest count has passed; that the time when a candidate can be deprived of victory after the polls close has gone by; that such cheating as there is now is on a scale so small as to be negligible; that it occurs only in isolated instances and largely in sections remote from the big centres.

The old cry of the defeated candidate that he has been “robbed” in the count is no longer heard in this country. The defeated candidate has to-day and always will have plenty of cries, complaints, allegations, and alibis, but crookedness in the count is not often one of them.

The illegitimate use of money, the corruption of the electorate, and the direct buying of votes are the charges most frequently made to-day and very often they are well founded and susceptible of proof, but the old shout that the election was stolen has gone out of fashion. Occasionally, there will come a wail from a candidate that he has been “counted out,” but it is in the primary election, not the general election,

that it happens now. That is a somewhat different thing, as I will show later on.

The fact is, elections are honestly conducted in these days because there is no other way to conduct them. Cheating in the count is not only too difficult and too risky but the results are much too meagre to make it worth while. It is not that the politicians have become more moral but as a practical political proposition it is regarded as a sheer waste of time to monkey with the count. Not enough can be accomplished to justify the trouble and the chances of detection, accompanied by unpleasant and unprofitable results, are far too great.

No up-to-date political boss bothers about the count in the general election. So far as he is concerned, if the other side can get its ballots in the box it can have them accurately and fairly counted. Not only this, no matter how much they may be lacking in scruples, intelligent politicians of the modern type consider any attempt at dishonesty in the count as stupid stuff, crude work calculated to injure the party organization, bring disastrous discredit upon the party leadership, and get nowhere.

That is the chief thing with them—it gets nowhere. There are other tricks to which the unscrupulous may resort, more effective in these days than tinkering with the count. For instance, there still is considerable padding of the registration rolls and repeating in the larger cities, and there are all sorts of ways of keeping voters away from the polls.

In New York, Philadelphia, Chicago—and some other cities—little gangs of repeaters regularly go from polling place to polling place in certain sections of the city and vote half a dozen times.

The way this is done is this: through friendly acquaintance the ward or precinct leaders get on the registration books the names of a number of transient guests at the various hotels in their district. Sometimes these men are race-track followers, who come regularly during the fall and spring, but always get out of the state before election day. Sometimes they are travelling salesmen who regularly come to the city at intervals, but are most of the time on the road.

In all cases, they are men who have not the slightest interest in local politics and no intention of voting in the local elections. They register because they are asked to do so by political friends and because they like to help the game along.

The ward leader keeps a careful list of these names. On election day he checks up on the fact that they are out of the city and, having done that, it is a perfectly safe proposition to send his friends around to vote on their names. Not long ago I talked with a race-track man who told me he was registered in New York, Louisville, Baltimore, and New Orleans, but voted in Philadelphia, where he lives!

But the fact is that this sort of thing does not amount to a great deal. It can be done only in a limited area and with a limited number of persons. At most, it means a few hundred votes. Not once in fifty times is it possible to affect the result of an election in this way. Not only are the territory and the persons limited, but it is also necessary to select precincts for the repeaters where the judges of election on both sides are tolerant enough, in case of stupidity upon the part of the repeater, not to make a "holler." Altogether it is a lot of trouble and a lot of work, and the results are insignificant. Actually, it is "old stuff" and not generally done any more. The days when masses of repeaters could be sent all over a city and vote in squads dozens of times have long passed. Under present-day election and registration laws, the "check up" on the voter is made in so many different ways that anything like mass repeating is practically impossible. It is done now more to maintain a political tradition than anything else.

In certain precincts where the thing can be done with entire safety, the ward leader will give the names of a few persons, whom he knows will not vote, to certain hangers on and heelers whom he has to pay anyway. It keeps them employed and makes them happy! It is an absolute fact that there is a class of political tramp who is literally miserable on election day if he cannot vote more than once. These are the old-timers and they are fast dying out, but a few remain in every city in the country. They expect to do a little re-

peating at every election and they literally think the bottom has dropped out of politics if they cannot vote at least twice. For the last ten years, however, most of the cities of the country—even the largest of them—have been practically clean on this count and it has been a long while since any serious charge of wholesale repeating sufficient to change the result of an election has been made.

What repeating there is these days is largely confined to the primary elections and only a small part of it occurs in the general elections. It is safer, easier, and more effective in a primary fight. Then the two major party organizations are not antagonistically arrayed against each other as they are in the general election. The disposition of the machines in the primaries is to help each other rather than interfere. Also, fewer people vote in the primaries and the chances of detection are very much lessened. Notwithstanding these facts, there is so little to be gained by it that the whole art of repeating is dying out of political fashion.

The point I wish to make is that crooked counting in the general elections is extremely rare and that both that and effective repeating on a large scale are largely things of the past. There is a little of both, of course, but it is not general and not big. In the main, elections are clean and the count honest. This statement will be something of a shock to the reform element in various cities, who are accustomed to regard all elections as reeking with crookedness, but it will stand the test nevertheless. In these days, if a candidate can get his voters to the polls he can have their ballots counted, and it is not possible, except in rare instances, to work in enough "ringers" to overcome a real majority.

This holds good for the city of New York, where the powerful Tammany organization is notoriously adept at every trick of the trade. It also holds good for Chicago, where the machine is of the rough-and-ready type that balks at no method of "putting it over," and it is true even of Philadelphia, where the acme of crooked politics has been reached. Baltimore used to be one of the cities where elections were never on the level, but it has been a great many years since there has been

even so much as an intimation that a candidate had been counted out or that there was the slightest tampering with the ballots inside the booth. Perhaps the fact that about ten years ago two election judges were convicted of falsely counting in a Democratic primary and given penitentiary sentences has had something to do with the cleansing of the count. Since that time it has not been possible to get a judge of election to take a chance. Under the law there, and in a great many other cities, it is made exceedingly easy and inexpensive for a defeated candidate to have the ballot boxes reopened and to secure a recount. It used to be that the defeated candidate had to prove fraud before he could do this. Now, in many states, it is provided that the recount shall be made if the allegation of fraud is made within a certain number of days.

It will be noticed that in speaking of the rarity of repeating and crooked counting I made a distinction between the general election and the primaries. What is true in reference to both these things in the general election is not quite so true in the primary elections, and there are excellent reasons why this is so, some of which I have indicated in this chapter. Others will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

THE COUNT IN THE PRIMARIES

THE three things that have most contributed to a cleansing of the count are an aroused public opinion, bipartisan election boards, and election laws so amended as to facilitate a recount of the ballots when evidence of fraud is furnished.

There was a time when, in most of the states, it was the custom for the political party in power to hold a majority of the judges and clerks of each election board. In Democratic states there would be two Democratic and one Republican judge. In Republican states there would be two Republicans and one Democratic judge. Obviously, that

was a situation that invited crookedness. It was only necessary to "fix" the minority judge and any returns the majority judges agreed on could be made.

That period has passed. There is scarcely a state in the Union to-day in which the election boards that count the votes are not evenly divided between the two dominant parties. In most of them the machinery is along identical lines. A clear understanding of this machinery and the way it works is the most convincing possible evidence of the fairness of the count.

In by far the larger number of states, there is in every election precinct an election board, which is also the board of registry for that precinct or district. This board is composed of two Democratic judges, two Republican judges, one Democratic clerk and one Republican clerk. It is clear that to carry out a fraud in the count successfully it is necessary to secure collusion among six persons. One honest or even one non-complaisant official can not only prevent the fraud but can endanger the liberties of the other five. Everybody is at the mercy of everybody else and six are too many to trust. "Fixing" one man of the opposite party is not such a hard thing, but "fixing" three is another matter. There is always the very real danger that one of them will not stay "fixed."

In addition to the bipartisan nature of the boards, the laws in most states allow each candidate, if he desires, to have a challenger or watcher of his own selection inside the booth to watch the count after the polls close. There is also, in some cities a policeman on duty in every precinct who is required to stay in the booth until the returns are finally completed. These things would seem to make dishonesty in the count not only difficult but dangerous. The truth is, it is not done any more—in the general election.

The reasons this is not equally as true of the primaries are these:

First—Because in some states the same safeguards that surround the general election are not furnished for the primaries.

Second—Because the party machines are always far more vitally interested in the primaries than in the general election.

Third—Because there are always fewer votes cast in the primaries—except in the South—and, therefore, such votes as are “stolen” have a greater effect on the result.

Fourth—Because the two party machines, instead of being hostilely arrayed against each other as in the general election, are invariably and naturally sympathetic toward each other in the primaries. Hence, collusion is easier to obtain.

I present these reasons merely as statements of fact. These things are true, even in states where the primaries are surrounded by the same legal protection as is the general election, and where they are conducted by the same officials and in the same way.

Here is the situation: the primaries of both parties are held at the same time and in the same place. None but registered Democratic voters may vote in the Democratic primaries and none but registered Republicans may vote in the Republican primaries. The three Democratic officials handle the Democratic ballots and count them. The three Republican officials conduct the Republican primaries and make the Republican count. Under the law all six are supposed to watch both counts. Actually, the three Democrats count the Democratic ballots and the three Republicans count the Republican ballots.

If the three Democrats choose to cheat a Democratic candidate, what do the Republicans care? And if the three Republicans want to rob a Republican candidate, the Democrats wish them luck. There is no reason why they should interfere with each other. Except on election day, there is no hostility between them. The point is that in the primaries not only are the representatives of the two parties on a friendly instead of a hostile basis, but in order to “put something over” it is necessary to secure collusion among only three officials of the same party instead of six divided between two parties.

Clearly, cheating in the primaries is easier, less dangerous, and more worthwhile from the machine viewpoint than in the general election. Yet, as a matter of fact, it is neither frequently nor extensively done. There is still a little cheating in primary elections in every state. There is some, but there is no longer anywhere that wholesale robbery that formerly featured every primary contest. In these days, such cheating as there is is more apt to be in isolated county districts than in the cities. In nearly every state there is a county or two in which the dominant party always "doctors" the returns a little, at least in the primaries, but I do not know of any posted man who thinks that enough of this is done anywhere to affect results except under extraordinary circumstances.

Summing up, I think the count in the general election is about 99½ per cent. straight and in the primaries about 90 per cent. straight. One of the best indications that this is true is the almost complete absence of election contests in these days. Ten or fifteen years ago, every close election was contested by the losing side. Now, it is a rare thing for a defeated candidate to institute contest. In the last gubernatorial election in Maryland, the Republican candidate was defeated by a majority of 165 votes in a total of approximately 350,000, but there was at no time even a hint that the defeated candidate would make a contest, although it would have been a comparatively simple and inexpensive matter to have had a recount. The fact that as close a vote as that was accepted generally as being straight seems to be one of the best indications that ballots in these days are counted as cast.

CHAPTER IX

THE FOREIGN-BORN VOTERS

BEFORE we get away from the question of who can and who cannot vote, it is essential to explain two important

classes. One of these is the foreign-born citizen; the other is the non-voting Negro of the far South.

Take the foreign-born first—there are in the United States to-day more than 11,000,000 male and female white persons more than twenty-one years of age who were born in foreign countries. The figures of the 1920 United States census show the following:

Naturalized males	3,314,577
Naturalized females	2,893,785
Total	6,208,362
First papers, male	1,116,698
First papers, female	77,534
Total	1,194,232
Aliens, male	2,138,205
Aliens, female	2,226,712
Total	4,364,917

These statistics refer only to the foreign-born of voting age. It is plain that the 1,194,232 who took out their first papers in 1920 have obtained their second papers by this time, and must now be added to the total of the naturalized citizens, which brings that total up to 7,402,594. The clear deduction from these figures is that the foreign-born are becoming naturalized citizens in this country at the rate of 1,200,000 every two years, or about 600,000 of them every year. The shutting off of the full tide of immigration will, of course, greatly decrease this ratio.

Now, the natural question is: What is the process by which the alien becomes a citizen? It is a simple enough proposition. The bulk of the naturalization cases are handled by the United States Court, but the state courts also have the right.

The aspirant for citizenship is required to go to one of these courts and personally obtain from the clerk an application blank, and fill it out with the essential facts about himself, such as his name, age, place of birth, race, occupation,

and how, when, and why he came to this country. This application is placed on file and constitutes his "first papers." He cannot make this application until he is eighteen years of age. Two years must elapse before he can take out his second papers, and at that time he must have lived at least five continuous years in this country, and the last year in the state where he makes application.

The latter step is more elaborate than the former. When the aspirant appears to take out his second papers he must not only present affidavits from two credible citizens testifying to his character and qualifications, but must submit to an oral examination by the judge, the purpose of which is to ascertain whether he has a sufficiently clear conception of the government of the country and its institutions to justify admitting him to citizenship. The questions are not stereotyped. The judge may ask any he pleases, but in the main they are simple. Here are some typical ones:

Who is the President of the United States?
Who is the Governor of the state?
What body makes the laws for the nation?
What body makes the laws for the state?
What body makes the laws for the city?
Who is the Mayor?
How many United States Senators are there from each state?
How many Congressmen are there?
How many states in the Union?
How many members are there on the Supreme Court of the United States?
How are they chosen?
What are the duties of the Vice-President of the United States?
How often are Senators and Congressmen elected?
Who are the Senators from your State?

If his answers to questions like these satisfy the judge that he is fit for citizenship, a certificate of naturalization is then given him and he becomes a full-fledged citizen. If not, he is told to come back six months later when he has learned more.

In New York, where live almost one-sixth of all the foreign-born in the country and where approximately 110,000 of them are naturalized every year, the process is a tremendously

hurried one. It has to be. The haste with which it is necessary to handle the many thousands of aliens who annually apply in New York City is such as to rob the naturalization ceremony of all dignity and impressiveness. Sponsored and coached by precinct politicians connected either with Tammany or the Republican machine, they are put through the mill in droves, and numbers of them get by without more than a glimmering of what it is all about.

Naturalization does not automatically make a voter of an alien. It merely places him on the same basis as a citizen born in the United States and gives him the same chance to qualify as a voter under the state registration laws.

There is no way of knowing how many of the naturalized citizens of the country do thus qualify. It may be that more than half of them do, and it may be that less than half do. There are no figures to show. The foreign-born vote is heaviest in the Middle Atlantic states of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. There were, in 1920, 4,477,812 naturalized citizens in these three commonwealths, considerably more than one third of the total in the entire country.

It is least strong in the states of the South. In South Carolina, which has less than any other state, there were only 3,062 in the state two years ago, and they are naturalized there at the rate of about 110 a year. Outside of the three states mentioned, the foreign vote is heaviest in Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, California, Ohio, Minnesota, and Wisconsin—and they rank in the order named.

Until September, 1922, only unmarried foreign-born women were required to go through the process of naturalization just described, in order to become citizens of the United States. Women born out of the country who married either native-born or naturalized citizens, automatically became citizens. Since September, 1922, under an act of Congress, all foreign-born women, whether married or single, have to take exactly the same steps as foreign-born males to become citizens and qualify as voters.

CHAPTER X

THE DISFRANCHISEMENT OF THE NEGROES

Now we come to the Negroes. There are in the country, according to the census of 1920, 2,792,006 Negro men of voting age and 2,730,467 Negro women—a total of 5,522,473, all more than twenty-one years old.

Of this number, approximately 4,600,000 are concentrated in the following thirteen states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.

There are 131,991 Negroes, over twenty-one years of age, in Maryland and 73,447 in the District of Columbia. This leaves about 700,000 Negroes of voting age scattered about through the thirty-four states of the rest of the country, and nowhere sufficiently concentrated to be a big political factor. In fact, there are a number of states which have less than a thousand. These include Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, North and South Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, and Nevada.

It is an accepted fact that in the states where the vast bulk of the Negro strength is centred the Negro does not vote. In the other states he does, but in the South he has largely foregone even the attempt to do so. The number of Negroes registered in these thirteen states is so small as to be wholly negligible. For instance, New Orleans, with a Negro population practically the same as that of Baltimore—150,000—closed a recent registration with less than 300 Negroes on the books. Only 595 registered in the whole State of Louisiana. There are at present approximately 55,000 qualified and registered Negro voters in the state of Maryland. That makes plain the difference between two states with relatively the same Negro population, one of which has stopped the Negro from voting and the other of which has not.

Politically, the South has solved its Negro problem. As

an issue it is a thing of the past, and the white people have ceased to think about it. The Negro has been almost entirely eliminated from participation in the politics of nearly all the states where he is most numerous, and the curious thing is that not only is there no apparent resentment of this fact among the Negro population, but the average white person, not actively engaged in politics, is usually at a loss to tell you how it has been accomplished.

When you ask the question, nine times out of ten the answer is—"by means of amendments to the several state constitutions containing what is known as the 'grandfather clause'." Even some of our wisest and most seasoned political analysts in Washington, of whom I inquired, insisted that such was the fact. The "grandfather clause," they pointed out, provides that no one shall vote in these states who was not "entitled to vote, prior to 1864, or who is a descendant of such person." This, they say, completely bars out the Negro and that is all there is to it. Unquestionably, this is the prevailing belief throughout the country.

It is absolutely wrong. There is no such thing as a "grandfather clause" left in the constitution of any Southern State. Most of them automatically expired by limitation, but the last one was the Oklahoma amendment, which was knocked out by the Supreme Court decision four years ago. Since then there has been in no state constitution any provision in the slightest way discriminatory toward the Negro. There is to-day no legal restriction in any Southern State as to the right of the Negro to register and vote in the general election, that does not also apply with full force to the white man.

But the white man votes and the Negro does not—how, then, is it done? The answer is that a combination of reasons, entirely legal and constitutional, has created a situation which the Negro cannot politically survive. If not eliminated by one of these, he is by another. Against the combination he has hardly a chance, although a very small number of them do register—but fewer still vote.

I will enumerate these reasons in the order of their potency:

First—The “white” primary.

Second—The poll tax.

Third—The educational qualifications.

Fourth—The selfishness of white Republican leaders.

Fifth—The strength of white public sentiment against Negro participation.

Sixth—The habit of not voting.

Seventh—The futility of voting.

That is the combination and it works. The white primary, is, beyond comparison, the most effective in the list. The states cannot, of course, limit voting in the general election to whites. That would be in direct conflict with the Fifteenth Amendment. The states can, however, make what rules they please for their party primaries. The Federal Constitution does not apply there.

What they have done—these states like Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Alabama—is to provide that none but white voters may vote in primary elections, and, further, that no party not polling a certain proportion of the total vote in the general election shall hold primaries at all. As the Republican party does not poll anything like the proportion fixed, the Republican party cannot hold primaries and is compelled to place its candidates on the general election ticket by petition. Very often it does not take the trouble even to do that, and lets the whole thing go by default.

With the Negroes unregistered, the result in the general election is so inevitably Democratic that no one takes any interest in it and only a handful of votes are polled as a ratification of the selection of the Democratic primaries. Not only has the law forbidding any but whites to vote in the primaries a strong psychological effect in keeping the Negro away from the general election, but with his own party holding no primaries and the general election of no consequence at all, there is not the slightest inducement for him to register, and he does not try. He has lost the habit of voting. He is out of politics, because there is no place where, or time when, he can participate without complete futility.

The poll tax and the educational qualifications are features of registration laws in every Southern state. They exist, too, in some of the Northern and Far Western states. Unquestionably they present very great, although not insuperable obstacles to Negro registration, even if the Negro did not appreciate that, with a white primary law in effect, there is no worth-while place for him to cast his vote after he gets it.

The Negro has a great disinclination to pay for the privilege of voting. The imposition of a tax causes him to lose interest in the whole proposition. So far as the educational qualification is concerned, its administration is in the hands of the registration officials, who are white. They have large discretionary powers. They can make the test simple and easy for the whites and difficult for the blacks. Ordinarily, they let the few Negroes who apply for registration get by. The idea is not to keep all Negroes off the lists, but the power is there, through the educational test, to apply it so unfairly that the Negro cannot qualify and the white voter can, and there is no hesitation in the South in admitting that it would be so applied if the Negroes attempted to register in any considerable numbers.

These are the things that put him out of politics, but the thing that helps keep him out, as much as anything else, is the attitude of the white Republican politicians in these states. These men all hold Federal offices. They are not in politics for their health. They are in it solely and entirely for the federal patronage. It is a business with them. Distinctly it is not to their interest to build up a virile, fighting Republican party in these states. Such a party would develop competition for control and candidates for their jobs. Those are the last things they want.

They centre on the control of the delegations from their states to the Republican national conventions. Every four years their aim is to take to the national convention a hand-picked delegation from their states, which will gain them recognition as state leaders by the national leaders. In the event of the election of a Republican President, this means

that they—and they only—become the distributors of the federal plums in their states.

It is for this purpose that they work to keep the local Republican machinery closely in their hands. Under the circumstances it is easy to see why they are entirely satisfied to let the Democrats pass white primary laws without protest, and why they make no particular effort to induce the Negro to register. Things suit them as they are.

That about describes the situation in the South. Of course the basic fact down there is that there exists an overwhelming sentiment among the whites against Negro participation in politics and a fixed determination not to permit it. The Negro recognizes this sentiment and it, perhaps as much as anything else, has contributed to his loss of political interest.

The net result of it all is that approximately 4,000,000 Negroes in the South, who could easily vote in any of the great states in the Middle or Northwest, are completely disfranchised.

But, there is another side to this story of the Negro disfranchisement in the South, and that is the white disfranchisement with which it has been accompanied. In their determination to wipe the Negro out as a political factor in such a way that the Constitution of the United States could not be used to protect him, these states of the Far South had to put the bars up so high that many thousands of white voters in these states have been unable to get over them. The educational test, simple though it may be made in the hands of sympathetic registration officials, tends to eliminate the really illiterate whites, a certain number of which will be found in every Southern state, but the poll tax eliminates vastly many more. Coupled with these obstacles to registration is the fact that, there being practically no general election contest at all in any Southern state, the only fight of any sort being in the primaries, politics and elections generally are of less interest in the South than they are in the North. The result is that, outside of the professional politicians and organization forces, a smaller proportion of the people take an active interest in them. The figures

show that the white vote in the South has been dwindling for some years, and there has in some of the states been a shocking drop in the registration figures. These things, however, are by no means, in the judgment of the people of these states, too big a price to pay for having really solved the Negro political problem. From their viewpoint, no price would be too big for that.

CHAPTER XI

THE NECESSITY FOR PARTY MACHINES—THEIR GOOD AND BAD SIDES

THE place has now been reached in this narrative where all that is left is to speak in general terms of the political organizations or machines which have in preceding chapters been described in detail.

The question of who can and who cannot vote and why they cannot has been dealt with. The source of the vote has been shown, the restrictions with which it is hedged about in different sections of the country explained, and the classes of citizens who for one reason or another are disfranchised, pointed out. All these things are necessary facts, but elementary. The average voter has, at least, a considerable part of this information stored away in his head, even though he may be vague and uncertain about a lot of it. But it is the clear understanding of the political machine that is generally lacking and this is the vital thing. Lack of an accurate and clear conception of the party machine, its factors and functions, its methods and scope, means hopeless and helpless political bewilderment. The voter who has not that has nothing upon which to base political knowledge and can acquire none that is sound or worthwhile. He is like a small child in the dark.

It is literally amazing how extremely little the average man and woman who votes knows about these things and how completely they fail to grasp the vital importance of knowing about them. Even among some of those who are themselves

cogs in the wheels, there are confusion of thought and ignorance of the realities of the thing of which they form part.

The general idea of a political organization is that it is a sinister and somewhat secret association of men who run politics, live by graft, and are headed by a boss who is a very vicious fellow indeed. As to how the machine operates, who belong to it, how they get in, what they get out of it, what they do, how they do it, what are its uses, what are its effects, what power it possesses, and where are its vulnerable spots, they have only the haziest notion.

The truth is that political organizations are absolutely essential to the conduct of the government—city, state, or national. This is a government by parties. Parties can no more be held together and made to function without organization than any great business can be run without organization. Without organization there would be no parties. Without parties there would be no government.

In every great corporation there is a machine and there is a boss. Without them they could not operate. The parallel between business machines and bosses and political machines and bosses is so close that often it is not possible to point out a difference. As with the political machine, the boss of the corporation machine is very often not the official operating head, but an apparent unofficial outsider. In many railroads it is not the president of the company who is the ultimate boss, but some great banker with an office in New York. The same is true with gas companies, telephone companies, trust companies, newspapers, businesses of all sorts. In every city and state there are numerous instances where these corporations are bossed from the outside, and the official head of the concern is the operating head but not the policy determiner nor the man with the last word. But whether the real boss is the official operating head or an unofficial outsider, a machine is inevitable and essential. And a machine, political, business, or social, does not run without a boss.

If political machines are bad, it is because the people permit them to be bad; but, good or bad, they are necessary. If the party organizations were suddenly swept out of exist-

ence, we would have a period of chaos and disorder—mob rule, bordering on anarchy—until a new machine was built up, as it inevitably would be. The system is full of abuses, but until a better one is devised—and so far there has been not so much as a single feasible suggestion along this line—we will have to hold on to it.

The party machines are not run upon efficient business lines like the corporation machines. The reason for this is that the voters and taxpayers, who compose the stockholders of the governments, city, state, and national, do not take the active interest in the efficient and economical administration of the public corporation that the stockholders of the private corporations do. Bad management by a business machine, with its consequent loss of dividends, arouses the private stockholder to instant interest and action. But bad management by political machines, with its consequent increase in taxes and higher assessments, arouses resentment and denunciation, but rarely stirs to effective action. They are exactly alike in their structural plan—these two classes of machines—but wholly different in the character of their operations.

The political machine makes for waste, extravagance, and inefficiency in the public service. It adds terribly to the taxpayers' burden. Its primary purpose is to get jobs, and in the pursuit of this it enormously swells the public payrolls. It breeds up a class of professionals who cost the country dear, and there is a long train of evil and undesirable things in its wake.

But there is another side to the picture. In every community its excesses are exactly equal to the tolerance of the people. They have always the power to smash the machine and clean house whenever they become sufficiently aroused to use it. They may have a good or a bad machine in exact proportion to the energy of their desire, but a machine they must have. It stands in all the great cities as a buffer between ignorance and helplessness on the one side and the red tape of the government on the other hand. It helps the poor, guides the ignorant, rescues the unfortunate, lightens the penalty for the sinful, and straightens out the bewildered.

There is no use talking about things as they ought to be or as we would like to have them. The thing to do is to look squarely at them as they are. The consensus of opinion among men who have studied and written on this subject is that party organizations are inescapable, should be accepted, and that, bad as they are, they probably avert things infinitely worse.

We are, perhaps, in a transition stage of political evolution. There may come a time when a workable substitute for the party machine will be found or a way devised for curing its ills and at the same time retaining its benefits, but that time is not yet, nor is it even dimly in sight.

When you add to these statements the fact that the country is very largely ruled and run by the party organizations, the sensible thing for the average voter would seem to be to acquire all the information about them he can.

There is no mystery about party organizations. They are simply constructed, loosely held together, and powerful only in proportion to the inertia and indifference of the voters. Under existing conditions this means that they are very powerful, indeed.

That the men and women who, through inherited or natural desire, or through selfish interest or ambition, go into politics should form an organization is wholly human and natural. The habit of men to organize dates back to those distant days when human beings first began, for purposes of protection, to congregate in bands. It was then the first politicians appeared, the first primitive political machines were formed, the first boss, in the person of the chief of the tribe, developed.

These things marked the beginnings of governments and the starting of civilization on its way. Human society is organized society, and without organization there can be no advancement along any line. Political organization is as inherently sound and essential as any other form of organization. Only its excesses and abuses are bad, not the thing itself.

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